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ABSTRACT

This dissertation is a history of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. Passed by Congress in 1971, it set the national suffrage age at
eighteen for all state and federal elections. It remains the last federal amendment
to broaden voting rights and the most quickly ratified amendment to the
Constitution. Those few scholars who have written about the 18-vote law uniformly
explain that it emerged as recompense for patriotic duty; i.e. if teenagers were old
enough to fight for America in Vietnam, they were also old enough to vote in U.S.
elections. This dissertation agrees that young Americans certainly deserved
enfranchisement. It argues, however, that youth earned suffrage not as a reward
for their public service but in recognition of their personal aptitude and political
gumption. Beginning during World War II, federal lawmakers offered legislation to
set eighteen as the national age of enfranchisement. In the 1960s, public support
for the 18-vote swelled as young people challenged authoritarian institutions and
orthodox values. Creative legislative maneuvering by a small group of dedicated
congressmen managed to extend suffrage to 18-year-olds through an amendment to
the Voting Rights Act of 1970. They steered the rider through a skeptical Congress
by persuading their colleagues that adolescents were capable of mature deliberation
and beneficial civic involvement. In an era when generational revolution appeared

ii

a real possibility, many legislators believed formally melding youths into the
electoral fold would be a tenable way to sustain sociopolitical order. However, other
lawmakers thought establishing youth suffrage via statute violated the
Constitution. In 1970, the Supreme Court ruled in Oregon v. Mitchell that
Congress could only regulate voting ages in federal elections and not for state or
local polls. Congress reversed the Court’s decision by passing the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment. After nearly thirty years of gestation, the 18-vote measure sailed
through the Article V ratification process in record time – a mere 100 days – to
become law in July 1971. Passage of the amendment induced state governments to
lower the basic age of legal majority to eighteen for most ventures.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age
or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State
on account of age.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
Twenty-Sixth Amendment1

On 1 July 1971, the headline of the New York Times, America’s paper of
record, blared in bold, thick print the thrilling end to a remarkable legal fracas: the
Supreme Court declared the Times could resume publishing the top-secret Pentagon
Papers. The Court’s ruling halted the first ever attempt by the federal government
to restrain the publication of a newspaper in American history. The Times
justifiably trumpeted the decision and the paper’s role in defending a free press.
The other front-page news fit to print that day received more modest coverage.
Below the fold, tucked between stories about political bribery in New Orleans and
military pay raises, the Times conveyed the approval of a twenty-sixth amendment
to the United States Constitution.2 The Times had not, of course, overlooked the

The words of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment can be readily found in any source that
contains the text of the United States Constitution. The amendment appears officially in 85 Stat.
825.
2 R.W. Apple, Jr., “The States Ratify Full Vote at 18,” New York Times, 1 July 1971, p. 1.
1

1

amendment, but it appeared overshadowed by the sensational splash of the
Pentagon Papers ruling. The Times’s plain reporting of what would typically be
historic news – the most quickly ratified of all the federal amendments – made
passage of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment appear underwhelming. The ordinary
coverage of its ratification accurately encapsulated the public’s relative indifference
to its enactment yet ignored the remarkable circumstances that led to its
establishment of eighteen as America’s uniform voting age.3
The debate over reducing the national voting age from 21 to 18 began quietly
during the Civil War. It ebbed thereafter until it captured the public’s attention
during World War II. Between 1942 and 1970, congressmen filed hundreds of bills
calling for a lowered voting age; in 1969 alone, over 60 resolutions were introduced.
Only one, in 1954, resulted in any action, and it failed to pass the Senate. Despite
public support from presidents Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, Lyndon
Johnson, and Richard Nixon, efforts to establish a federal suffrage age remained
stalled. A handful of states, however, moved to lower their official voting ages,

The article contains an error made in the process of trying to complete the story by deadline. Apple
reported that Ohio became the last state necessary to ratify the Twenty-Sixth Amendment when its
legislature approved the proposal on 30 June 1971. Ratification of the amendment was actually
completed when North Carolina’s legislature voted its approval early on 1 July, just before
Oklahoma endorsed it. The Administrator of the General Services Administration (the person duly
charged with officially validating alterations to the United States Constitution and U.S. legal code)
confirmed the authoritative ratification timeline on 5 July 1971 upon President Richard Nixon’s
certification of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. See 36 Fed. Reg. 12725 and The Constitution of the
United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation, Rev. ed, (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1973), p. 44.
U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Ratification of Amendments to
the U.S. Constitution, by David C. Huckabee, CRS Report 97-922 GOV, (30 September 1997), p. 4.
3

Huckabee determines that, excluding the 27th, the average number of days for ratifying
constitutional amendments is 617.

2

including Georgia, Kentucky, Alaska, and Hawaii.4
Not until the late 1960s did Congress address youth suffrage seriously. In
1970, Congress approved an extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that
included a provision providing 18-year-olds franchise privileges in federal, state,
and local elections.5 The Supreme Court ruled at the end of 1970 that Congress did
not have the power to extend suffrage via statute or to stipulate minimum voting
ages in state or local elections.6 The decision meant that 18-to-20-year-olds would
be allowed to vote for president and vice president in the upcoming 1972 election
but not for state or local officials. The Court’s verdict posed a dreadful quandary for
the states: how to create and finance a dual ballot system for federal and all other
elections.7
Faced with potential election-day confusion and the extra expenses of
complicated voting mechanics, the states appealed to Congress for legislative relief.
Congress responded in March 1971 by approving a constitutional amendment
prohibiting the denial of voting rights to all American citizens age eighteen and
older.8 State legislatures rushed to sanction the proposal; by July, the necessary

4

Georgia and Kentucky set the voting age at 18; Alaska, 19; and Hawaii, 20.

5

Title 3, 84 Stat. 318, 42 U.S.C. § 1973bb.

6

Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).

See U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Constitutional
Amendments, Lowering the Voting Age to 18: A Fifty-State Survey of the Costs and Other Problems
of Dual-Age Voting, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971).
7

S.J. Res. 7, 92nd Cong., 1st sess. (1971). On 10 March 1971, the Senate passed an 18-vote
joint resolution, which the House of Representative approved on 23 March – the day the TwentySixth Amendment was sent to the states for ratification.
8

3

three-fourths of states (or 38) needed to ratify an amendment proposed by Congress
had done so. On 5 July 1971, President Nixon signed the Twenty-Sixth Amendment
into law after Ronald L. Kunzig, head of the General Services Administration,
declared it ratified.9
The Twenty-Sixth Amendment remains the last federal amendment to
broaden voting rights, but it has attracted slight academic interest. Only one full
monograph has chronicled its history.10 Most descriptions of the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment occur as token asides in larger volumes of history or political science.11
Several commonly-used monographs covering the history of the 1960s either ignore
it altogether or mention it in passing;12 one mistakenly labeled it the “Thirty-Sixth

New York Times, 6 July 1971, p. 1. No story accompanied the photo. On 7 July 1971, the
Administrator of General Services published the certifying statement that the amendment had
become valid. See F.R. Doc. 71-9691 and 36 F.R. 12725.
9

Wendell W. Cultice, Youth’s Battle for the Ballot: A History of Voting Age in America (New
York: Greenwood Press, 1992). The book’s title is somewhat misleading because it is more of a
descriptive, blow-by-blow narrative detailing federal and state 18-vote proposals than an analysis of
voting age in America.
10

For example, see Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press 1991), 91; George Anastaplo, The Amendments to the Constitution: A Commentary
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 221-223; Richard B. Bernstein with Jerome
Agel, Amending America: If We Love the Constitution So Much, We Do We Keep Trying to Change
It? (New York: Times Books, 1993), 138-139; Alan P. Grimes, Democracy and the Amendments to
the Constitution (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1978), 141-147; Alexander Keyssar, The Right to
Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States, (New York: Basic Books, 2000),
277-281; David E. Kyvig, Explicit and Authentic Acts: Amending the U.S. Constitution, 1776-1995
(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1996), 363-368; Judith Shklar, American Citizenship:
The Quest for Inclusion (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 17-19; and Clement E.
Vose, Constitutional Change: Amendment Politics and Supreme Court Litigation since 1900
(Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1972), 357-359.
11

For instance, see Terry H. Anderson, The Movement and the Sixties: Protest in America
from Greensboro to Wounded Knee (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); William Chafe, The
Unfinished Journey: America Since World War II, 7th edition, (New York: Oxford University Press,
2010); David Farber, The Age of Great Dreams: America in the 1960s (New York: Hill and Wang,
1994); Todd Gitlin, The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage (New York: Bantam, 1993); and James
T. Patterson, Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945-1974 (New York: Oxford University
12

4

Amendment.”13 There are some clear reasons why the amendment has been a
neglected research subject. It is not considered a major moment in American
history (like the ratification of the Constitution), a legislative turning point (like the
Social Security Act of 1935), an essential amendment (like the Fourteenth) or a
critical civic law (like the Voting Rights Act of 1965).

Establishing a national

voting age never became a cause célèbre like women’s suffrage, nor did youth
suffrage ever reach the level of “movement” akin to other civil rights ventures.
Until the late 1960s, the 18-vote issue garnered little sustained interest, and,
mirroring the public’s apparent indifference, politicians viewed the matter as of
marginal legislative importance. Lowering the voting age also became
overshadowed by other contemporary concerns involving young people, such as the
Cold War, Vietnam, the civil rights movement, juvenile delinquency, and the
counterculture. Understandably, scholars have given more consideration to
subjects deemed more consequential or dramatic.
The lack of a rich historiography has engendered a uniform explanation of
why the Twenty-Sixth Amendment was ratified. The consensus asserts, as
Alexander Keyssar summarizes, that “were it not for the war in Vietnam, the voting
age still might be twenty-one.”14 Youth suffrage advocates reckoned that if young
men were old enough to be drafted to fight and die in Vietnam, then they should be

Press, 1996).
Maurice Isserman and Michael Kazin, America Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 281.
13

14

Keyssar, The Right to Vote, 318.

5

old enough to choose the public officials responsible for making war policy.
Proponents of the 18-vote often cited the selfless sacrifice of young citizen-soldiers to
justify a claim for enfranchisement. Other supporters emphasized the obvious
unfairness of demanding compulsory military service from disfranchised youths.
Historians rarely concur when analyzing events, but the “old enough to fight, old
enough to vote” thesis remains the ubiquitous interpretation of the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment.15
The portrayal of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment as the reflexive legislative
spawn of uncomplicated circumstances oversimplifies why Congress established and
the public accepted youth suffrage. Moreover, its slender historiography neglects
the thirty-year gap between its initial offering during World War II and eventual
ratification in 1971. The focus of this dissertation is to explain that delay. It argues
that establishing eighteen as the national voting age was deferred until adults
acknowledged adolescents as autonomous, rational decision-makers capable of
giving electoral consent. Youth earned voting rights not as a reward for their public

For example, see Cultice, Youth’s Battle for the Ballot; Keyssar, The Right to Vote, pp.
277-281; Solomon Montoya, “The Formulation and Ratification of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment”
(Ph.D. Dissertation, New York University, 1973); Samia J. Amamoo, “The Legal Struggles to Gain
Americans the Right to Vote,” Social Education, vol. 64, no. 3 (April 2000), 172-179; and Wynell
Schamel, “The 26th Amendment and Youth Voting Rights,” Social Education, vol. 60, no. 6 (October
1996), 374-377. Non-academic sources also support the consensus; for instance, see Elaine Scarry,
“Separate But Equal for Gays, Too: Emancipation, Women’s Suffrage, 18-Year-Old Vote Were All
Linked to the Right to Serve in the Military,” Los Angeles Times, 16 February 1993, 5B, and “The
26th Amendment,” The History Channel, accessed 10 July 2011, http://www.history.com/topics/the26th-amendment. Official government sources concur with the “old enough” thesis; see as examples
“The 26th Amendment,” History, Art, & Archives, U.S. House of Representatives, accessed 10 July
2011, http://history.house.gov/HistoricalHighlight/Detail/37022; and “Presidential Proclamation:
40th Anniversary of the 26th Amendment,” White House, accessed 10 July 2011,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/07/01/presidential-proclamation-40th-anniversary26th-amendment.
15

6

service but in recognition of their personal aptitude and political gumption.
Lowering the age of suffrage required two prerequisites before it could become
federal law: 1) a change in the social perception of adolescence, and 2) the
restoration of political reformism. Both factors coalesced in the late 1960s to
encourage young people to demand enfranchisement and to justify constitutionally
expanding the domain of suffrage to include adolescents.
In the long, tough slog to secure youth suffrage, adolescents overcame
significant sociopolitical barriers that had tangential connection to the war in
Vietnam. Youth once inhabited a nebulous niche in American society that
circumscribed their political relevance. Like other societies, the United States
partially stratified its population by age. Age stratification steered people into roles
and ranks that carried different degrees of prestige, prerogative, and power. For
American adolescents, chronological age became the benchmark of their social age,
or the time within the human life cycle a society deems a person capable of
performing expected tasks.16 For example, 18-year-olds can vote and 17-year-olds
cannot simply because their birth date (and not any demonstrated proof of interest,
aptitude, or knowledge) legally allows them to register. Different ages of legal
majority, however, let 16-year-olds sign binding contracts and determine courses of
medical treatment without the consent of parents or guardians. Teen-aged persons
lacked electoral privileges because age-conscious norms shaped adult views of what

Gunhild O. Hagestad and Bernice Neugarten, “Age and the Life Course,” in Robert H.
Binstock and Ethel Shanas, eds., Handbook of Aging and the Social Sciences, 2nd ed., (New York:
Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1985), 46-61.
16

7

citizenship roles were “appropriate” for youth. Until the late 1960s, adult doubt
about the intellectual and emotional capacity of young people to act responsibly
squelched actions to lower voting ages.
The social conception of adolescence framed adult perceptions about teenage
abilities. Scholars of adolescent history find that western cultures have
traditionally maintained a view of adolescence as an innately turbulent time of the
human lifespan. American educator G. Stanley Hall theorized in 1904 that “storm
and stress” defines adolescence, meaning it is characterized by mood swings (the
storm) and conflict (the stress).17 His thesis lent scientific credence to social
generalizations that cast adolescents as insolent, irresponsible, and immature
creatures. Hall’s work gave new authority to old prejudices that restricted youth
actions until grown-ups deemed adolescents capable of self-determination, the
common hallmark of adulthood. Young people did things to expose the speciousness
of the stereotypes characterizing adolescence, such as conducting political advocacy,
making tough battlefield decisions, and analyzing their own behaviors in light of
societal norms. Nevertheless, the insidious convictions of “storm-stress” thwarted
efforts to extend voting rights to American youth.
Adolescents also confronted a sociopolitical tradition of unequal electoral
inclusion. The establishment of legal ages of electoral majority served as the
fundamental, but usually unmentioned, baseline for all suffrage qualifications.

G. Stanley Hall, Adolescence: Its Psychology and Its Relations to Physiology,
Anthropology, Sociology, Sex, Crime, Religion, and Education , 2 vols., (New York: D. Appleton and
17

Company, 1904).

8

Western democratic states, starting with ancient Athens, adopted restrictive laws
that reduced the voting citizenry to persons perceived as naturally most capable:
those people who, first, had reached majority age and who, additionally, also
possessed real estate, an XY chromosome, white skin, wealth, and/or citizenship.
Rooting the franchise in age evidenced a social belief that voting was a political
license extended only to mature individuals who theoretically possessed the
cognitive and emotional qualities supposedly requisite for casting ballots
responsibly. Thus, suffrage was conceived more as a privilege of adulthood than a
right of humanity or citizenry. While majority ages for voting sometimes
fluctuated, age 21 served as the traditional western standard, and it became the
most universal of all suffrage requirements. Historian Marchette Chute contends
that, in America, the conditions “free, white, and twenty-one” became so pervasive
that they “passed into the language as a litany.”18 No matter how qualified
otherwise, potential voters had to be, as the laws required, of “full age” before
becoming a bona fide elector.
To gain the prize of suffrage, young people had to focus on the process of
earning it. Establishing a minimum national voting age at eighteen could not
become an actionable legislative possibility until 1) young people became conscious
of themselves as a political constituency, and 2) adults became convinced that young
people possessed the ability to deliver a rational and meaningful vote. The former
required a galvanizing of shared opinions, feelings, and beliefs, which the dramatic

Marchette Chute, The First Liberty: A History of the Right to Vote in America, 1619-1850
(New York: Dutton, 1969), 313.
18

9

events of the 1960s made possible. The latter demanded young people prove
themselves to be adults, which the transformative experiences of the 1960s made
poignant. Lowering the voting age could not be achieved until adolescents
demonstrated a capacity to proffer consent sensibly.
The active campaign to establish 18 as the national voting age began during
World War II. Youth agitation for a lowered franchise age prodded state and
federal politicians to consider the prospect. Though only Georgia acted on youth
suffrage during the war, teens got adults to ponder whether adolescents should
vote. During the 1950s, adults became increasingly convinced that young people
could vote. Postwar teenagers gradually showed themselves to be independent
young adults capable of expressing maturity and responsibility. Businessmen, for
instance, took notice of the personally sophisticated and publicly influential
economic choices made by teenage consumers. Mass media circulated seminal
academic theories casting adolescents as more talented, skillful, and clever than
previously perceived. Insightful adults looked past the stereotypes of “storm-stress”
to glimpse the sometimes brilliant social and cultural critiques made by young
people in graffiti, poetry, and song. Many adults realized that the erudite views of
youth suggested a talent for critical thought. However, fears of teen recklessness,
fueled by Cold War-enhanced hysteria about “juvenile delinquency” and “beatniks,”
continued to impede the enfranchisement of adolescents.
During the 1960s, a small but persistent cadre of advocates prodded
lawmakers to accept a lowered voting age. Rather than march in the streets like
10

young militants, they lobbied in the halls of legislatures on behalf of their cause.
They devised a considered, well-crafted argument that youth suffrage would make
America’s political milieu less unhinged by offering young people a direct stake in
the system. Critics of the 18-vote argued that the meretriciousness of adolescents,
personified by bomb-throwing radicals and dope-smoking hippies, showed youth
lacked the maturity to participate responsibly in politics or society; hence, lowering
the voting age would damage America’s democracy. In an era when traditional
authority looked ready to crumble and generational revolution appeared a real
possibility, formally melding youths into the electoral fold proved to be a tenable
way to smooth generational tension and sustain sociopolitical order.
Creative political maneuvering played an important role in establishing the
18-vote. A small group of dedicated federal legislators, particularly Senators Birch
Bayh, Edward Kennedy, and Mike Mansfield, steered youth suffrage through a
skeptical Congress. They persuaded a majority of their colleagues that young
people were capable of mature deliberation and beneficial civic involvement. They
also pointed to polls indicating a public groundswell supporting youth suffrage.
Their task was abetted by a congressional era defined by institutional and
legislative reformism. During the 1960s, liberal Democrats pushed procedural
changes that harnessed obstructionism. Modifying how Congress worked led to the
approval of historic legislation that provided social welfare, protected civil rights,
and broadened suffrage, including constitutional amendments that allowed citizens
in Washington, D.C. to vote in presidential elections, abolished poll taxes, and
11

granted youth suffrage.
A liberal Supreme Court determined to expand civil liberties helped, too, by
affirming the principle of “one man, one vote.” In four decisive cases, the Court
expanded federal oversight of suffrage by mandating that all citizens, regardless of
where they reside in a state, receive equal representation.19 In Oregon v. Mitchell
(1970), however, it authored a curiously narrow decision allowing states to
determine the time and manner of conducting elections. That ruling confused who
possessed the authority to regulate voting ages in state and federal elections.
Congress reversed the Court’s holding by passing the Twenty-Sixth Amendment,
which the states adopted in short order. After nearly thirty years of gestation, the
18-vote measure sailed through Congress and the Article V ratification process in
record time – a mere 100 days – to become law in July 1971.
Though not as monumental as other federal amendments, the Twenty-Sixth
should not be trivialized or dismissed. It marked the political coming-of-age for
American youth by granting 18-to-21-year-olds the right to vote and by
guaranteeing them the privilege of self-determination. Ratification of the TwentySixth Amendment was not simply a reaction to the turmoil engendered by Vietnam;
it acknowledged a new understanding of youth status within a society becoming less
deferential and more inclusive. Dropping the voting age did the very thing
centuries of tradition had delayed: it gave instant civic responsibility to
inexperienced adolescents. The Twenty-Sixth Amendment should be understood as

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963), Wesberry v.
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
19

12

the byproduct of social change and political labor rather than as recompense for
patriotic service. Like the other suffrage amendments, changing the electoral
status quo through setting a uniform voting age required hard work and tough
advocacy by committed activists and their congressional champions. Their
resiliency resulted in a fundamental alteration of constitutional law: forever
banning age-based electoral discrimination against persons aged eighteen to
twenty. The Twenty-Sixth Amendment was the reward youth had earned for
proving the capacity to proffer consent as maturely as adults. How young people
eventually overcame political resistance and social prejudices to change the
Constitution is a fascinating tale that stretches back to the establishment of voting
as a mechanism for group decision-making.

13

CHAPTER II
THE TYRANNY OF THE (LEGAL) MAJORITY:
ADOLESCENCE, ADULTOCRACY, AND VOTING AGES
For although there may be exceptions to the order of nature, the male is by nature
fitter for command than the female, just as the elder and full-grown is superior to
the younger and more immature.
Aristotle20
In 1930, Bernard R. Riley, an 18-year-old from Miami, filed suit in Florida
court to obtain suffrage, seeking to take advantage of an apparent loophole in state
law. Section 3962 of Florida’s Revised General Statutes of 1920 declared that
married male minors “are hereby authorized to assume the management of their
estate, to contract and be contracted with, to sue and be sued, and to do and
perform any and all acts, matters, and things that he could do if he were twenty-one
years of age.”21 The recently-wedded Riley argued the statute implicitly conferred
suffrage rights by granting him “any and all” civil prerogatives afforded majorityaged men. The Florida Supreme Court unanimously disagreed, ruling statutes could
not alter the age qualification of voters fixed in the state constitution. The Court
deftly sidestepped the “any and all” clause by determining Florida’s legislature

20

Aristotle, The Politics, 1.1259b.

21

Quoted in Riley v. Holmer, 100 Fla. 938, 939 (1930).

14

intended the statute to remove the disability to contract and be contracted with and
not to permit married minors to vote in state elections. Justice C.J. Terrell
concluded, “Under our law, both males and females are minors till they reach the
age of twenty-one years. This was the common-law rule.”22 That Riley remained
disfranchised, though allowed other privileges of legal adulthood, also followed an
ostensibly common-sense tradition: adolescents should not vote in any case
whatsoever.
Becoming a certified elector, as Riley’s suit implied, had served as the
capstone to full-fledged adulthood. Determinations of majority age became the
foundation for adultocracy, or the sociopolitical system that vested decision-making
authority in adults. It forged age-related constructs of power that transcended race,
class, and sex and cut across every type of social, economic, and political structure.
Adultocracy bolstered western systems of age hegemony by adding legal,
governmental, and electoral layers to communal frameworks that stratified persons
old to young. A universal and unchallenged understanding of adolescence as a
period of “storm and stress” abetted adultocracy by framing adolescents as a
separate and subordinate social species ill-equipped for grown-up tasks.
Since adults believed youth a group naturally inferior, as Arisotle had
proposed, governments denied suffrage to teen-aged persons, like Bernard Riley,
until judged by adult authorities as 1) sufficiently experienced to vote responsibly
and 2) developmentally capable of voting rationally. Age qualifications to vote and

22

Ibid, 939-940.

15

hold office spawned a tyranny of the majority consciously designed by the architects
of democracy: minors governed without consent by those persons of legal majority
age. As a result, adolescents, like other social minorities, existed as political
subjects to the will of the majority with few civil privileges and scant influence upon
official decision-making processes.

Every society has developed some mechanism of voting for resolving
individual differences concerning collective action. The custom of voting, however,
did not mean that every individual played an equal role in decision making. Every
polity permitted only those individuals considered physically, mentally, and
emotionally fit the license to make binding decisions for whole societies; usually,
those persons were men; invariably, those persons were adults. Control over group
decision-making processes rooted adultocracy. The term adultocracy describes a
sociopolitical system ruled by people who have reached legal adulthood but who are
not considered elderly.23

Its definition follows the logic of 18th-century British

As a political arrangement, adultocracy should not be confused with gerontocracy.
Gerontocracy is a form of rule defined by two central qualities: 1) a small cadre of elders control
political power and 2) those elderly leaders are significantly older than the majority of the adult
population. Humans rarely employed gerontocracy as a governing system because, as Phyllis
Dolhnow attests, few people lived past age fifty in most societies throughout history. Phyllis
Dolhinow, “The Primates: Age, Behavior, and Evolution,” in Age and Anthropological Theory, David
I. Kertzer and Jennie Keith, eds., (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 65-81. Ancient
Sparta hosted one of the few successful gerontocracies in world history. It was ruled by a council of
elders (the gerousia) comprised of two kings and twenty-eight men over 60 years old. They were
nominated from the most prestigious families, elected by acclamation in the Spartan assembly, and
served life terms. The gerousia held veto power over decisions made by the assembly. The
consensus appears to be that the gerousia, and not the Spartan assembly, was the sovereign body of
state; thus, Sparta could be understood as a political gerontocracy. See Aristotle, The Politics
1272a4-12; Paul Cartledge, Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta (London: Duckworth, 1987), 124-129;
and G.E.M. De Ste. Croix, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War (London: Duckworth, 1972), 124138.
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statesman Edmund Burke who declared that only persons “of adult age, not
declining in life, of tolerable leisure for discussions, and of some means of
information” should be granted civic authority.24
In every sociopolitical system, adultocracy granted adults special dominion
over young people. To the progenitors of bands, tribes, and states, adultocracy
appeared the most organic means for effecting communal order: from the
distinctive abilities of fully mature creatures to provide for and protect their young
and the innate authority of parents to rule their children emerged the social right of
adults, especially men, to govern. 25 No matter the political family (one, few,
many), the governmental genus (monarchy, oligarchy, democracy), or the
lawmaking species (despotism, plutocracy, republicanism) the universal aspect to
each system was that adults, particularly men, ruled.
Three cross-cultural generalities can be observed in the history of
adultocracy. First, those persons considered adults ruled no matter the size of the
population, the particular political form employed, or the complexity of the
governing system. Second, adolescents had more influence in smaller, informal,
and decentralized political arrangements (like bands and tribes) than larger,
formal, and centralized political structures (such as states).

Third, voting ages

Frank O'Gorman, Edmund Burke: His Political Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1973), 133.
24

According to political sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset, the legitimacy of any political
system can only be achieved when its denizens can “engender and maintain the belief that the
existing political institutions are the most appropriate for the society.” Seymour Martin Lipset,
Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics, 2nd ed., (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1981), 64.
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evolved from culturally amorphous references to fixed legal requirements as age
stratification gradually formalized and political schemes became evermore
systemized. Societies that lacked an ability to fix precise birth dates, featured short
life expectancies, and practiced egalitarianism created sociopolitical climates in
which the classification “youth” was not completely prohibitive in relation to status
as compared to cultures that developed systems to document age, fostered longish
life spans, and adhered to constitutionalism. Adultocracy did not, of course,
completely exclude youth from civic life. Parents and authorities expected
juveniles, at minimum, to marry, soldier, work, pay taxes, participate in worship,
and obey the law. But underage youth generally lacked their own sovereign voice,
representation, or agency, while the interests of adults were given direct expression.
26

And adolescents, though citizens, could not share equally in the prerogatives of

the commonweal because of the preponderance of power afforded adults.
Adultocracy slotted adolescents into a peculiar niche that circumscribed their
political relevance: they were neither truly children totally adult nor fully citizen.
Adultocracy determined who could participate in decision-making
enterprises. When to declare a person an adult became a riddle partially solved by
the social construction of age. Like other social categories, such as race, class,
gender, sexuality, and ethnicity, age provides primary shape to the contours of
group organization and the conditions of individual life. Age also conditions social

See Ruth R. Faden, Tom L. Beauchamp, and Nancy M.P. King, A History and Theory of
Informed Consent (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986) and Robert Mnookin, Child, Family,
and State (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978).
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assumptions about individual capacities and frames cultural standards for
evaluating appropriate behavior and conduct.27 Sociologist Cheryl Laz points out,
for example, that various societies routinely employ the commands “grow up” and
“act your age” to correct non-conformity to normative expectations associated with a
particular chronological age.28 The admonitions “not old enough” and “too old”
exemplify the use of age norms to impede persons from pursuing non-ageappropriate courses of action. Historically, all societies have deemed children
innately inferior to adults in strength and sense, and most of them have judged
adolescents as more mistake-prone, restless, and unruly relative to adults. Such
culturally-accepted age prejudices justified cordoning off young persons into agesegregated institutions (like schools and juvenile halls) and temporally parceling
civil, communal, and individual liberties along chronologically-restrictive timelines.
The universal predisposition to esteem chronology rather than ability when
assigning citizen roles rooted age stratification within the world’s governance
See Ralph Linton, “Age and Sex Categories,” American Sociological Review, vol. 7, no. 5
(October 1942): 589-603; Talcott Parsons, “Age and Sex in the Social Structure of the United States,”
American Sociological Review, vol. 7, no. 5 (October 1942): 604-616; and Matilda W. Riley, “On the
Significance of Age in Sociology,” American Sociological Review, vol. 52, no. 1 (February 1987): 1-14.
Curiously, the study of age as a social construct has lagged. For many years, age was a “neglected
aspect” of academic study. See Ralph Linton, “A Neglected Aspect of Social Organization,” American
Journal of Sociology, vol. 45, no. 6 (May 1940): 870-886. Some forty years later, Matilda White Riley,
a leading practitioner of age studies, admitted “age and aging constitute an empirical domain about
which little is known.” See Matilda White Riley, “Foreword,” in Age and Anthropological Theory,
David I. Kertzer and Jennie Keith, eds., (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 10. The
scholastic literature examining age remains scant compared to the volumes devoted to race, class,
gender, sexuality, and ethnicity. The most significant work on age has been conducted by
anthropologists and sociologists. Historians, even of a social bent, seem disinterested in chronicling
age as a factor of decisions and actions in the past. The few pieces that do examine age, particularly
the history of adolescence, were written in the 1960s and 1970s as a means of ascertaining and
explaining contemporary youth issues. More investigation into the history of age would be
academically beneficial, since age hierarchies remain as pervasive as other social constructs.
27
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Cheryl Laz, “Act Your Age,” Sociological Forum, vol. 13, no. 1 (March 1998): 85-113.
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systems. Age stratification steered people into sociopolitical ranks that carried
different degrees of prestige, prerogative, and power. For adolescents, age signified
qualification to assume certain personal, civil, and legal prerogatives. Age of
majority laws allotted duties and privileges to citizens based on arbitrarily-chosen
years of chronological time. As much as any other social category, age defined the
boundaries of citizenship. Majority-age laws framed civic inclusion by temporally
apportioning a person’s ability to marry, drive, get a job, sign a contract, fight in the
military, own property, vote, and seek political office. Lawmakers and jurists in
Athens and Rome crafted the western template for allocating majority ages: first
bestow transactional prerogatives; next impart civil protections; then confer
political rights.29 The tenets that govern majority ages in England and America
derived chiefly from tort law (which controlled civil liability), common law (which
offered statutory rules regarding individual emancipation), and legislation (which
provided a chronological sequence for doling out civic prerogatives).
Majority-age schemes exemplified a key aspect of age stratification in
western societies: adults do not usurp decisions from minors; rather, they attempt
to manage consent for minors.

The logic of majority age laws emphasized that

Both Athens and Rome recognized the two key transactional rights (to enter contracts and
to draft wills), three civil rights (to declare emancipation from fathers, elder brothers, or guardians,
to secure inheritances, and to own property), one public right (to participate in communal worship),
two legal protection (to initiate legal proceedings and to represent themselves in courts), and one
political privilege (to attend meetings of the popular governing assemblies). See W. Warde Fowler,
The City-State of the Greeks and Romans: A Survey Introductory to the Study of Ancient History ,
5th ed., (London: Macmillan and Company, 1907), 209-210; Léon Homo, Roman Political
Institutions from City to State (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1929), 74-75; Robert Garland, The Greek
Way of Life (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 180-183; Lesley Adkins and Roy A. Adkins,
Handbook to Life in Ancient Rome (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 46-51; and Beryl
Rawson, Children and Childhood in Roman Italy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 73-74,
136, and 142.
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undeveloped persons had special vulnerabilities that rendered them in need of
sustained adult protection until they had matured, even to the point of excluding
them against their will from certain public or private activities.30 Common sense
dictated and common law insisted that children needed special legal protection
because of their physical, emotional, and mental immaturity. William Blackstone,
the foremost legal expert of 18th-century England, forcefully asserted that extending
minority status allowed parents and civil authorities to best protect children “from
the snares of artful and designing persons; and, next, of settling them properly in
life.”31 The sociopolitical biases favoring “mature” persons posited that aging
provided the experience and wisdom required to perform vital civic tasks
proficiently.32 Western peoples defined “maturity” as the capacity to think
intelligently, cope steadfastly, and relate rationally. Legal definitions of maturity
emphasized the achievement of sui generis (i.e. personal control over decisions and
actions free of compulsion) as the crucial factor separating children and adults.
Western law allowed for some juveniles, in extraordinary circumstances, to make

Western states, starting with Athens, constructed a system of statutory and procedural
safeguards designed to assure the “best interests” of children. The “best interests” doctrine
asserted that governments had an inherent power (parens patriae) to protect minors because the law
deemed them unable to act of their own accord. See Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert J.
Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (New York: Free Press, 1973), and Julia Halloran
McLaughlin, “The Fundamental Truth about Best Interests,” St. Louis University Law Journal, vol.
54, no. 1 (October 2009): 113-165.
30

William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol. 1, Of the Study, Nature,
and Extent of the Laws of England (New York: Oceana Publications, 1967; reprint of the 1st
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American edition, 1771), 441.
Gunhild O. Hagestad and Bernice Neugarten, “Age and the Life Course,” in Robert H.
Binstock and Ethel Shanas, eds., Handbook of Aging and the Social Sciences, 2nd ed., (New York:
Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1985), 46-61.
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autonomous decisions sans parents or guardians over some legal matters (usually
financial and medical).33 To avoid case-by-case competency judgments, however,
western codes considered all youth as persons with limited but increasing capacities
for consent. Pinpointing legal ages when sui generis occurred was problematic. The
choosing of the precise chronological years for marriage, employment, conscription,
contract, and suffrage ultimately relied on adult discernments of youth
competencies rooted in age chauvinism. As Bernard Riley discovered in 1930,
adult-developed majority ages curbed full self-determination for adolescents
regardless of life achievement or personal ability.
The social conception of adolescence framed adult perceptions of teenage
immaturity. Historians of childhood debate whether the conception of adolescence
was the result of “invention” or “discovery.”34 But they agree that the main
constant in cultural metaphors describing adolescence was its depiction as an
inherently turbulent time of the human lifespan. For example, Romans blamed an
innate “mental wickedness” for causing adolescents, especially males, to behave
mischievously and act impulsively.35 Early modern Englishmen characterized

During the 1970s, for example, American jurists established the “mature minor” doctrine
that permits children deemed capable by a court to give consent sui generis to medical treatment.
See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
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Some scholars support the thesis of Philippe Ariés, who argues that western peoples
conjured adolescence as a component of social life during the Renaissance; before then, it “was
confused with childhood.” Other academics agree with the development model of Erik Erikson. He
maintains scientific research uncovered adolescence as a universal “life stage” in human maturation
that transcended social boundaries and historical eras. See Philippe Ariés, Centuries of Childhood:
A Social History of Family Life, trans. by Robert Baldick, (New York: Knopf, 1962), 25, and Erik
Erikson, Identity, Youth, and Crisis (New York: W.W. Norton, 1968).
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Beryl Rawson, Children and Childhood in Roman Italy (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2005), 75. See also Emiel Eyben, Restless Youth in Ancient Rome (New York: Routledge,
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adolescence as a “wild and wanton” “stage of lawlessness” plagued by “vice, lust,
and vain pleasures of the flesh.”36 Contemporary Europeans and Americans have
continued constructing negative images of “incorrigible,” “juvenile,” and
“delinquent” youth around the age norms associated with mature, well-adjusted
adults.37
In 1904, an American educator, G. Stanley Hall, seminally defined
adolescence as a life stage characterized by a “storm” of emotional mood swings and
the “stress” of physiological and psychological conflicts.38 His thesis lent scientific
credence to social generalizations that cast adolescents as unstable, irresponsible,
and disobedient creatures. To save young people from degeneracy during the
maturation process, Hall advocated lengthening and institutionalizing adolescent
preparation for adulthood.39 He asserted that a temporally-extended, state-crafted
1993).
Ilana Krausman Ben-Amos, Adolescence and Youth in Early Modern England (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 18; Barbara A. Hanawalt, Growing Up in Medieval
England: The Experience of Childhood in History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 197;
C. John Sommerville, The Discovery of Childhood in Puritan England (Athens: University of
Georgia Press, 1992), 34; and Steven R. Smith, "Religion and the Conception of Youth in
Seventeenth-Century England,” History of Childhood Quarterly 2, no. 4 (Spring 1975): 513. Paul
Griffiths contends that youth had a creative influence on pre-civil war English society despite
demonization by adults. Paul Griffiths, Youth and Authority: Formative Experiences in England,
1560-1640 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).
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See Pamela Cox and Heather Shore, eds., Becoming Delinquent: British and European
Youth, 1650-1950 (Hampshire, England: Ashgate-Dartmouth, 2002) and Anne Meis Knupfer,
Reform and Resistance: Gender, Delinquency, and America’s First Juvenile Court (New York:
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Routledge, 2001).
G. Stanley Hall, Adolescence: Its Psychology and Its Relations to Physiology,
Anthropology, Sociology, Sex, Crime, Religion, and Education , 2 vols., (New York: D. Appleton and
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Company, 1904).
Hall’s biographer, Dorothy Ross, contends that his recommendation to extend the
preparation for adulthood, and not the coining of “storm-stress,” proved his most innovative
contribution to the social conception of adolescence. Dorothy Ross, G. Stanley Hall: The Psychologist
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adolescence would allow adult authorities to better control youth development and
to better shepherd adolescent assimilation into modern adult culture.
Hall’s counsel to extend adolescence under firm adult oversight mirrored
traditional remedies for handling adolescent tempestuousness. Beginning with
Athens and Rome, western people reckoned that anxiety-ridden and rebellious
juveniles needed extended time to acclimate to the different expectations and
increased responsibilities of age and citizenry. In drafting majority-age schemes,
western jurists reckoned all humans had a facility to assent (or provide silent
acquiescence) but only certain persons possessed the capacity to consent (i.e. furnish
active agreement or dissent). Legislative decisions regarding who would be granted
suffrage boiled down to which social groups could be trusted to proffer consent
independently and sensibly. 40 Admittance policies based on birth and residence
initially pared who could vote. Subsequent debilitations based on wealth, gender,
race, religion, literacy, and age whittled enfranchisement further, and competencebased restrictions narrowed it to a small cadre: adults, particularly men. No
matter how qualified otherwise, potential voters had to be, as the laws required, of
“full age” before becoming a bona fide elector. Thus, western states conceived
suffrage more as a privilege of adulthood than a right of humanity or citizenry.

as Prophet (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1972).
Legally, people who seek the power of consent have to demonstrate: 1) the facility to
comprehend understandably and disclose accurately the information necessary to make a decision
that could be judged as reasonable by informed persons; 2) the freedom to make decisions absent
pressure, duress, fraud, deceit, intimidation, coercion, constraint, enticement, and/or undue
interference; and 3) the fitness to do or decide upon something suitably. See Paul S. Appelbaum,
Charles W. Lidz, and Alan Meisel, Informed Consent: Legal Theory and Clinical Practice (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
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The civic reason for age-delaying political participation was plain: to protect
the best interests of the state from the disorders of rowdy and bumptious young
males. They were not allowed full enfranchisement – to participate in assembly and
hold political office – until adulthood because supposedly wild and wanton nature of
adolescents compelled adults to marginalize them, albeit briefly, to maintain civic
order. The disability of age made young males in western states subjects of adult
rule since adult lawmakers had absolute control over official decision-making
bodies. As adult men saw their civic responsibilities swell with the centralization
and expansion of their states, the governmental participation allowed young males
decreased. Adults thought adolescents too impulsive and irresponsible to conduct
the august work of the state assiduously or sensibly. A Roman jurist, Ulpian,
claimed the exclusion of adolescents necessary because “everyone agrees that
judgment, at this age above all, is delicate and weak, exposed to numerous
deceptions and vulnerable to the treachery of many.”41 States held youth back from
full immersion into political life until their skills had sharpened and their
egocentrism had dulled, irrespective of ability or aspiration.
When to apportion the power of electoral consent to adolescents became a
socio-legal conundrum. Lawmakers recognized the task of codifying precise suffrage
ages as fundamentally arbitrary but wholly necessary since consent required
developed faculties to understand, reason, and judge. Western states grafted
franchise ages onto the scaffolding of majority-age laws. Athenian and Roman law
Bruce W. Frier and Thomas A.J. McGinn, A Casebook on Roman Family Law (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2004), 438.
41
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codes used the word “adult” to describe the ages when males could begin the process
of attaining full citizenship: 18 in Athens and 17 in Rome.42 But neither Athens
nor Rome promulgated an official suffrage age. Becoming a citizen did not confer a
civil right to vote since Athenians and Romans did not elect candidates to civic
offices or decide upon public proposals in plebiscites. Instead, citizenship bestowed
a political privilege – to attend meetings of the popular governing assemblies – and
voting remained bound to deciding legislative or judicial questions and confirming
magistrates.43 In addition, the age of citizenship did not grant a claim to seek
political office. Athens and Rome set minimum ages to hold bureaucratic and
administrative positions between the late 20s and early 40s; the more important the
responsibility, the higher the prerequisite age.44

One of the frustrations involved with antiquities research is the imprecision regarding age.
Few studies examine ancient voting, and they say little about age requirements. Most works claim a
potential voter had to be an “adult” without clarifying a minimum voting age. Aristotle’s work, as
detailed as it is, does not specify exactly at what age males earned full voting status within the
Athenian assembly. E.S. Staveley, the author of the only single-volume study of Greek and Roman
voting, even admits “. . . it is not ever certain who constituted the electoral body” in Athenian or
Roman congresses. E.S. Staveley, Greek and Roman Voting and Elections (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1972), 101. Hence, my conclusions regarding age conception within the GrecoRoman franchise are conditional considering the limited nature of the available evidence and a lack
of first-hand knowledge of the Latin or Greek languages.
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Fowler, The City-State of the Greeks and Romans.

In Athens, Cleisthenes’s reforms of 508/7 B.C.E. set age thirty as the threshold for
membership in the Boule (council of 500) and dikasteria (the law courts). In Rome, no legallyprescribed age threshold barred young males from seeking magistracies for most of the Republican
era. The governmental sprawl of empire required Rome to institute official minimum ages for
holding offices. The Lex Villia Annalis (“age law”) of 180 B.C.E. set age 28 for the Quaestorship, 40
for the Praetorship, and 43 for the Consulship.44 Sulla (82-81 B.C.E.) increased the age to become
an quaestor to 30, while Augustus (27 B.C.E.-14 A.D.) lowered it to 25 so that the age of majority for
holding office matched the age of discretion set in private law by the Lex Plaetoria of 200 B.C.E. See
Staveley, Greek and Roman Voting and Elections, 121-179; Homo, Roman Political Institutions from
City to State, 49-84, 124-125, 207, and 345; Rawson, Children and Childhood in Roman Italy, note
10, 138; Barry Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), 56; Alexander Yakobson, Elections and Electioneering in Rome: A Study in the Political System of the
Late Republic (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1999), 8-9; Florence Dupont, Daily Life in Ancient Rome,
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Similar to Athenians and Romans, Englishmen considered the power to
consent an essential element of political citizenship. After King John signed the
Magna Carta in 1215, enfranchisement evolved from scant to significant
importance.45 Internecine brawls over governmental authority prompted British
citizens to view voting as a civic task to be performed only by those persons who had
a noticeably personal stake in the outcomes of public decision-making. British
lawmakers granted shares of political involvement to males based on perceptions of
ability and achievement measured by amounts of land owned and years of age lived.
England’s representative bodies, the Witan (the great king’s councils first organized
in the 10th century) and Parliament (which first met legally in 1236), retained the
same basic criteria for participation: only “wise men,” or experienced men who held
important socioeconomic positions, would be summoned to attend.46 In 1430,
members of Parliament (M.P.s) established the vital qualification for
enfranchisement. To be an elector or M.P., a man had to be a freeholder (i.e. a
landowner holding permanent and absolute tenure of property with the freedom to
dispose of it at will) possessing real estate assessed at least 40 shillings of value for

trans. Christopher Woodall, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 7; and W. Jeffrey Tatum, “Roman
Democracy?” in A Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought, Ryan K. Balot, ed. (Oxford:
Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 217.
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A Short History of Parliament, Clyve Jones, ed., (Rochester, NY: Boydell & Brewer, 2009), 3-9 and
Levi Roach, Kingship and Consent in Anglo-Saxon England, 871-978 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2013), 27-44.
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the annual land tax.47 Thereafter, English political theory claimed property
ownership reflected the permanent stake in society that ensured the independent
judgment required of a virtuous voter. The 40-shilling freehold remained the basic
franchise standard until abolished by the Reform Act of 1832.
The repeated use of the word “men” in English political documents presumed
the attainment of adulthood as a condition of enfranchisement. For example, the
Magna Carta guaranteed critical civil rights to all free men of “full age” without
stating what chronological year marked civic majority. Confusion over the political
definition of “adult” grew in the early modern era as the practice of electing M.P.s
gradually replaced the tradition of selecting “wise men” to serve. Throughout the
17th century, competitive partisan politics gradually replaced the casual, patrondriven poll of yore.48 Questions regarding franchise credentials increasingly arose
when people were asked to vote for, rather than assent to, parliamentary
candidates. When youths got involved, especially 40-shilling freeholders, the issue
8 Henry VI. c. 7 (1430). Read the citation as “the 8th year of King Henry VI’s reign,
statute issue no. 7.” See also William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 1:172-173.
Two years later, another statute mandated that a freeholder must live within his declared county of
election. 10 Henry VI. c. 2 (1432). At the time of the 40-shilling proclamation, Henry was only eight
years old. See Ralph Griffiths, The Reign of Henry VI: The Exercise of Royal Authority, 1422-1461
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981). The 40-shilling requirement limited suffrage to
less than 20% of England’s adult male population. But historian Derek Hirst finds that many local
officials creatively quantified 40 shillings to help men gain franchise; e.g. they might include
annuities, rent charges, mortgage payments, ecclesiastical benefits, and appointments in
government service as part of the accounting of value. Moreover, Hirst notes that the inflation of the
16th and 17th centuries stimulated by the turn from feudalism to capitalism made the 40-shilling
requirement “virtually meaningless” because increased land values multiplied the number of
potential voters. See Derek Hirst, The Representation of the People?: Voters and Voting in England
under the Early Stuarts (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975).
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of qualifications became more problematic. Sculpting the temporal bounds of youth
suffrage could determine the outcome of elections, particularly since scholars
believe that 17th-century England hosted a young population.49
In the years after the Restoration and through the Glorious Revolution, local
uncertainty over franchise parameters, including age restrictions, incited
arguments regarding voter eligibility. British laws provided cities, boroughs,
counties, and shires the prerogative to determine the standards for voter eligibility.
Those units developed a mish-mash of idiosyncratic franchise criteria that yielded
an inconsistent and confusing muddle of voting conditions that allowed adolescents
political inroads.50

Some community traditions, for example, permitted

enfranchisement to those males who knew how to identify a counterfeit penny,
count money, measure cloth, or conduct business properly.51 During the 1680s and
1690s, public concern over age eligibility escalated as the number of young males

Jeffrey L. Singman believes that the demographic expansion of England “meant that a
large part of the population at any time were young people; it has been estimated that roughly a
third were under the age of 15, and half under age 25.” Jeffrey L. Singman, Daily Life in
Elizabethan England (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995), 9.
49

See John Hostettler and Brian P. Block, Voting in Britain: A History of the Parliamentary
Franchise (Chichester, England: Barry Rose, 2001).
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Henry of Bracton, Henry of Bracton on the Laws and Customs of England, trans. by
Samuel E. Thorne, (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1968), 2:250.
Bracton claimed that bodily appearance “as where he is bearded, great in stature or the like”
presumed “sufficient proof of age.” If visual appearance left a question of age, the petitioner’s age
could be “proved” by either an examination of “twelve lawful men,” testimony of fact by kinsmen, or
by an affirmative oath swearing “that he has reached at least his twenty-first year or more.” Bracton
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participating in politics and standing for election swelled. In more than a few cases,
teen-aged males won seats in Parliament.52

Many adults complained that minors

should not be allowed to legislate on matters to which they were not themselves
liable. Other Englishmen feared corrupt operators and scheming fathers would
cajole the young political neophytes into making imprudent, maybe even dangerous,
decisions that served partisan interests more than the public good.53 William
Blackstone chastised the immature politicos for their "imbecility of judgment.”54
Concerns about irrationality and rambunctiousness within the electorate
spurred Parliament to eradicate the potential for youth disruptions to political
order. In 1696, it passed an omnibus bill to reform elections. Part VII of the act
barred all males below twenty-one years of age from voting for members of
Parliament or serving in Parliament.55 Blackstone admitted the choice of twentyone to be the suffrage age was “merely arbitrary.”56 But he declared Parliament’s

Holly Brewer reports, “Between 1660 and 1690 alone, forty-three boys under age twentyone gained seats in the [House of] Commons.” Holly Brewer, By Birth or Consent: Children, Law,
and the Anglo-American Revolution in Authority, (Chapel Hill : University of North Carolina Press,
2005), 26; see also, 40-41.
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action entirely necessary “to prevent the mischiefs that might arise, by placing
extensive [governmental] authority in hands that are either incapable, or else
improper, to manage it.”57 To shield the state from the potentiality of damage
inflicted by unruly adolescents, M.P.s closed the local loopholes that had allowed
adolescents electoral participation by declaring a national voting age.
The popular explanation why 21 became the year of electoral majority says it
emerged from a tradition of concluding the training for knighthood at that age.
However, knighthood was an age-fuzzy apprenticeship. The general age range for
reaching full knighthood stretched between the mid-teens and mid-twenties,
depending upon when his riding and martial skills were perfected and tried in
battle.58

Parliament’s promulgation of 21 as the national electoral age squared

more with the scheme of majority-age laws than the vocational education of
knighthood. The establishment of a fixed suffrage age corresponded with other
state efforts, begun in the 12th century, to assimilate young males into adulthood
and incorporate them into the citizen body within an age-graded legal structure.
M.P.s did not conjure an age at random to proclaim the attainment of suffrage; they
consciously borrowed a pre-existing age from two property rights gained only upon
reaching twenty-one: to inherit (important in a culture that practiced
primogeniture) and to dispossess (which implied a right to action: to obtain, keep,
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use, or discard property based on individual discretion).59 By welding
enfranchisement to the age of inheritance and the dispossession of property,
Parliament upheld the tradition of land-based, stakeholder political rights.
Therefore, the setting of twenty-one as the nationwide age to vote and hold office
was not as subjective as commonly believed.
Parliament’s establishment of an official voting age triggered a significant
change in the nature of suffrage. Because of the reform bill, age replaced property
as the primary basis for election. After 1696, arguments about the enfranchisement
credentials for teen-aged, 40-shilling freeholders ceased: no matter how much
property an adolescent held, he could not vote or hold office until reaching age 21.
For adolescent lads, however, the 1696 decree closed paths for electoral opportunity
and political agency that custom had once abided. The precision of 21 took from
local officials the authority to interpret the electoral meaning of “adult,” but,
concurrently, the law provided them the means to thwart claims to suffrage by
underage constituents. Hence, the 21-vote law accomplished what Parliament
intended: to harden the traditional practices and beliefs supporting adultocracy.
In America, the colonies replicated the English pattern of gradual youth
marginalization through suffrage codification. According to historian Cortland F.
Bishop, the initial colonial franchise laws were “neither numerous nor well

Holly Brewer states that primogeniture was a key source of political power. Through
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defined.”60 Most colonies simply enfranchised “freemen” or “freeholders” with little
definitiveness in regard to precise qualifications. 61 For young males, the
imprecision of electoral codes and the fluidity of colonization opened avenues to
political involvement. Well-known, well-connected, or well-born adolescents
sometimes cast ballots, competed for local offices, and won elections.62 In the very
earliest years of settlement, when elections were occasional and irregular, colonial
governments allowed males as young as 16 and 17 to vote. America’s first
representative assembly, Virginia’s House of Burgesses, initially allowed 17-yearolds who paid poll taxes to become legislators. Virginia and Plymouth each taxed
16-year-olds in the early 1620s to pay for the salaries of public officials and fund the
maintenance of government. Historian Marchette Chute posits that “since this tax
was imposed on all males over sixteen it seems probable that all of them were
voters.”63
Colonial adolescents did not inhabit a world as socioeconomically caste as
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that in Europe, and westward expansion provided them wide opportunities to strike
out on their own and claim independence. Scholars Oscar and Mary F. Handlin
maintain that many young males parlayed their abilities into official or informal
roles of communal influence.64 A colonial atmosphere favoring aptitude allowed
ambitious and talented youths to leverage their endowments individually to voice
opinions and to express consent periodically in group situations, such as militia
elections.65 In addition, informal politicking customs (including a reliance on
personal testimony and communal knowledge to determine franchise ages) allowed
ambitious adolescents assorted entry points into the multi-layered colonial political
structure. The young population of America provided some pull for youth; for
instance, Robert E. Brown’s study of colonial Massachusetts found that “more than
60 per cent of the people were minors” and “25 per cent of the polls (males over
sixteen) were under twenty-one.”66
Demographic heft, however, did not garner for youth power equal to that of
adults. Political participation by young colonists appears inconsistent and did not,
like in England, ever seriously threaten to disorder colonial governance. Assertive
adolescents may have nudged and pushed, but, clearly, adults held the command to
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decide political courses of action. Historian Holly Brewer finds that a moderate
number of Virginia adolescents served in the House of Burgesses. Though each of
them “fit the picture of teenage males elected to Parliament during the seventeenth
century: significant wealth, high status, powerful patron, previous membership of
father, often early inheritance,” Brewer finds few of the young assemblymen had
any real legislative clout.67
When lawmakers sensed that youths might threaten the adultocratic status
quo, colonial assemblies responded by codifying enfranchisement ages. The 1629
charter for Massachusetts Bay, for instance, empowered “the Freemen of the
Company” to elect governing officials “from tyme to tyme” without specifying a
suffrage age.68 In 1631, the General Court legislated that “no man shall be
admitted to the freedom of this body politic” who was not a full church member, but,
again, it did not set an age floor for “man.”69 The 1641 Massachusetts Body of
Liberties provided that 21-year-old freemen could give “votes, verdicts, and sentence
in civil courts” but did not specifically provide for their inclusion at the colonial
assembly.70 In 1646, a group of prosperous merchants who attended worship but
were not members of a church petitioned for suffrage rights. The merchants argued
67
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they deserved a vote because they had served in Indian wars, paid taxes, and led
godly lives. The General Court denied their petition, but Marchette Chute notes it
“had a particular attraction to the young” who sympathized with the claim to an
earned electoral stake.71 The grumblings of un-franchised adolescents caused the
General Court in 1647 to proclaim twenty-four as the voting age.72 Twenty-four
remained the age standard in Massachusetts until 1692, when William and Mary
issued the colony a new charter that lowered it to 21.73
Like Massachusetts, the other colonies eventually moved from de facto to de
jure electoral ages of majority.74 In the process, each colony entrenched the power
of adults by codifying specific chronological years for voting and office-holding.
Parliament’s 1696 act declaring twenty-one as the national age of enfranchisement
seems to have instigated colonial actions. Prior to 1696, just three colonies had selfdeclared twenty-one as the official voting age: Connecticut (1656), Pennsylvania
(1682), and New Hampshire (1682), and only Pennsylvania had proclaimed it as
part of a founding charter or frame of government. After 1696, each colony codified
21 as the franchise age. Four colonies had twenty-one imposed upon them as part
of William & Mary’s re-chartering process: Massachusetts (1692), Carolina (1696),
71
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Virginia (1699), and New York (1699). The other colonies adopted twenty-one on
their own: North and South Carolina (1715), Rhode Island (1723), Delaware (1734),
and Georgia (1754). Maryland and New Jersey never promulgated an age of
electoral majority prior to America’s break from England, but historian Albert
Edward McKinley asserts that “there is no doubt” that twenty-one “was enforced in
those colonies.”75
Like in England, adolescent males in America increasingly found themselves
politically marginalized as adult lawmakers formalized electoral qualifications.
That process continued when the colonies transitioned to states upon America’s
independence. The military, social, and intellectual upheavals of the Revolution
inspired young people, especially those males aiding the Patriot cause, to stake
practical and ideological claims to suffrage. States received a smattering of
proposals to extend franchise privileges to minors serving in the armed forces. Only
Pennsylvania allowed adolescent soldiers to vote in general elections, but just once
(in spring 1776) before reverting back to the 21-vote tradition upon the writing of a
new state constitution in fall 1776.76 And every state required delegates to
constitutional conventions to be at least twenty-one.
The Revolution caused Americans rethink traditional limits on political
participation, but it did not prompt a radical redefinition of suffrage. Some scholars
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regard the Revolution as fomenting a republican ideology that energized
disfranchised social groups to pursue the benefits of citizenship. They argue that
the egalitarian, contractual, and consent-based philosophy that animated America’s
patriots became a dominant force behind the clamor for including more people into
the political nation.77 During the 1770s and 1780s, the transition of the American
population from subjects to citizens required that persons contributing to the wellbeing of the country should have some say in government. In some states, that
sentiment provided the moral justification to enfranchise women and free blacks.78
Driven by the relationship between taxation and representation, other states
reduced property qualifications or separated voting requirements from owning
property to paying taxes, which allowed poor men in those places a voice in political
decision-making.79
For minors, the transformative power of the Revolution and republicanism
was far weaker: adults remained unshakably in control as Americans seized rule
from the British and formed the federal republic. Suffrage rights for youth were
not on the Patriot political agenda, and no prominent American of the founding era
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publicly challenged the legal or traditional supremacy of adultocracy. America’s
founders fully supported republican forms of government, but they could not justify
allowing minors to vote or hold office. To validate the turn from monarchical
authority, Americans employed an age-based paradigm: since adults possessed the
capacity to reason, born from the wisdom gained from experience, a government
based on the consent of the governed was justified. To maintain the viability of the
claim, America’s Founding Fathers perpetuated the British tradition of defining
electoral consent as an entitlement of age rather than ability. They accomplished
that by writing constitutions that specified when enfranchisement would be granted
to constituents and ignoring how consent could be assessed among the citizenry.
American lawmakers justified the denial of youth enfranchisement and the repeal
of suffrage extended to women and free blacks by raising the specter of an unwise
and unrestrained democratic multitude threatening civil order. As educator
Thomas Cooper exclaimed, “Republicanism is good, but the ‘rights of boys and girls’
are the offspring of Democracy gone mad.” 80
The traditional skepticism about the mental and emotional fitness of young
people served as the main rationale for barring youth suffrage. The customary view
of adolescence as a time of tumult compelled adults to not enfranchise adolescents,
despite youth contributions to securing nationhood and the egalitarian spirit of
republican ideology. In a 1776 letter to a fellow member of the Massachusetts
assembly, John Adams asked rhetorically, “Why set the standard at age twenty-
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one? What reason should there be for excluding a man of twenty years eleven
months and twenty-seven days old, from a vote when you admit one who is twentyone?” Adams answered himself, “The reason is, you must fix upon some period in
life, when the understanding and will of men in general, is fit to be trusted by the
public.”81 To Adams and his adult contemporaries, turning twenty-one served, in
lieu of a common rite of passage, as an arbitrary but necessary marker of civic
maturity signifying social recognition of full adulthood, enfranchisement, and
citizenship. Despite the turn in home rule established by Adams and other
founders, American voting age laws replicated the adultocratic boundaries of
authority defined by British custom. Every state constitution from 1776 through
1943 declared twenty-one as the electoral age of majority.

The basic thesis for age-delaying enfranchisement emphasized that adults would
not grant adolescents suffrage until they gained the cognitive capacities necessary
for balancing the grown-up demands of public and private life. The laws of Athens,
Rome, England, and America each incorporated Aristotle’s view that the
development of self-determination constituted the hallmark of maturity by
constructing an age-graduated process for apportioning decision-making sanction.
By the time the Florida Supreme Court heard Bernard Riley’s case in 1930, he had
attained the traditional social attributes normally associated with adulthood: a
married, self-sufficient, taxpaying householder. In a vital political aspect – his age
John Adams to James Sullivan, 26 May 1776, in The Works of John Adams, Second
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– he remained a child. Riley’s case evidenced that the typical evaluation of
adolescent requests for prerogatives, whether arbitrated by judges, legislators, or
parents, focused narrowly on the chronological age of the petitioner rather than the
content of character or the context of condition. For adolescents, the command to
act one’s age became a doubled-edged sword requiring them to balance comporting
to adult-defined behavioral standards while harnessing their natural impulses for
individual autonomy. Riley’s plea did not ask to overturn statutory orthodoxy; it
simply asked for a share of electoral self-governance equitable to his own personal
sovereignty. The aged judges of the Florida Supreme Court refused to consider
Riley’s life circumstances and instead focused on the legal precedent of denying all
minors, self-sufficient or not, the adult privilege of suffrage.
As Riley learned, adolescents suffered the disabilities of age-based
chauvinism because of a social consensus stereotyping them as reckless, insolent,
and unruly no matter how independent or self-reliant. The term “adolescence”
became code for a pernicious form of prejudice that anchored denials of opportunity
to a chronological bigotry that cut across racial, sexual, and economic
disfranchisements. Juveniles could engage in civic life, but they were not entrusted
with civil authority. Conceptions of adolescents as congenitally inferior creatures
informed the contrivance of adultocracy to harness their dynamism. Adults feared
that the innate defiance of adolescents would morph into fanaticism and, possibly,
anarchy if not checked. Adultocracy granted grown-ups absolute power and special
privileges because they appeared, as Aristotle averred, naturally possessed with the
41

equanimity to govern sensibly and the experience to rule wisely.
The adult consensus that only persons of majority age possessed the cache of
wisdom and experience to vote and hold office smacked of autocracy. Many
adolescents had similar, if not better, cognitive abilities than adults but were unfranchised because of age-based chauvinism. Adults considered young people
incompetent for having the developmental imperfections that, as Aristotle observed,
were “natural” to adolescence. Teen-aged persons, especially those emancipated
like Bernard Riley, became politically anomalous: they possessed the requisite
personal skills to live independently but were denied the electoral license to shape
the political life of the nation they inhabited. The great risk of democracy is that
the state trusts individual judgement to make the electoral and governmental
decisions necessary for its preservation. Because adults simply did not trust
supposedly stressed-out and rebellious adolescents to carry out democratic tasks
maturely, they consciously constructed a tyranny of the legal majority that favored
age over ability. American adolescents vowed that if given a genuine opportunity
by adult authorities to prove their mettle, they would secure their right to vote.
That chance came during World War II.
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CHAPTER III
WAR, YOUTH, AND SUFFRAGE, 1940-1945

This is no easy war. It means the continuation of democracy or the end of it, so it is
a pretty serious war for us. We have sent hundreds of thousands of soldiers abroad,
and while they are fighting for democracy abroad it is just as important for us to
preserve democracy at home. And the most important part of that is the right to
vote.
John J. Bennett, New York State Attorney General82

D-Day, 6 June 1944, began badly for Allied invasion forces. German
defenders along the ridgelines of the coasts of Normandy, France, poured mortar
shells and machine-gun fire into enemy platoons stuck on the beach. Allied
strategists planned to spread the assault over five beaches, each given special code
names. The Germans put up the toughest resistance on Omaha beach, where Allied
invaders suffered an 80% casualty rate, the highest of the five attack points.83 The
recollections of the surviving paratroopers, foot soldiers, and marines starkly
describe the harrowing experiences of the day’s combat. Bernard Friedenberg, a
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medic assigned to the 16th Infantry Regiment’s Medical Detachment, remembered
vividly a young soldier at Omama with a gaping chest wound. Friedenberg quickly
diagnosed that only constant pressure on the wound could stave off the GI’s death.
As his hands worked to control the bleeding, he heard the desperate cries of
“Medic!” from other troops who needed his immediate attention. Friedenberg now
faced an awful quandary. Should he stay with the patient, who was most likely to
die regardless, or leave him to save other lives? At that moment, Friedenberg
understood the grave consequences of his battlefield assessments. “Who should live
and who should die,” he wrote, “is not a decision a twenty one year old boy should
have to make. It is a decision only God should make but where was God?”84
Friedenberg shot the GI full of morphine to ease his pain and moved on to treat
another injured soldier.
Wartime America asked young men like Sergeant Friedenberg to make such
tough, life-changing choices. American youths threw themselves into the work of
war. On front lines and factory floors, they labored with conviction and devotion.
Yet the government that willingly sent 18-, 19-, and 20-year-olds into battle
willfully refused to enfranchise them. Advocates of youth suffrage exposed the
hypocrisy of employing adolescents to defend democracy while denying them
electoral rights. They pushed the issue into the national political arena by framing
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it as one of reward. Youths deserved enfranchisement because of their meritorious
service. State and federal lawmakers put forward bills to reduce legal suffrage ages
from twenty-one to nineteen or eighteen. Except for Georgia, wartime governments
rejected those proposals.
Two interconnected factors influenced wartime debates regarding voting
ages: legal structures parceling opportunities to proffer consent by age and social
conceptions defining adolescents as immature and recalcitrant. The recent (ca.
1900) social subscription to a liminal (i.e. prolonged) adolescence fused onto the preexisting structure of gradated majority ages. Together, beliefs in liminality and the
piecemealing of full legal standing had bolstered the abiding consensus that teenage
persons needed some time to develop the temperament and judgment necessary to
execute the grown-up tasks of civic life. An advocate for establishing eighteen as the
national voting age identified the conundrum of youth: “These young people, who
certainly could be trusted to exercise the citizen’s prerogative to vote, are still
chained to our elders’ concept of ‘legal age.’”85 Supporters of the 18-vote argued that
the circumstances of war had upset those convictions by plunging adolescents into
adult situations. In an April 1943 poll, George Gallup’s American Institute of
Public Opinion revealed that many Americans sympathized with the plight of the
unfranchised underage soldier. A Gallup interviewer summarized, “The majority
feel that since the Army can use the judgment of this age group to good advantage,
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there seems no good reason why the same judgment would not work in politics.”86
Opponents conceded that the stellar war service of youth appeared to make them
deserving of suffrage. But to enfranchise all 18-, 19-, and 20-year-olds because of
the patriotic actions of a few gallant youth obfuscated the longstanding recognition
of teenage persons as “immature and unstable as they stand in the swirl of
adolescence.”87
Several obstacles blocked revising voting ages during World War II. Some
lawmakers thought adolescents should be enfranchised as recompense for duties
performed, but many, including President Franklin Roosevelt, did not reckon youth
suffrage a political priority in the midst of war. Most members of Congress,
particularly conservatives, believed federal legislation to set a national voting age in
American elections violated the states’ constitutional right to determine the
qualifications of electors. Many policymakers heartily acknowledged the vital
contributions of young people to the war effort, but, like their adult constituents,
they did not readily accept adolescents as capable voters. Though government
officials relied on young combatants to make mature decisions on the battlefield,
they distrusted adolescent citizens to choose sensibly at the ballot box. Nor did
young people appear all that interested in obtaining suffrage. When asked, most
individual teenagers agreed with the reasoning that a person old enough to fight for
democracy was old enough to be afforded the full franchise of democratic
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citizenship. Yet, adolescents did not collectively mobilize or campaign on behalf of
their own enfranchisement. As a result, neither superb war service nor stirring
democratic appeals yielded voting rights for American youth.

Fighting World War II fostered a high degree of social unity among
Americans. The clarity of the battle between democratic good v. totalitarian evil
inspired them to toil tirelessly and enthusiastically for victory. Like other social
groups, America’s youth rallied to help win the war. Enthused by the spirit of
collective purpose, teen-aged Americans joined the “Arsenal of Democracy” that
churned out enough tanks, planes, ships, and armaments to overwhelm the Axis.
Thousands of other adolescents, particularly males, enlisted in the armed forces.
The labors and sacrifices of young people, similar to other social groups, helped to
vanquish fascism and established democratic societies in Europe and Asia.
Young Americans accepted the national consensus that World War II was
being fought to defend the right of all persons to have self-determination and to live
in security. Even left-wing youth groups that had criticized the war as a needless
conflict to enrich western capitalists ardently supported the fight against fascism
after Pearl Harbor. One leader of the Youth Communist League declared, “Our
objective was and is: every YCL member a Production Commando.”88 The selfevident need for youth to serve and the clarity of the cause that America fought for
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inspired adolescents to accept the grown-up obligations of warfare. As one lad
declared,
I, as an individual, will do my utmost to help in national
defense, and will do all in my power to protect my country
from any country who tries to destroy democracy. I will be
ready at any time to be called upon for national defense, if
it is for the army or in my community or in a factory. I will
do all I can to express to other people my thoughts on what
a free country means to me. In other words, I love to be an
American, and I want to stay that way.89
Factors such as race, gender, class, ethnicity, and religion differentiated the
war experiences of youth. But, in the context of war service, all adolescents
yearned to be, or be seen as, adults; i.e. persons capable of determining their own
fates or courses of action without compulsion. Adolescents saw World War II as an
opportunity to overcome age-based prejudice through their achievements. Historian
James Marten posits that warfare has usually allowed young people to escape
“prewar restraints on their behavior and limits on their imaginations.”90 Youth in
wartime America hoped to accelerate their advancement into adulthood by
showcasing their skills and aptitudes. They believed adults would accept them as
first-class citizens by exhibiting their willingness to sacrifice, soldier, and sweat for
the Allied cause. Many young people, like Bernard Friedenberg, disproved the
stereotypes of youth irresponsibility through their splendid service. Many
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adolescents even chose to withdraw from school, knowing full well the long-term
ramifications of an incomplete education, to secure the esteem of “mister,” “Mrs.,” or
“sergeant” rather than remain classified as a “kid” or a “teenager.”91
Adult authorities publicly and repeatedly deemed young citizens a necessary
part of the fight. A pre-war report authored by the National Youth Administration
predicted: “That the nation needs the loyalty and cooperation of its youth, now and
in the days to come, is not to be questioned.”92 President Roosevelt, in a speech
before the International Students Association, declared that the Allied cause was
“the cause of youth itself . . . youth must fight the battles and bear the
responsibilities of the peace to follow.”93 Adults encouraged Washington officials to
mobilize youth manpower. A March 1942 poll conducted by George Gallup’s
American Institute of Public Opinions revealed that 82% of respondents agreed that
“all men and women over 18 who are not already in military service” should be
“required to register with the government for some kind of civilian defense or war
work.”94 And adults lavishly praised youth for superlative service. In a 1944
editorial, the Chicago Tribune lauded those “tens of thousands of boys whose
ordinary prospect in peace times would have been limited by the theory of juvenile
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delinquency, the teen-age tradition, who are now out with the army, navy, and coast
guard, in combat or in training for combat, doing a man’s job and probably with
more than the ordinary adult’s vigor, resiliency, and instinctive courage.”95
Such declarations clarify adult appreciation of youth, but scholars disagree
over the intentions of adults to draw young people into the war effort. Robert
William Kirk contends that adults encouraged them to participate for material (to
collect needed war supplies) and personal (to develop character) reasons.96 William
M. Tuttle, Jr. holds that the involvement of youth had mainly a political motive (to
embrace democratic values).97 Whatever their aim, many adults believed that
united war service might rekindle a sense of intergenerational comity that had been
lost during the Great Depression. An Army recruitment poster targeted toward
youth emphasized, “This fight is for your country. You must make sure it’s your

victory too!”98
Adults, however, kept youth from full immersion into the war because of the
age prejudice inherent to the storm-stress model of adolescence. The cultural
understanding of adolescence as a naturally turbulent period framed teenagers as a
discrete social group mentally and emotionally ill-equipped to handle the mature
tasks of grown-up life. Historian Anthony M. Platt shows how G. Stanley Hall’s
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identification of adolescence as a “problem” spurred state intrusion into the private
sphere to “save” youths from their inherent deviancy.99 Over the first four decades
of the 20th century, adults utilized Hall’s prescription for a prolonged adolescence to
intensify public control over young people. Authorities designed juvenile courts,
compulsory education laws, and prohibitions on child labor to protect the best
interests of minors and assist their transition to adult status but, in the process,
they institutionalized chronological segregation. Sociologist David Bakan contends
that such enactments imparted a modern calibration of ages that divided
adolescence and adulthood at the high-school years, particularly eighteen – the
customary year of graduation.100
To avoid carping about the science of adolescent development, government
administrators utilized the age gradations of secondary school as the rubric for the
dividing and sub-dividing of civic assignments. For instance, the War Labor Board
allowed children as young as fourteen to obtain work permits, but only if they had
completed the eighth grade, passed a physical examination, and received
permission from their parents.101 Influenced by the custom of a prolonged
adolescence but tempted by the weighty burdens of war to mobilize all youth,
civilian and military authorities disagreed over when they would allow young
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people to serve autonomously (i.e. without the need for parental consent) as workers
and soldiers. After some debate, federal officials chose sixteen as the minimum age
of employment and eighteen as the age floor for conscription.
Those decisions sparked a generational quarrel over the service role of youth.
Underage adolescents saw themselves as associate partners in the campaign,
players who possessed talents and abilities exceptionally suited for modern warfare.
Teenagers understood clearly how their efforts, irrespective of their youthful age
and inexperience, directly connected to the defense of freedom at home and around
the globe. And they insisted upon having their fair share of the work load. A
Census Bureau survey in April 1944 showed that 20% of males aged fourteen and
fifteen and more than 25% aged sixteen and seventeen were gainfully employed.
Fewer teenage girls worked, in aggregate, than boys, but the report revealed that
33% of females aged sixteen to eighteen had jobs. Moreover, 35% of all adolescents
(primarily boys) between ages sixteen and eighteen had left school altogether and
gone to work.102 A wartime study of young males found, however, that well over
half of them desired “adult” service activities and deemed their current position
(usually part-time manual labor) was not “big enough” to assist the war effort
meaningfully.103
Federal war planners viewed juveniles as adjunct assistants to adult labor,

102

U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Teen-Age Youth in the Wartime Labor Force,” Monthly

Labor Review 60, no. 1 (January 1945): 6-17.

Ronald Lippett and Alvin Zander, “A Study of Boy Attitudes Toward Participation in the
War Effort,” Journal of Social Psychology 17, no. 2, (May 1943): 309-325.
103

52

helpers who would act as subordinates and make secondary contributions to war
activities. Public authorities sought to look out for the best interests of young
people, and the war effort itself, by striving to protect unsure and unqualified
youths from harmful or overwhelming situations. The system for acclimating teenaged people to war service apportioned tasks along a stepped structure of
chronology-based eligibility standards, resembling closely the graduated allocation
of responsibilities forged by age of majority laws. War administrators limited
adolescents to roles that adults thought young people could handle relative to the
magnitude of the task. Adult perceptions of youth capability rather than
demonstrations of aptitude or interest initiated the drawing of age lines. As
historian Joseph Kett asserts, “Adolescence was essentially a conception of behavior
imposed on youth, rather than an empirical assessment of the way in which young
people actually behaved.”104
Following the cues of Paul V. McNutt, chairman of the War Manpower
Commission, civilian authorities outlined a program for youth service founded on
educational age gradations.105 Adults enlisted junior-high school children as
“salvagers.” They mainly recycled consumer goods and collected donations of,
among other things, scrap metal, fats, and money, activities usually chosen and
organized by school administrators.106 Besides meeting national material needs,
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adults also encouraged participation in scrap collection, historian Robert William
Kirk claims, for psychological reasons, such as “improving character through
practicing diligence, enhancing patriotism, developing a sense of purpose in children
in order to reach a common goal, preventing their delinquency, and lessening
children’s fears and insecurity.”107 The war work of junior-high youth functioned
more as volunteerism, purposefully expending time and energy directed at
benefitting society. They grew frustrated that their young age excluded them from
assisting the war effort in an independent manner; a psychologist reported that
they deeply resented “being treated like babies when there is so much vital work to
be done.”108 Young adolescents believed themselves to be contributing to the war
effort but became impatient to experience the sense of personal triumph and feeling
of patriotic amity associated with autonomous, rather than adjunctive, war service.
Authorities regarded high-school teens as homefront “reservists” available
for, but not yet fully capable of, war duty. Their war work more resembled
employment, or the deliberate use of labor to perform the jobs of war.109 As youths
grew older, the age shelters that had protected them from full immersion into the
war gradually fell. And adults insisted high-schoolers put aside the high jinks of
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teendom to take on the serious duties of citizenship. In a story about female war
service, reporter Yolande Gwin noted that “Betty Co-ed of 1943 is not the dating,
dancing, and frivolous young student as were her predecessors. . . . Her daily
schedule is taken in the tempo of war rather than peace and her spare time is taken
in doing her part for her country rather than for herself.”110 The main task of highschool age youth was to gain the education and training fundamental to their
imminent war duties. While in the process of getting ready to work or fight, they
participated in homefront preparedness. Adults usually coordinated the important
rear-guard activities, such as taking part in civil defense, war bond sales, Red Cross
first aid, and messenger service. In less vital ventures, like forming “anti-rumor”
squads, planting backyard gardens, and assisting rationing boards, teenagers were
given slight supervisory agency. When working together, the roles of males and
females often, but not always, differed. Boys generally carried out managerial
errands or manual labor, while girls performed clerical work or served as support
staff.111
The expectation of adults that secondary-school students would make
significant, but supervised, contributions to the war effort did more to reinforce civil
paternalism than develop youth autonomy. The notion that adolescents would
benefit from adult-imposed structure, order, and discipline formed the ideological
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core of age relations during the war. Gladys Huntington Bevans, a nationallysyndicated home-affairs columnist, counseled her parent-readers to tamp the
precocious, though patriotic, desires of their high-school aged children to rush into
war service. Rather than prematurely endure the pressures of handling orders by
officers or bosses, teenagers, she advised,
should have during this part of their adolescence the
guidance and championship of their parents and the
developing influence of home. Under the most favorable
circumstances this fast maturing period that is often
accompanied by bewilderment asto conduct and ideals.
Teen age boys and girls often find it difficult to adjust to
the world. They are not ready at 13 or 15 for the experiences
and shocks of war. Rather do they need those years at
home to build up their bodies and their characters to better
fit them to fight for their country.112
Like Bevans, most every adult believed that anxiety-ridden juveniles needed
and desired guidance in finding self-definition.113 Authorities could, therefore,
simultaneously exploit adolescents for their adult-like capabilities and treat them
like dependent children. Historian Joseph Kett contends that one of the
continuities in youth history is adolescent wavering between states of dependence
and semi-independence, especially during times of national strife. He writes,
“Young people at times experienced a halfway blend of freedom and restraint, with
elements of freedom becoming more pronounced over time. But at other points they
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were exposed to temporally alternating opportunities for independence and adult
responsibility on one side and demands for submission on the other.”114 Traditional
dogma about the storms and stresses of adolescence mandated that adults check
teen impulses for the good of society and the war effort. Restricting youth to a
narrow range of adult-approved activities, however, mitigated the hopes of
adolescents to leverage their war ventures to break the customary confines of
chronology.
Many young people, of course, found the adult-imposed, age-based structure
of mobilization conspicuously neglectful of ambition and ability. They viewed the
system as poignantly un-democratic as they strove for the chance to work and fight
against fascism on par with other citizens. Youths also perceived a fundamental
hypocrisy in the conflicting messages authorities conveyed. Adults insisted that
teenagers act maturely while helping the cause, but they treated adolescents as if
they were incapable of mature behavior or deeds. Scholar Richard M. Ugland finds
that juveniles grew more dismayed than delinquent over their inability to assist the
war effort fully. He quotes from a 1942 report issued by the Progressive Education
Association that concluded, “’Youth have suffered more from the frustration of not
being invited to share in solving real problems than from being overtaxed in
working at them.’”115 Over the course of the war, Ugland concludes, adolescents
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became more and more perplexed by their marginalization. As a girl from
Indianapolis wrote, “’We know we’ve got to do something; we know we’ve got to go
out there and help. . .or we’ll go crazy but what can we do?’”116
Adolescent Americans who worked and fought for democracy considered
themselves worthy of political privileges. Traditional adult concerns about teen
credulity, though, motivated a stunting of political involvement among adolescents.
The chaos of the Great Depression pushed millions of young Americans, particularly
college students, to join political advocacy groups. The American Youth Congress
emerged as the unofficial spokesman for the young. It was an umbrella
organization of diverse student and youth groups, including the Boy Scouts and
Young Communist League, that supported liberal positions, such as the creation of
federal scholarships for education, abolition of child labor, and elimination of
warfare.117 In 1937, the AYC became the first student group to advocate publicly
for reducing voting ages to eighteen.118 Though the AYC and other youth
organizations condemned communism and fascism, adults thought malleable young
minds might succumb to charismatic Pied Pipers of radicalism, foreign-born and
homegrown.119 In October 1940, Mrs. William Hastings, first vice president of the
116
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National Congress of Parents and Teachers, asserted, “Corruption of our youth by
subversive propaganda is a violation of our American liberties regardless of highsounding names of hypocritical ‘front’ organizations. Certainly we have a right to
inquire about the character of our children’s education; to see that they are taught
the true principles of Americanism and nothing else.”120 The Educational Policies
Commission of the National Education Association issued a report in November
1940 summarizing the results of a nationwide investigation into high-school
programs for civic preparation. The Commission concluded that, on the whole,
secondary school graduates were “’loyal to the ideals of democracy’” and “’wellinformed on many political and economic questions.’” It labeled the time gap
between graduation and the attainment of suffrage a “’distinct problem’” and
recommended lowering voting ages to eighteen to maintain the civic consciousness
of young adults.121
Members of the NCPT and NEA and other public officials did not fear young
people publically goose-stepping or subverting the republic. They did have a
concern for the political thoughts and talents of youth on the eve of World War II as
part of their general worry about the global state of democracy. In the context of a
war proclaimed as a democratic crusade, adult concern for political socialization
made ideological and practical sense. Public officials strove to cultivate among
young people a sense of personal ownership in America’s democratic system. Gene
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Tunney, former heavyweight boxing champion of the 1920s, organized the Young
Voters’ Exchange to coordinate local and state efforts that worked to get young
people active in civic life. Tunney avowed, “They are the reservoir, the new blood of
democracy. If we can get them excited about the privileges and duties of
citizenship, our democracy lives. If not, it sickens and dies.”122 Tunney and other
public leaders urged adolescents to self-engage by studying the governmental
system, investigating contemporary issues, and forming political beliefs. Seventeen
magazine, a periodical aimed at teen-age girls, editorialized: “The only people who
are too young to . . . have political opinions are the truly infantile who can’t read,
and the perpetually young who don’t read.”123 In a war to defend democracy, elders
placed great pressure on young Americans to uphold the tenets of the republic by
performing their civic duties – even if voteless.
The first congressional conversations regarding youth suffrage emerged as a
result of disagreement about the age of conscription. The push for draft legislation
came from the Military Training Camps Association, a small but vocal group that
had been a part of the pre-war “preparedness” movement. In May 1940, it started a
lobbying campaign for compulsory military service. The issue of conscription
became extremely controversial. Opponents included the education establishment,
major religious groups, organized labor, the pacifist movement, and Republican
isolationists. Some of them argued an antebellum draft was unconstitutional
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because in 1918 the Supreme Court upheld the legality of involuntary induction but
only in times of war.124 Other draft foes charged financiers and arms
manufacturers were pressing for conscription to maximize profits under the guise of
defending democratic principles, rekindling fears that the so-called “merchants of
death” would again trick America into entering a European war. Most congressmen
backed the use of volunteers, particularly unmarried and childless young men,
before resorting to conscription.125
The Nazi sweep across Europe, and, in particular, France’s surrender to
Germany in June 1940 tilted congressional opinion toward acceptance of a
peacetime draft. On 21 June 1940, one day before France fell, Senator Edward
Burke (D-NE) and Representative James Wadsworth, Jr. (R-NY) each filed
legislation proposing to make able-bodied males ages 18 to 65 available for
enlistment.126 Lawmakers agreed that men in the lower age brackets (18 to 30-35)
should be drafted first. They wrangled mostly over the age floor of conscription.
Some congressmen agreed with 18, the accepted age for full combat participation
during World War I. Other legislators wanted it raised to 21 to match the
traditional age of majority and the original conscription age set in the Selective
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Service Act of 1917.127
The American public generally supported the return of conscription. A Life
magazine poll taken in July 1940 revealed that 71% favored “the immediate
adoption of compulsory military training for all young men.”128 A month later,
George Gallup found that 67% of males between sixteen and twenty-one and 61% of
young men 21-to-24 supported the principle of a peacetime draft.129 Isolationists in
Congress acknowledged that the poll results mirrored a shift in public opinion from
favoring complete neutrality to supporting limited aid to the Allies. They
strenuously objected to the Burke-Wadsworth bill, however, arguing peacetime
enlistment would precipitate actual American intervention in the war.130
Isolationist groups picketed Capitol Hill and crowded the galleries in the House and
Senate seeking to derail Burke-Wadsworth.131 The draft issue also sparked protests
by left-wing student organizations, such as the American Youth Congress,
American Youth Committee, Youth Committee Against War, Young People’s
Socialist League, and American Student Union, that had advocated pacifism or
isolationism since the 1930s.132 As Congress debated conscription ages during the
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first week of September 1940, Washington, D.C. police dispersed over 1,500 young
people demonstrating against coerced induction. Some opposed conscription
altogether; others supported the Burke-Wadsworth bill but assailed plans to limit
the call-up to males in their 20s.133 No adversaries to the draft law mentioned the
incongruity between the conscription and disfranchisement of young men since
America was not yet at war.
In early September, a joint House-Senate committee set ages 21 to 65 as the
range for registration and 21 to 35 as the ages eligible for induction to military
duty. The committee did not conjure original age spans; rather, it borrowed from
age classifications used by American armies during the Civil War and World War
I.134 On 14 September, the House and Senate approved the committee bill, known
officially as the Selective Training and Service Act. President Roosevelt signed it
into law two days later.135 The act required every male from 21 to 35, regardless of
race or nationality, to enroll in the Selective Service system. Registered men could
volunteer before being called, and volunteers could choose their branch of military
service. In October 1940, the first peacetime draft in America’s history commenced.
The government selected men through a lottery system administered by local draft
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boards. Conscientious objectors were offered a choice between noncombatant
military duty or alternative service. Draftees were required to serve one 12-month
enlistment, and were limited to duty only in the Western Hemisphere or U.S.
territories.136 These restrictions on service reflected the nation’s lingering
isolationism, suspicions of militarism, and reluctance to fight except for defensive
reasons.
As the international pressures to enter the war increased in 1941, federal
officials pondered reducing the minimum age for draft eligibility. In April 1941, as
Axis armies conquered southern and eastern Europe, the War Department
announced a tentative proposal to lower the conscription age to 18 and begin a
compulsory military training program for youths as young as 17 and up to age 21.
“At present,” the Chicago Tribune reported, “the army has enough older men and
the need is for younger men who are more physically fit for army life.”137 President
Roosevelt and the head of Selective Service, Lewis B. Hershey, declared the plan
“necessary” to prepare a backlog of young men for future combat.138 A May 14 poll
indicated a slight majority (51%) agreed with lowering the draft floor to eighteen,
but, as Gallup reminded, 71% had approved it in August 1940.139 Representative
Charles I. Faddis (D-PA), spokesperson for the House Military Affairs Committee,
asserted that no member backed the Army’s plans. Faddis indicated that the
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committee agreed with his belief “that the average 18-year-old boy ‘has not reached
the proper physical development to be able to make as desirable a soldier as he
could.’”140 A woman from San Francisco writing to the Washington Post identified
youth disfranchisement as “the strongest argument” against reducing the
conscription age, lamenting that the “boys of 18” had no say in the issue since they
lacked “a voice in Government.” “If ‘taxation without representation’ was deemed
unbearable to our forefathers, what can one say of ‘taxing’ one’s physical being
without representation?” she asked, “Is a man free who is compelled to risk his
neck, yet is denied the right to vote?”141 In August, Congress dropped the top draft
age from 35 to 28 and increased the term of service for conscripts from twelve to
thirty months. But it did not stray from the 21-draft though the Army insisted it
needed younger, more physically fit troops.142
The national defense emergency caused by Japan’s bombing of Pearl Harbor
changed the public calculus regarding adolescent military service. Of the 1.6
million men enlisted as of December 1941, about half had been drafted under the
Selective Training and Service Act, and most came from the 21 to 28 age class.143
Immediately after the attack, FDR, Hershey, and Henry Stimson, the Secretary of
War, pressed Congress to reset the minimum registration age to either 18 or 19 to
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create a large pool of potential combatants.144 “We may need a lot of men,” Hershey
affirmed, “And we have to find out where we can get them.”145 Some lawmakers
publicly worried the nation could not adequately equip or train a military inflated
by teenage conscripts, while others privately cringed at the notion of compulsory
service for under-age “children.”146 Columnist Walter Lippmann reported that part
of the objection among congressmen to the induction of 18-or-19-year-olds sprung
from a “feeling that those who are too young to vote and enjoy the full privileges of a
citizen should not be called upon to pay the full price of citizenship.”147
On 19 December 1941, Congress amended the Selective Training and Service
Act to require all males between 18 and 64 to register for the draft and to make men
from 20 to 44 eligible for active duty. The revision also removed the prohibition on
duty outside the Western Hemisphere and increased the term of service to the
duration of the war plus six months.148 From 41 million liable registrants, the War
Department projected it could raise a fighting force of 7 million if combat
circumstances required. Though 18- and 19-year-olds were not subject to
compulsory military service, they could be mobilized along with older men for work
in war industries.149 The editors of the Chicago Tribune, a conservative, anti-New
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Deal daily, cheered Congress’s action. “There is no better material for the army
than the youth of 18 or 19,” they stressed,
He has a man’s strength and much more than a man’s recuperative powers. He can enjoy hardships which would
reduce a more mature brother to sullen anger. He is at an
age when obedience comes easily and the capacity to learn
and to adapt to changed circumstances is greater than it
will be a few years hence. What the young man of 19 may
lack in caution can be corrected with training and, in any
event, will be more than balanced by his greater audacity
in times of danger.150
As manpower needs escalated, the pressure to lower the age for active duty
intensified. Military leaders initially projected that an armed force of three million
men would suffice; by February 1942, they expected to need seven million.151 After
the first official registration drive following Pearl Harbor, Selective Service officials
predicted that 18- and 19-year olds (which the War Department estimated to
number nearly 3 million)152 would become eligible for active duty in future
drafts.153 In April 1942, the Army tried to induce pre-draft-age youths to volunteer
by offering them their choice of service branch, which was a departure from regular
enlistment procedure. Parental consent, however, was still required before the
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armed forces would accept an underage recruit.154 In late May, President Roosevelt
ordered 18-and 19-year-old males to complete the Selective Service inventory of the
nation’s available manpower, which several observers claimed was a precursor for
asking Congress to revisit the draft-age floor.155 With American families sending
loved ones off to battle, public opinion regarding lowered draft limit changed; a June
1942 Gallup survey revealed that 52% of persons opposed an 18-19 draft.156 The
parents and grandparents of underage teens candidly voiced their disapproval. A
grandmother, for instance, impugned “the fathers of our democracy” as craven for
contemplating any proposal to “send the children out to fight for them.”157 “If it is
true that men always have to call on children to help fight their wars,” a person
from Washington, D.C. maintained, “then it is high time the voting age be lowered
and children have all the privileges of men.”158
Despite the naval victory at the Battle of Midway and ground advances in
North Africa during the summer of 1942, Secretary of War Stimson stated drafting
18- and 19-year-old youths “would be necessary eventually.”159 House Military
Affairs Committee Chairman Andrew May (D-KY) disagreed. He relayed to parents
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that “private advices”160 assured him that the Allies should bring the war to an end
“probably in 1942 and unquestionably in 1943”; thus, there would be no need to
induct their young sons.161 The exhaustion of unmarried men from the draft rolls,
not battlefield triumph, stirred the War Department to request another review of
the minimum conscription age. In August 1942, Selective Service chief Lewis
Hershey warned married men faced mobilization by Christmas because the
numbers of unwedded draft-age males were rapidly dwindling.162 An unnamed
congressman predicted that the exhaustion of single men from the enlistment rolls
meant the armed forces would renew their request for drafting 18- and 19-year-olds.
“’And if our generals and admirals tell us this is essential to insure victory,’” he
forecast, “I believe Congress will amend the Selective Service Act.”163
When the Democrat-controlled 77th Congress returned from summer break in
September 1942, governmental sentiment leaned toward calling up adolescents
before married men with children.164 A high-ranking Selective Service official told
the Wall Street Journal that conscripting the under-aged would impel Congress to
take on the herculean task of redesigning the system of draft classifications: from
statuses determined primarily by deferments based on marital status, child
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dependency, and employment necessity to those based solely on physical fitness
tests.165 Nevertheless, Republicans and Democrats re-litigated the draft age floor.
On 2 September, Senator Chan Gurney (R-SD) introduced an amendment to the
Selective Training and Service Act that would lower the minimum conscription age
from twenty to eighteen, which was followed on 7 September by a nearly-identical
18-draft bill filed in the House of Representatives by James Wadsworth (R-NY).166
Government officials estimated that including 18- and 19-year-olds would add
somewhere between 2.5 and 3.25 million males to the Selective Service rolls, with
about 1.5 million physically capable of military service.167 House Military Affairs
Committee Chairman May reiterated his personal opposition to conscripting youths
under twenty “’unless I am convinced that the nation actually needs them.” He
added that forthcoming hearings on the Wadsworth proposal would “’give the Army
an opportunity to show the need.”168
Democrats offered two main objections to the Republican proposals. They
said inducting inexperienced youth would put military units at risk and mobilizing
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college-aged teens would endanger America’s productive capacity.169 Republicans
countered that permitting them to be drafted had an advantage over volunteerism:
the provision of adequate preparation by professional military personnel. They
reasoned that, in theory, a more mature 18-year-old conscript would be better
equipped physically to train for combat than an underdeveloped 17-year-old
volunteer.170 As Wadsworth claimed when he submitted his 18-draft amendment,
“History teaches us that these young men will make most effective soldiers when
given thoro[ugh] training and the army will be the better for their being in it.”171
The GOP also warned that unless Congress changed the Selective Service Act to
allow the induction of 18- and 19-year-olds, enormous economic and domestic
dislocations would incur because of need to draft married fathers.172 Newsweek
reported that the chatter about drafting family men “was pumped along partly to
build a fire under Congress to legislate for conscription of 18- and 19-year-olds.”173
Senator Albert J. Engel, Sr. (R-MI) privately expressed to his son that the use of
this tactic by his party was “undoubtedly to crystallize public sentiment which has
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been against the drafting of boys under 20 years of age.”174
House and Senate leaders appeared reluctant to address the 18-draft bills as
thousands of parents loudly protested.175 As the editors of the Washington Post
observed, “The implication right along has been, of course, that since the proposed
measure is bound to be politically unpopular and since elections are in the offing, it
might be better to withhold consideration for the time being.”176 As Congress
dickered, other federal officials pressed the 18-draft issue. The War Department
began by announcing two plans to expand its youth manpower. In mid-September,
it called to duty all draft-age college members of its enlisted reserve, whom had
been allowed educational deferment.177 Less than a month later, it escalated the
recruitment of under-20 volunteers by offering them their choice of service in all
Army branches and the opportunity of qualifying for commissions.178 Then, during
the first two weeks of October, President Roosevelt took to the airwaves to urge
national support for the 18-draft “so that an Army with the spirit and hardihood of
youth may shorten the war with annihilating new offensives”179 Before the radio
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chats, FDR had thought it unnecessary to lower the age of conscription before the
end of 1942.180 Convinced by federal manpower executives that enlisting 18- and
19-year-olds would not disrupt agricultural or industrial production and persuaded
by military brass that more troops were necessary to fight, what one general called,
“’this young man’s war,” Roosevelt reversed his stance – which GOP leaders charged
was nothing more than a political ploy to placate upset constituents before the
upcoming November mid-term elections.181 In response to the president’s call,
committees in the House and Senate took up the Gurney and Wadsworth measures
after weeks of delay.
Cued by the Commander in Chief, Secretary of War Stimson and Army Chief
of Staff George Marshall argued the case for the military necessity of resetting the
age floor of conscription. Stimson claimed only the 18-draft would allow the armed
forces to reach its manpower goal of nine million (7.5 million Army + 1.5. million
Navy). He also provided data that indicated the Army was “too old”: the average
age of a division had climbed exactly two years (26 to 28) from March to August
1942.182 Marshall testified the swift, highly mobile, and mechanized warfare being
fought in Europe, Asia, and Africa “requires youth” because of their comparative
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advantages in physical fitness to older men.183 He also claimed, anecdotally, that
platoons performed poorly because they were staffed with “too many overage men”
who lacked the “vigor and enthusiasm” of young troops.184 Indeed, both Stimson
and Marshall emphasized that adolescent males possessed superior fighting ability
relative to adult men. As Stimson declared,
Members of the 18 and 19 age groups are peculiarly well
adapted to military training. This is a military axiom. Their
response to leadership, their recovery from fatigue, their
enthusiasm, or ‘flair for soldiering,’ are exceptional as compared
with older and younger age groups. The simple fact is, they
are better soldiers and never before in its history has the
American nation more urgently needed exceptional soldiers.185
Other War Department staff echoed Stimson’s beliefs. His adjutant, Major
General James A. Ulio, averred, “In many instances, [18- and 19-year-old males]
have proved to possess not only physical stamina superior to that of older comrades
but more dash and fighting spirit – which when equally trained and equipped
soldiers meet – is the deciding factor in battle.”186 Influential Americans outside of
government concurred. “[B]oys of eighteen are ideal material for pilots,
bombardiers, radiomen, navigators, jeep and tank drivers,” syndicated columnist
Robert Quillen stressed, “They learn fast; they are daring; they are resilient, and,

183

Atlanta Journal, 14 October 1942, 1.

184

Chicago Tribune, 15 October 1942, 12.

185

Ibid, 14 October 1942, 20.

186

Washington Post, 5 October 1942, 1.

74

above all, they have a split-second reaction that is lost in a few years.”187 Eighteenyear-olds also appeared to have other advantages. As William D. Hassett, Harry
Truman’s personal secretary, explained to an Oklahoma congressman that they
“generally have fewer reasons for deferment than older men since they are rarely
fathers, normally have not developed skills making them essential to war industry,
and usually are in better physical condition.”188
The draft-age debate exposed familial splits and professional disagreements
splits regarding youth capabilities. Protective parents and grandparents
emphasized that the inborn juvenility 18- and 19-year-old boys should warrant
further seasoning at home before shipping them abroad. They seemed to agree with
an adult who wrote Survey Graphic magazine that teenagers should have “a chance
to gain experience and independence before going, fresh from school, into war.
Everyone should have at least the right to grow up!”189 While generals and
admirals advocated drafting teenagers, educators and doctors argued that most
youths of 18 or 19 were not psychologically or physically developed enough to stand
the shocks of modern battle. Dr. Thomas V. Moore of Catholic University
recommended to the House Military Affairs Committee that “some effort should be
made to test their emotional maturity, and all those who are emotionally immature
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should be rejected” if Congress decided to lower the draft age.190 Other physicians
recommended underage lads receive a combination of physical and combat training
up to age 20 or 21 before deployment overseas.191 Many adolescent boys, however,
declared themselves immediately fit for duty. A telephone poll of 17, 18, and 19year-old males conducted by George Gallup showed an overwhelming majority
(81%) in favor of a reduced conscription age. Many of the youths surveyed said they
backed the proposal to bypass parental objections to joining the military; as one
respondent admitted, “’I approve lowering the draft age but my parents don’t.’”192
Thousands of young men below age twenty flocked to recruiting offices in
anticipation of a new draft floor. Reports from towns and cities across America
showed a stunning spike of teen volunteers, many of whom abandoned their
schooling to enlist.193
Pressed by Roosevelt, Stimson, and Marshall and pushed by the wave of
underage enlistments, Congress worked quickly to lower the conscription age. On
Thursday, 15 October 1942, after only two days of hearings and less than eighty
hours after the president’s request, the House Military Affairs Committee
unanimously approved James Wadsworth’s proposal to reset the draft age at
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eighteen.194 The next day, the House Rules Committee (the institutional panel that
determines the guidelines that define the length of debate and the nature and
extent of amendment for every major bill shall debated on the House floor)
hurriedly cleared the measure for consideration by the full House under a partial
“gag” rule. It limited deliberation to four hours and restricted changes to the
measure only to amendments seeking to revise the conscription age limits. Also on
Friday the 16th, the Senate Military Affairs Committee unanimously endorsed Chan
Gurney’s 18-draft measure, which was to be delivered to the Senate the following
Monday.195 The committee’s report, clearly impressed by the testimony of Stimson
and Marshall, affirmed,
Not only the success of our armed forces depends upon the
employment of our 18 and 19 year old men as soldiers but
that our very national existence is dependent upon their use.
Members of these age groups are particularly fitted for military
training and combat. Their response to leadership, their
quick recovery from fatigue, their aggressiveness, their enthusiasm, and their ‘flair for soldering’ far exceed such qualities
in other age groups. The simple fact is that they make better
soldiers than persons of other age groups and that America
cannot win unless full use is made of their military capabilities.
Our armed forces must have the qualities that belong to youth.196
Congressional action on the 18-draft decelerated once the bills reached the
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House and Senate floors for deliberation. On 17 October, in an unusual Saturday
session, the House overwhelmingly approved, 345-16, Wadsworth’s measure.197
Before final acclamation, the House was roiled by intense debate over an
amendment filed by Ed Gossett (D-TX) to set the age of conscription at nineteen.
Before Gossett’s motion, Hamilton Fish (R-NY) assailed the “gag” rule limiting floor
action, declaring it forestalled consideration of his plan to require that all teenage
troops receive a year’s worth of training before entering combat. Piggybacking on
Fish’s complaint, Jerry Voorhis (D-CA) supported Gossett’s pitch as a safeguard to
prevent drafting immature 18-year-olds. Harold Cooley (D-NC) angrily attacked
the Wadsworth bill, shouting: “’It doesn’t take a lot of courage, but it take[s] a lot of
gall to take 18-year-old boys and make cannon fodder out of them because you know
that’s what will be done. . . .Has Congress decided to let Boy Scouts fight this
war?’”198 Military Affairs Committee chair Andrew May calmed the chamber by
offering his personal regrets that teenage boys had to fight at all, with or without
preparatory training, but he beseeched his colleagues “’to be brave. Let’s get this
job over with and let’s get the job of licking Hitler and Tojo over with.’”199
Anticipating ratification of Wadsworth’s bill by the Senate, King George VI of Great
Britain signed a proclamation making English males 18 years of age liable for
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military service.200
The chief threat to speedy passage of the 18-draft in the Senate was an antivice amendment filed by Joshua Lee (D-OK). In advance of the debate regarding
the House-approved conscription bill, civic organizations and parents (particularly
mothers) bombarded senators with letters and telegrams demanding they provide
teenage enlistees “special safeguards” for their education, military training, and
recreation.201 Anxious adults had seemingly shifted their concerns about
conscripting 18- and 19-year-olds from worries about their physical and emotional
capacities to soldier to distress about maintaining their moral turpitude within the
rowdy, macho culture of the camp environment. Lee responded to the communiqué
barrage by proposing to ban prostitution and liquor sales in and around military
posts. On 19 October 1942, the Senate Military Affairs Committee rebuffed Lee’s
tender, 7-1.202 After Lee vowed to bring his amendment to the Senate floor, military
officials moved to undermine it. Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox said Lee’s plan
would wreck troop morale.203 Secretary of War Henry Stimson claimed he had no
objection to the anti-prostitution article but dreaded the prohibition section would
encourage bootlegging.204 Many senators concurred; as Millard Tydings (D-MD)
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emphasized, “’I think liquor is one of the greatest curses that ever afflicted the
human race. . .but heaven knows I do not want to go back to the Capone era all over
again.”205 Other senators blasted Lee for attempting to inject a moral “diversion”
into a debate on military affairs. Some lawmakers insisted that adolescent
conscripts were “old enough” to make independent choices about their private lives.
Senator Robert LaFollette, Jr. (R-WI) asked, “’Why should we assume that these
men who are fighting to preserve our country don’t know enough to be careful in
their personal habits? Why should be discriminate against them?’”206 On 22
October, the Senate killed Lee’s prohibition rider 45-29.207
Two days later, the Senate voted to accept the House-approved 18-draft bill
but added an amendment, offered by Lee O’Daniel (D-TX), requiring a 12-month
training period for all soldiers under age twenty before deployment into combat.208
Senators heatedly clashed over the necessity of mandatory training, and,
collaterally, the military’s stated need for adolescent conscripts. Prewar
isolationists, particularly Robert Taft (R-OH), George Norris (I-NE), and Hiram
Johnson (D-CA), strongly supported the bipartisan drive for the 1-year training
program. Johnson insisted it was necessary because “’these are our children. These
children have a right to their little span of life, their little fling at happiness, just as
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we have had ours. . . .Give youth some other opportunity than to die.’”209 President
Roosevelt tried to intervene by sending a letter to the Senate, read aloud by Chan
Gurney, imploring it to accept the view of Stimson and other military leaders that
the 12-month preparation course would needlessly shackle war planning and troop
deployment.210 The Senate tacked the training provision to the 18-draft bill
anyway. Its decision meant a joint congressional conference had to settle the
differences between the Senate and House versions of the legislation. The
conference would not meet for another two weeks, however, because of a work break
to allow congressmen an opportunity to campaign before the 3 November 1942 midterm elections.
Being the first national election held after Pearl Harbor, the 1942 mid-terms
allowed voters their first chance to express their opinion of federal war
management. The plebiscite revealed much displeasure with the paucity of military
success and the surfeit of bureaucratic regulations. The people appeared restless
that battlefield progress against the Axis had proved elusive after the U.S. victory
at the Battle of Midway the previous June. And at the time of the election, the
Marines were stalemated at Guadalcanal. Americans seemed particularly
perturbed with the government agencies that ran the war economy and especially
annoyed by the rationing of consumer goods, wage and price controls, tax increases,
limits on commerce and trade, and rising inflation. Republicans benefitted from the
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public disenchantment with Washington, winning 44 seats in the House and 9 in
the Senate. Though the Democrats still maintained a 222-209 House majority (with
four independents) and a 57-38 majority in the Senate (also with four
independents), the election results indicated that voters wanted the GOP to temper
the statist tendencies of Congress and the White House.211
Some Democrats said congressional actions to lower the conscription age from
twenty to eighteen cost them important votes, principally among the parents and
grandparents of draft-eligible boys. About a month after his party’s pummeling,
Kent Keller, a staunch New Dealer from Illinois, wrote to Vice President Henry
Wallace that familial concern over the issue created “’a swelling chorus’” among
mothers that their “’very babes (for all children remain babies to all mothers) were
being sent out by Roosevelt to be killed in HIS war. And they voted that
conviction.’”212 The stunning results of the mid-term may have caused Keller and
other incredulous Democrats to overstate the electoral impact of the mother-voters.
Yet, two of the foremost liberal incumbents to lose their seats – Joshua Lee and
George Norris – were prominently embroiled in the draft-age kerfuffle just before
election-time.
Following the mid-terms, lawmakers rushed to solve the 18-draft dilemma
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before the 77th Congress concluded, as scheduled, in mid-December. In the morning
of Wednesday, 10 November 1942, the joint legislative committee stripped the 1year, mandatory training amendment from the conscription-age proposal; that
afternoon, the House adopted the committee measure with a “mighty roar” viva
voce.213 The Senate ratified the bill the following day also via voice vote.214 On 13
November 1942, President Roosevelt signed the 18-draft into law.215 The Teenage
Draft Act was the last major legislation passed by the 77th Congress.
In adopting a clean (i.e. no pre-combat training provision) draft bill, Congress
acquiesced to military necessity. Lawmakers listened to the pleas of President
Roosevelt, Secretary Stimson, and General Marshall for young troops to be made
immediately available and believed their assurances that teenage conscripts would
be adequately prepped for battle. With the Army entering the fight against the
Germans at North Africa, the Navy struggling to sweep the Axis out of the Pacific
and Atlantic Oceans, and the Marines stymied at Guadalcanal, congressmen
understood that allowing the armed forces instant access to the approximately
100,000 youths who turned eighteen each month was essential to victory.216
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Representative Dewey Short (R-MO) summarized the thoughts of many of his
congressional colleagues in explaining the main objections to the compulsory
training amendment. “’It is a terrible thing to draft youths 18 and 19 years of age
and send them forth into battle to die,” he exclaimed, “But we are engaged in a
devastating war and we’re not going to defeat the Nazis and Japs with 45 year old
potbellies. . . .Let us do nothing to hamstring our military efforts. Who, in the name
of God, is going to tell us what is “adequate training” unless we leave it to the
military leaders themselves?’”217 The urgent need for combatants, as so wellarticulated by the armed forces chiefs, also swung public opinion. A Gallup poll
released after the mid-term elections showed 67% (men 73%, women 60%)
supported the drafting of 18- and 19-year-old young men, a clear change from the
slight majority who opposed it back in June. In addition, a “special survey” of
under-20 youths showed 81% approved lowering the conscription age to eighteen.218
As the joint congressional conference met, college-aged youths sent letters and
declarations petitioning lawmakers to drop the training requirement from the 18draft bill. Typical of the messages was a note from Dartmouth College’s
undergraduate governing council: “’We think that the Senate amendment would
only hamstring our generals at a time when speedy action is necessary for our
successes and for the success and relief of our Allies.’”219
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After the change of the draft age, American combat units in the final two
years of the war were mainly staffed by men in their early 20s who had been
conscripted as older teens in 1943 or 1944. Establishment of the 18-draft affected
the age demography of the U.S. armed forces. The average age of an American
soldier was 26, sailor 23, and Marine 22.220 In September 1943, Congress briefly
discussed and quickly rejected drafting 17-year-olds (for lacking “maturity”) as part
of a bill to exempt fathers from conscription.221 Beginning in December 1943,
fathers were called to duty, with those in the 18 to 21 age group inducted first.222
Sending teenage sons into combat distressed parents like no other issue of the war.
A small contingent of mothers wrote the St. Louis Globe-Democrat to complain that
“boys of 18 and 19 are too young to go to war, too youthful to be sent in to settle a
gory mess.” “If they’re not old enough to vote,” the mothers concluded, “they’re not
old enough to take the place of the oldsters in the fighting ranks.”223
Public consternation about fixing a national conscription age initiated the
first significant congressional discussion about setting a national age of
enfranchisement. Going into World War II, every state limited voting rights to
persons age 21 and over. Youth suffrage proponents hoped to declare eighteen as
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the minimum federal voting age. The U.S. Constitution did not declare a majority
age of enfranchisement or specifically prohibit persons under age 21 from voting.
The only statement in the Constitution referencing age in relation to suffrage
occurred in the Fourteenth Amendment. It forbade states from abridging or
denying “to any of the male inhabitants . . . being twenty-one years of age” the right
to vote in federal elections “except for participation in rebellion, or other crime.”224
The intent of the wartime legislation was to establish a uniform national voting age
since none existed and not to reduce an existing age by two or three years.
On 17 October 1942, the same day the House voted to reduce the draft age to
eighteen, Representative Victor Wickersham (D-OK) offered the first youth suffrage
amendment. He proposed to set eighteen as the voting age for federal elections.225
The 36-year-old Wickersham had spent most of his political career as the court clerk
of Greer County, Oklahoma, before being elected to Congress in spring 1941 to fill a
vacancy caused by the death of Sam C. Massingale.226 Wickersham was known for
his dedication to constituent service and his affability (e.g. he always answered his
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telephone by saying “Hello, this is Victor Wickersham, your best friend”). 227 He also
had a reputation for helping young people, as a 17-year-old from Frederick, OK,
remarked upon requesting information from Wickersham about a career in
journalism: “I have heard a great deal of your interest in the young people of our
district.”228 Wickersham routinely courted potential young voters by writing
congratulatory letters to junior- high, senior-high, and college graduates.229 He did
not make any public statement in Congress or to the press about his 18-vote
proposal. Whether Wickersham was motivated by his “continued interest in the
youth of our nation” or moved by the House vote to reduce the draft age to eighteen
remains unclear.230
Two days after Wickersham filed his resolution, the Senate began debate on
the House-approved legislation to subject 18- and 19-year-old males to conscription.
In the midst of the deliberations, Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI), 58-year-old
dean of the GOP’s isolationist wing, offered an amendment that would set the
national voting age at eighteen for both federal and state elections. Prompted by
his opposition to the pending conscription bill, Vandenberg stated upon filing his
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motion: “If young men are to be drafted at 18 years of age to fight for their
Government, they ought to be entitled to vote at 18 years of age for the kind of
government for which they are best satisfied to fight.”231 Whereas Wickersham
made his amendment applicable only to national elections, Vandenberg’s resolution
extended voting rights to citizens over eighteen in all elections, federal and state:
Section 1. The right of the citizens of the United States, who are 18 years of
age or older, to vote shall not be denied to abridged by the United States or
by any State on account of age. The Congress shall have power to enforce
this article by appropriate legislation.
Section 2. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall be ratified as an
amendment to the Constitution by the legislature of three-fourths of the
several states within seven years from the date of its submission to the
States by the Congress.232
Raymond Willis (R-IN) hailed Vandenburg’s motion and urged “’the states
individually to reduce the voting age to fighting age.’”233
Vandenberg’s 18-vote resolution appeared to counter to his reputation as a
crotchety curmudgeon. In April 1940, Dorothy Thompson wrote in her syndicated
column “On the Record” that “Senator Vandenberg simply does not speak the
language of anybody under the age of 40 in this country. . . .Even when he says
something very nice, he says it in words that are used up, which have unfortunate
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associations which harken back to a time that no one wants to see restored.” 234
Despite his seeming antiquarianism, Vandenberg’s domestic politics reflected a
layer of sympathy for young people buried underneath his crusty conservatism. The
economic panic of 1893 wrecked his father’s leather-goods business, which,
according to biographer Lawrence S. Kaplan, forced “the nine-year-old Arthur to
spend much of his youth living by his wits.”235 The tough socioeconomic
circumstances of his upbringing led him as a journalist and editor of the Grand

Rapids (MI) Herald to demand safe working conditions for children and to champion
legislation that barred the use of child labor. As a U.S. Senator, Vandenberg
continued his advocacy to protect young workers. In 1937, 1939, and 1941, he filed
constitutional amendments that empowered Congress “to limit and prohibit the
labor for hire of persons under 16 years of age.”236 Vandenberg’s private papers do
not provide any hint as to why he submitted his 18-vote resolution, but, in the
context of his opposition to lowering the draft age, it appropriately fit his penchant
to shield youth from exploitation while simultaneously seeking to expand their
opportunities as individuals.237
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Vandenberg’s act inspired other congressmen to pursue the establishment of
a national voting age. In the two weeks after his 18-vote motion, representatives
Jennings Randolph (D-WV) and Jed Johnson (D-OK) submitted House legislation
that copied Vandenberg’s measure verbatim.238 Several people congratulated
Vandenberg for illuminating the injustice of youth votelessness in light of the
teenage conscription bill and encouraged him to square other suffrage inequities,
such as the disfranchisement of Washington, D.C. denizens.239 The Wall Street

Journal, a conservative newspaper that had routinely supported Vandenberg’s
isolationist and anti-New Deal tack, chided him for filing a mawkish “gesture.”
“There is no connection in reason between military duty and the political franchise,”
the Journal’s editors opined, “It does not follow that the youth of 18 has attained the
maturity of judgment which intelligent voting requires. To say that if a man is good
enough to fight he is good enough to vote is only sentimentalism.”240 The 77th
Congress ended on 16 December 1942 without taking action on any of the 18-vote
proposals. Establishing a national voting age did not garner much attention since it
was broached late in the legislative session and because, as reporter W.H. Lawrence
of the New York Times noted, it was a “collateral issue” to the draft age
imbroglio.241
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The 18-vote also became collaterally attached to congressional debate
regarding anti-poll tax legislation. During the 1890s, southern state governments
adopted the poll tax (an assessment fee levied as a prerequisite to vote) as part of a
cache of disfranchising measures to exclude African-Americans and poor whites
from electoral politics.242 In 1937, the Supreme Court upheld the legality of poll
taxes and ruled the authority for levying them rested wholly with the states. It also
noted that the Constitution allowed for the eradication of poll taxes as applied to
federal elections.243 After the ruling, congressional efforts to eliminate poll taxes
intensified. Southern Democrats, with assistance from a handful of Republicans,
successfully rebuffed legislation in 1939, 1940, and 1941.244 On 13 October 1942,
four days before Wickersham proposed his 18-vote measure, a House motion filed
posthumously for anti-poll tax champion Lee Geyer (D-CA) easily passed a 252-84
roll-call vote. Southern Democrats bitterly objected that it would stir up racial
strife by enfranchising blacks and deprive states control over their elections as
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guaranteed in the Constitution.245 The bill, as Geyer had formulated it in 1940,
cleverly framed abolishing poll taxes as the prevention of “pernicious political
activities” that might disable overseas soldiers from casting ballots in forthcoming
federal elections. Geyer had borrowed the phrase “pernicious political activities”
from the Hatch Act of 1939. Named for Senator Carl Hatch (D-NM) the law
restricted employees of the executive branch (except the president, vice president,
and certain high-level officials) from engaging in partisan political activities, such
as using public funds for electoral purposes.246 Geyer originally filed his bill as an
amendment to the Hatch Act, reasoning that southern politicos manipulated
elections by paying the poll taxes of some citizens. His 1940 measure banned the
levying of poll taxes as a prerequisite for voting for the President, Vice President,
Senator, or Representative in Congress; it did not seek to outlaw poll taxes for other
elections.247 After his death in October 1941, collegial sentiment for Geyer within
Congress and the emotion of fighting a “good” war on behalf of democracy carried
other anti-poll tax proposals.248 As Representative Thaddeus Wasielewski (D-WI)
underscored, “’Thousands of people disfranchised by the poll tax are serving in the
armed forces of the United States. Is it fair to deny them the right to express their
H.R. 1024, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 88, (13 October 1942): 8174. See
also Chicago Tribune, 14 October 1942, 11; New York Times, 14 October 1942, 1; and Washington
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will as to the people who will represent them? We cannot fight for freedom and
then deny its existence, to any degree whatsoever, to any group, any place, in
America.’”249
Since soldiers were technically employees of the executive branch (as
members of the War Department), Geyer had believed the Hatch Act might provide
an indirect path to poll tax elimination via the policing of federal solider-vote
laws.250 Congress faced a tangled mess of state voter qualifications that challenged
enfranchising military personnel. Kentucky, Louisiana, and New Mexico, for
example, had no provisions for absentee voting whatsoever. New Hampshire
allowed absentee voting only in presidential elections. Massachusetts and North
Dakota mailed absentee ballots to all persons outside the state serving in the armed
forces. Seven states (Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Nevada, and
South Dakota) mailed ballots to state citizens in the armed forces and called for
their collection at training camps or points of station. Fourteen states (Connecticut,
Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey,
North Carolina, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina) allowed state
citizens who were in military to absentee vote by mail but did not send them a
ballot until requested. And twenty-one states (Alabama, Arizona, California,
Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Michigan, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode
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Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
and Wyoming) extended absentee voting privileges to soldiers and civilians but had
no specifications for delivering or collecting ballots.251
In July 1942, Representative Robert Ramsay (D-WV) and Senator Theodore
Green (D-RI) introduced companion absentee soldier vote bills. Green, chairman of
the Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections, maintained that the acts did not
alter state voting requirements regarding residence, poll-tax payments, or age. The
measures sought to permit any member of the armed forces stationed within the
continental United States to vote by postcard in the November 1942 mid-term
elections if eligible to meet their home state’s qualifications for voting.252 On 23
July 1942, the House passed Ramsay’s resolution after nearly seven tumultuous
hours of delaying tactics coordinated by John Rankin (D-MS), who, Gordon Canfield
(D-NJ) angrily snapped, had orchestrated a “’sorry day in the history of the
republic. We filibuster all day, and over what? Over giving the service men their
vote, and we are dancing minutes with the question of giving the right of franchise
to those who are preparing to give their lives for what they call a free America.’”253
Over the next two months, the Senate and House approved amendments to
251
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Ramsay’s measure that allowed absentee voting in primary and general elections
for federal offices, permitted mail ballots for military personnel at home and abroad,
and waived poll tax obligations if servicemen met residency, minimum voting age,
and/or property requirements.254
The addition of the poll-tax rider to Ramsey’s amendment became, according
to New York Times Capitol Hill reporter C.P. Trussell, “the most volatile measure
dropped into the hoppers since Pearl Harbor.”255 It would apply only to soldiers
hailing from the eight remaining poll-tax states: Arkansas, Alabama, Georgia,
Mississippi, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. The congressional
battle over the poll-tax waiver pitched Southern Democrats and a small group of
hardcore anti-statist Republicans against northern and western congressmen,
Democrat and Republican, “from districts having an important colored vote.”256
Senator Walter George (D-GA), who led Senate resistance, clarified that the poll tax
allies were not “’opposed to soldier voting’” since many congressmen, including
himself, had sons and other males relatives in service. However, the poll-tax rider
to the soldier vote bill set an ominous precedent: “I]f Congress can now say who
shall vote for membership in the House and Senate in wartime, it will not be long
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before the Congress is exercising the same power in peacetime.’”257 Some
Republicans, including party leaders Arthur Vandenberg and Senator Robert Taft
(R-OH), agreed with George and criticized federal countermanding of state laws;
other GOP members believed Ramsey’s proposal would create an army of new
Democrat voters.258 Southern Democrats denounced the poll tax exemption as a
liberal-northern threat to the right of states to determine election qualifications,
which, of course, was the fount of one-party, one-race rule in the South.
Representative John Rankin thundered that the poll-tax rider was “’part of a longrange Communistic program to change our form of Government and our way of life,
and to take control of our elections out of the hands of the white Americans in the
various States and turn them over to certain irresponsible elements that are
constantly trying to destroy private enterprise and to stir up race trouble –
especially in the Southern States.’”259 Supporters of the legislation retorted that
eliminating poll taxes for all the soldiers, white or black, who willingly sacrificed to
defend the freedoms of their fellow citizens simply served the cause of democratic
justice. As Representative William Pheiffer (R-NY) declared, “’if a man is good
enough to fight for his country he is good enough to exercise his right of franchise
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without paying tribute.’”260 On 16 September 1942, less than two months before
the November elections, President Roosevelt signed the Soldier Vote Bill despite
some hesitation regarding the mechanics of processing the mail-in ballots.261
After executive approval of the soldier vote measure, the legislative push for
a discrete anti-poll tax resolution embroiled Congress. Poll tax foes realized the
Soldier Vote Bill had induced Congress to declare for the first time that it had the
power to quash all forms of poll taxes, not just those that touched military
personnel. To many people, a war that required special individual sacrifices to
preserve democracy made poll taxes an anachronistic affront. “American citizens
should not be required to pay for the privilege of extending democratic rights,” the

Washington Post editorialized, “The poll tax should go the way of the former
property qualification for voting.”262 One week after President Roosevelt authorized
the Soldier Vote Bill, anti-poll tax advocates in the House managed to pull off a
discharge petition, a rare parliamentary procedure.263 They gathered the necessary

260

Atlanta Constitution, 10 September 1942, 3.

Soldier Vote Bill, U.S. Statues at Large, vol. 56, ch. 561, (16 September 1942): 753. See
also Chicago Tribune, 17 September 1942, 2, and “Votes for Servicemen,” Newsweek, 21 September
1942, 54. The lateness of the bill’s passage can account for why fewer than 28,000 of the 5.5 million
people in the armed forces would vote in the 1942 federal elections. See New York Times, 25 October
1942, 31, and Levine, Theodore Francis Green, 66. In 1944, Congress created the War Ballot
Commission to increase the number of soldier returns. The 1944 ballot allowed servicemen to vouch
orally for their age: “Proof of Age for Voting Federal Ballot. The statement of an individual solider
as to his age will control his eligibility, insofar as age is concerned, to receive a Federal ballot.” See
Manual for Soldier Voting Outside the United States in the November 1944 General Election, War
Department Pamphlet No. 21-11, 5 June 1944, p. 12, Record Group 2, Series Group I, Series 2, Box
12, “Sec. of State Correspondence – ‘B’ (General), John B. Wilson” Folder, Georgia State Department
of Archives and History, Atlanta.
261

262

“Votes for Soldiers,” editorial, Washington Post, 28 August 1942, 12.

For more about discharge petitions, see John W. Petty, “The House Discharge Procedure
and Majoritarian Politics,” Journal of Politics 69, no. 3 (August 2007): 678-688.
263

97

218 signatures to discharge (i.e. relieve) the House Judiciary Committee of its
jurisdiction over Lee Geyer’s bill (which had been stuck in committee over twenty
months since it was originally filed in January 1941), thereby turning the measure
to the House Rules Committee.264 Under the parliamentary rule governing the
discharge petition, the earliest date for House consideration of Geyer’s motion
would be 12 October. On that day, the House passed a resolution that took it out of
the southern-dominated Rules Committee directly to the legislative floor.265 The
next afternoon, 13 October, the House overwhelmingly approved the Geyer Bill,
thus sending it to the Senate for consideration.266
Prospects for passage of the anti-poll tax legislation initially looked slim. Ten
days prior to receiving the Geyer motion, a Senate Judiciary subcommittee had
roundly rejected a statute offered by Senator Claude Pepper (D-FL) to void poll tax
prerequisites for voting in federal elections as a “’clear violation’” of the
Constitution.267 Within the full Judiciary Committee, Chairman Frederick Van
Nuys (D-IN) engineered an alliance of northern and western Democrats and
moderate Republicans to approve the Geyer Bill handily (13-5) but with an
amendment that banned poll taxes in both the primaries and elections for national
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offices.268 Southern Democrats again fumed that the proposal was an
unconstitutional infringements of states’ rights. “’This bill means federal control of
elections,” Senator Tom Connally (D-TX) bristled, and, in language recalling the
supposed era of “Negro Rule” during Reconstruction, he charged, “’However
obnoxious may be poll tax requirements, they are not as bad as federal bayonets at
the voting booths.’”269
Helped by a two-week recess to campaign for the November mid-terms,
southern Democrats schemed to stall the Senate’s legislative clock until the end of
the 77th Congress (slated to adjourn on 16 December 1942). As congressional rules
stated, all unaddressed or unresolved bills had to be re-introduced at the start of
the next Congress once a legislative session ended.270 On 13 November, Theodore
Bilbo (D-MS) launched the first full-blown Senate filibuster since one in 1938
orchestrated by southern Democrats to kill an anti-lynching bill.271 He was a
master of the race-baiting politics of the Jim Crow era and a staunch defender of
states’ rights, particularly in regard to determining voter qualifications.272 Bilbo
claimed he was prepared to talk until Christmas, but the strategy plotted by his
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legislative confederates planned to bury Geyer’s revised bill in an avalanche of
parliamentary maneuvers, quorum calls, points of order, and amendments.
One of the amendments, filed by Bilbo on the seventh day of his filibuster (21
November), proposed to establish eighteen as the national minimum voting age.
His 18-vote rider to the Geyer Bill surely sounded democratic when it said, “No
person otherwise qualified to vote in any primary or other election for any such
[federal] officer shall be denied the right to vote in such election because of his age,
if such person is 18 years of age or older.”273 Bilbo’s motives, however, were clearly
polemic. He utilized the 18-vote measure as a hedge against the possibility that
further efforts to pass the anti-poll tax bill might be made.274 In case the Senate
revived the bill, Bilbo hoped to slay it by pressing consideration of his resolution to
lower the minimum voting age via continuation of the filibuster. Bilbo, like other
southern congressmen, believed a national anti-poll tax bill was the first step
toward federal control of state elections. According to historian Ronald L.
Heinemann, southern objections to such legislation “were heightened by wartime
pressures that threatened to upset not only political equilibrium but traditional
race relations as well.”275 Bilbo’s resolve to maintain white supremacy by quashing
a simple expansion of electoral privilege drove his legislative charlatanism. On 23
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November 1942, two days after filing his 18-vote measure, a Senate vote for cloture
on Bilbo’s filibuster failed, thereby killing the Geyer anti-poll tax bill and closing
any further discussion in the 77th Congress of a uniform suffrage age.276
The first session of the 78th Congress (6 January to 21 December 1943)
opened with a rush of youth suffrage bills. Senators Arthur Vandenberg and Harley
Kilgore (D-WV) and Representatives Hamilton Fish (R-NY), Jennings Randolph,
Thomas J. Lane (D-MA), and Grant Furlong (D-PA) each filed joint resolutions
proposing constitutional amendments to extend voting rights in all elections to
citizens at least 18 years of age.277 Each of these proposals copied the wording of
Vandenberg’s October 1942 measure. Congressman Wickersham re-filed his
previous amendment allowing persons over age 18 to vote only in federal
elections.278
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Congressional motions to lower the voting age gained influential support.
The American Civil Liberties Union, and the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine
Workers Union of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, and the National
Education Association each publicly supported the 18-vote.280 Joy Elmer Morgan,
an NEA executive, declared, “The enfranchisement of 18-year-olds would be a
logical climax to the amazing growth of the American high school . . . is in keeping
with the work to extend and enrich education for citizenship and to encourage
increased emphasis on the study of current affairs.”281 Eleanor Roosevelt was the
first federal official connected to the executive branch to back resetting voting ages.
In late January 1943, Eleanor Roosevelt asserted in “My Day,” her nationallysyndicated column, “If young men of 18 and 19 are old enough to be trained to fight
their country’s battles and to proceed from training to battlefields, I think we must
face the fact that they are also old enough to know why we fight this war. If that is
so, then they are old enough to take part in the political life of their country and to
be full citizens with voting powers.”282 On a trip to Columbia, Missouri, a few weeks
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In July 1944 at a press conference in Asheville, North Carolina, Roosevelt again said she favored
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after the column appeared, she reiterated: “I have no objection to lowering the
voting age to 18 years if students are properly trained in citizenship. We expect so
much of 18-year-olds in war it is only fair that we should expect the same of them in
peace.”283 The public comments of the First Lady were significant because, as the

New York Times emphasized, her “daily newspaper column often gives hints of
policies under discussion in Administration circles.”284
The seeming interest of the White House and the flurry of federal bill filings
triggered state action to reduce voting ages. The U.S. Constitution gave to the
states primary authority for establishing eligibility requirements for suffrage.
Despite a wide variety of voter prerequisites, only two qualifications were
prescribed by all the states: residence and minimum voting age. Since the Civil
War, only New York had seriously considered reducing the age of
enfranchisement.285 In 1943, thirty-one state legislatures, stirred by the “old
enough to fight, old enough to vote” argument, weighed measures to recalibrate
legal voting ages. State lawmakers sympathetically but unenthusiastically
considered the youth suffrage proposals. Twenty-seven statehouses either chose not
to act on or did not report bills out of committee. In Arkansas, New York, and
Wisconsin, one house of the legislature approved a youth suffrage proposal while
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the other house declined. Only Georgia successfully lowered its voting age, from 21
to 18, during the war.286
State rejection of extending voting rights to young people mirrored public
opinion. Gallup polls conducted in January and April 1943 showed that a majority
of those persons asked opposed changing laws to permit 18-, 19-, and 20-year-olds
suffrage. The January and April polls, however, revealed that the idea of lowering
voting ages was gradually gaining favor:287

Date of Poll
June 1939

Yes
17%

No
79%

Undecided
4%

January 1943

39%

52%

9%

April 1943

42%

52%

6%

In June 1939, Gallup’s group first asked Americans about the prospect of youth
suffrage in response to its promotion by Judge Ben B. Lindsey. Americans knew
Lindsey as the originator of America’s juvenile court system, an international
authority on juvenile delinquency, and outspoken advocate for children’s rights.288
In spring 1939, Lindsey had given several public speeches and, according to
nationally-syndicated columnists Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen, had been
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granted a private audience with President Franklin Roosevelt in support of the 18vote. Pearson and Allen reported that Lindsey emphasized two points in his talk
with FDR: 1) modern youth were capable of voting because they matured more
quickly, in terms of educational and experiential development, than prior
generations, and 2) young men who faced the possibility of conscription because of
world political events deserved an electoral say in deciding whether the United
States should go to war. Lindsey told Pearson, “’With longevity increasing, we are
becoming a nation in which old people have a controlling voice in the affairs of the
nation.’” Because America “’always has been a young nation,’” Lindsey concluded,
“’we must keep it that way” by enfranchising America’s three million 18-, 19-, and
20-year-olds.289
The overwhelming majority of poll respondents in 1939 disagreed with
Lindsey. Gallup’s results showed some demographic variation: Democrats and the
working class favored the 18-vote more than Republicans and the wealthy. The
reason for the party and class split, Gallup speculated, related to a general belief
that young people and the poor strongly supported the President Roosevelt and the
New Deal.290 Nevertheless, nearly everyone queried opposed Lindsey’s idea for
generally the same reason. People disputed his claim that better contemporary
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schooling had prepared youth to vote as knowledgeably as adults. Gallup
conveyed, “By far the most frequent comment is that most young people under 21
are too unfamiliar with political matters to make competent voters. Many of them
remark that ‘even at 21 you don’t know very much about what’s going on.’” That
sentiment held across age lines:291
Persons Aged
21 to 29

Yes
17%

No
83%

30 to 49

17%

83%

50 and over

18%

82%

Neither Nazi aggression in Europe nor other international episodes portending war
affected the poll results. Gallup made no mention of the looming war or potential
conscription as factors influencing what people thought about reducing voting ages.
By April 1943, however, America’s participation in World War II and the use
of youth in combat convinced 25% more respondents that adolescents should vote
than the June 1939 survey. Though a slight majority still supported the 21-vote
tradition, the induction of 18-year-olds into the armed forces caused many citizens
to reconsider whether it should persist. The January 1943 Gallup poll revealed a
consistent rise in favorable opinion for youth suffrage over different age spans:292
Persons Aged
21 to 29

Yes
41%

No
53%

Undecided
6%

30 to 49

38%

52%

10%

50 and over

37%

52%

11%
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Two population groups acutely affected by the impact of war – teenagers and
the parents of young troops – nudged the 18-vote issue into the national spotlight by
highlighting the intelligence of contemporary youth and the injustice of service
without suffrage. A high-school student from Hancock, Maryland, asked, “if a
young man at [eighteen] is old enough to fight for a thing, and know what he is
fighting for, isn’t he old enough to help protect and play an active role on behalf of
that for which he is giving his life?”293 Another adolescent challenged the supposed
“’fact that the men below 21 were ill-advised in political matters.’” “’This might
have been true in 1789,’” the youth asserted, “’but the educational systems of this
country have advanced to the point where a young man has a knowledge of political
affairs at the age of 18. I have recently turned 19 myself and have participated in
many debates with elders who have respected and valued my opinions on a parity
with one who has passed the present legal age.’”294 The father of a soldier from New
York City questioned why adolescents “who certainly could be trusted to exercise
the citizen’s prerogative to vote, are still chained to our elders’ concept of ‘legal age.’
I have a son who will be 21 in a few days, but as he is serving in our Army overseas,
this won’t mean a thing to him from this angle of consideration. It seems to me that
if these young people of 18 and over are old enough to fight they should be
considered old enough to vote; otherwise we oldsters do them a great disservice.”295
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The slim public majority who backed the 21- vote remained skeptical about
enfranchising adolescents. They acknowledged that young men had benefitted from
improvements in American education, shouldered much of the fighting burden, and
made tough decisions in harrowing circumstances. And they often congratulated
underage troops for their impressive military service. Nevertheless, most adults
believed that, as a group, adolescents lacked the knowledge of current events,
interest in political matters, and maturity of cognitive judgment to vote wisely. As
a Baltimore clerk summarized to a Gallup pollster, “They just haven’t got enough
sound political judgment at that age.”296 Other adults doubted the claim that the
battlefield prowess of young combatants proved teenagers possessed the sagacity to
cast ballots. “How anybody can relate the capacity to tote a gun to experience in
affairs of government is more than I can see,” a man wrote the New York Times, “I
had, naturally, expected to see a lot of harebrained things emerge from the welter of
war, but I never expected to see [the youth suffrage] proposal taken seriously; yet
we see it actually taken up by a few otherwise sensible men.”297
The “otherwise sensible men” gibe referred to those state and federal
lawmakers who endorsed Georgia’s approval of the 18-vote. During the first week
of August 1943, Georgia voters had overwhelmingly accepted, by over a 2 to 1
margin, a constitutional amendment lowering the legal suffrage age from 21 to 18,
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thereby becoming the first state to grant voting privileges to teenagers.298

Youth

suffrage had been a chief plank of Ellis Arnall’s gubernatorial campaign. Arnall, a
35-year-old former state attorney general, had won the governorship in 1942 from
demagogue Eugene Talmadge by pledging to cleanse the Peach State of cronyism
and corruption. In particular, Arnall promised to eradicate political tampering with
Georgia’s higher education system. In the spring and summer of 1941, Talmadge
engineered the firings of Marvin Pittman (president of Georgia State Teachers
College), Walter Cocking (dean of the University of Georgia’s School of Education),
and ten professors from other Georgia universities for allegedly promoting
communism, religious non-conformity, and/or race-mixing in their professional
capacities. Several members of the Georgia Board of Regents (the state’s
educational oversight committee) balked at Talmadge’s demand for lack of
reasonable evidence and refused to sack the accused. Talmadge then moved to
“pack” the Board of Regents by forcing the resignations of the disagreeable
members and replacing them with stooges who coveted being his hatchet men. In
July 1941, the Talmadge-tilted Board discharged the accused educators. In
December, the Southern Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools suspended
the University of Georgia and nine other public colleges from its list of accredited
institutions for violations of academic freedom and political interference into the
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operations of the state’s colleges.299 Over the next several months, the American
Medical Association, Association of American Law Schools, Association of American
Universities, American Association of Teachers Colleges, and American Association
of College Schools of Business all sanctioned or suspended Georgia colleges in some
fashion for Talmadge’s meddling.300
Talmadge staked his re-election campaign on stirring the economic and
psychological anxieties of the “wool-hat boys,” i.e. rural white Georgians.301
Historian Thomas G. Dyer asserts Talmadge built his political career on a message
tailored to country folk that combined “a strong populist appeal with anti-urbanism,
anti-intellectualism, and racism.”302 The dislocations and uncertainties engendered
by the Great Depression and World War II heightened provincial paranoia about
the South’s scant leftists, labor organizers, and race liberals. The penchant to place
blame on every variety of social, political, or economic radical for causing the
Depression or war or threatening white supremacy spurred Talmadge and other
southern demagogues to search college campuses for ideological deviants.
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“Although he had graduated from the [University of Georgia’s] law school,” Dyer
writes, “Talmadge had little fondness for higher education and seemed to delight in
making educators uncomfortable.”303
In the past, Talmadge’s purges of educational “furriners” who seemed to
challenge his views or the South’s orthodoxy garnered him much electoral
support.304 The discharge of Pittman and Cocking and the resulting loss of
accreditation backfired. Devereaux McClatchey, member of Atlanta’s Board of
Education, called the affair “a disgusting triumph of ignorance, prejudice, and
savagery over the forces of enlightenment and civilization.”305 A Georgia “farm boy”
averred, “I am a high school graduate and plan to enter college in September. This,
if for no other reason, would make me a bitter non-supporter of Talmadge if I were
of voting age. I dislike his dictatorial methods of ruling the University System as
well as the state as a whole.”306 The education controversy alienated many white
Georgians, rural and urban, and it provided the cohesion to hold together an antiTalmadge political alliance that coalesced around Ellis Arnall. According to one
biographer, Arnall’s “youth and inexperience neatly fit the prototype of a crusader
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against an entrenched machine.”307 Labeled the “boy wonder of Georgia politics,”
Arnall pledged to sweep away the “high-handed, low-browed” practices of the
Talmadge gang.308 During the gubernatorial race, Talmadge taunted Arnall as a
liberal zealot bent on racial coeducation. Arnall swiftly thwarted the charge. “’If a
nigger ever tried to get into a white school in my part of the state,” he vowed, “’the
sun would never set on his head.’”309 With his segregationist bona fides affirmed,
Arnall tore into Talmadge’s malfeasance. The damage inflicted by Talmadge to
Georgia higher education gave Arnall an issue to keep him on the defensive
throughout the campaign no matter how many times Talmadge tried race-baiting.
In a 1971 interview, Arnall declared: “I ran against Talmadge because he had
interfered in the University System of Georgia about saying what the teachers could
teach and what they couldn’t. . . .[I]t was academic freedom, dictatorship, accredited
schools. He thought, Talmadge thought, the ignorant people, who didn’t have a
college education, would be for him. But they were the most strongest for me
because they wanted their children to have that advantage.”310
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The education issue also rallied Georgia students to Arnall’s side, and they
were responsible for much of the fervor that the campaign generated. The loss of
accreditation meant graduates from state universities possessed diplomas worthless
outside of Georgia; i.e. they were barred from postgraduate work and professional
practice in other states. “To these young people,” the Atlanta Constitution
emphasized, “the threat of Talmadge’s dictatorship in Georgia is quite as real as the
threats of Hitler and Mussolini and Tojo.”311 Outraged by Talmadge’s “Hitlerism,” a
group of Georgia co-eds from across the state formed the Student Political League in
April 1942.312 According to its leaders, the SPL organized “to destroy Talmadge-ism
in Georgia” and “to restore the accredited rating to the University System.”313
Willis Johnson, University of Georgia SPL organizer, declared that its members
simply could not stomach “the public lynching of Georgia educators by a mere nod of
the Governor’s head.”314 The SPL claimed no “affiliation to any candidate for public
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office,” but its members eagerly worked to elect Ellis Arnall governor.315 “Arnall for
Governor” clubs formed on university campuses, and student newspapers endorsed
his candidacy without hesitation. A poll of University of Georgia students revealed
that 92% supported Arnall over Talmadge.316 “We know what Ellis Arnall stands
for,” one student declared, “integrity in public office. . . .We like his youth, vitality,
and his sincere desire to change things long in need of changing.”317 Many students
saw a ripe opportunity to topple Talmadge’s machine via a youth-led political
operation. The student editors of Georgia Tech’s weekly, The Technique, urged,
Students of Georgia, to arms. . . .Let us conscript the
power of the ballot box to reinstate academic freedom
in Georgia, to dethrone injustice, despotism, and ignorance.
Let each student who is of age be certain to register and
cast his unchallengable vote against tyranny. And let each
student wield all the influence he can possibly command
for this same purpose. May this September see the end of
demagoguery and despotism in Georgia.318
Arnall’s staff worked closely with the SPL to take an active part in the
campaign. During the summer vacation of 1942, several thousand SPL members
fanned out across the state to urge parents, friends, and fellow Georgians to vote for
Arnall. They mailed literature, wrote influential letters, canvassed neighborhoods,
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arranged parades, carried placards, burned Talmadge in effigy, spoke at rallies, and
implored Georgia troops stationed out of the state to obtain absentee ballots on
Arnall’s behalf.319 The SPL also enlisted the aid of high-schoolers. Jean Martin,
17-year-old president of the Ben Hill County SPL, stressed, “We are too young to
vote. We don’t earn any money to give to a campaign fund. Still we want very
much to help. We high school students may be wrong. But we aren’t dumb enough
to think Talmadge will stop with the university if he gets away with his grab there.
We want to help stop him now before he grabs for the high schools with the support
of a Talmadgized university system.”320

Some adults became irritated by the

exuberance of the student campaigners. A man from Colbert, Georgia complained,
They really believe that they must organize a crusade
and save the state. . . .Most of them are sophomores and
freshmen and very few of them are 21 years of age, and
very few can vote. Why should a minor who cannot vote
tell us, the voters, how we should vote? The daddies of these
boys should call them home; they are too smart for their
breeches; they know too much for their ages. They fail to
realize that their minds are as yet immature and they cannot
pass sound judgment on anything.”321
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Although most of the students were, indeed, under twenty-one and could not vote,
Arnall believed their activism, rather than their ballots, would get him elected
governor.322 After he won the office in September 1942, Arnall said in a speech
broadcast over national radio that young Georgians should receive “full credit” for
his victory over Talmadge.323
As governor, Arnall worked to reestablish the accreditation of Georgia’s
colleges as part of a progressive reform package to restore political integrity and
citizen-focused government to the state.324 One element of the program sought to
enfranchise young people. In November 1942, Arnall first announced his proposal
to lower Georgia’s voting age to eighteen at a national conference of state attorneys
general held in St. Louis. He claimed his primary motive in seeking youth suffrage
was patriotic: “if men of 18 are old enough to fight for their country, they should
have a right to vote.”325 Arnall also hinted that he wanted to enfranchise Georgia
youth as a reward for helping him fulfill a personal ambition.326 He acknowledged
in his 1946 autobiography the quid pro quo elements behind his 18-vote call,
I knew that I owed much to the audacious and vigorous
322
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campaign of Young Georgia. I knew that they represented
an element in public life that deserved, somehow, to be recognized.
But it was not until the campaign and the party convention
were over that their real place in the political system occurred
to me. A young man, a student at Georgia Tech, who had worked
hard in the campaign and shown exceptional interest in spite
of his nineteen years and his disqualification as a voter, came
to my office to tell me goodbye. He was being inducted into the
service and expected to be stationed soon in New Mexico. ‘Well,
I guess I am old enough to help with the Japs, even if I can’t vote.’
he said as he was leaving. My young friend was old enough to
fight, but he was not old enough to vote. It set me to thinking
and to examining the precedents.327
Ralph McGill, influential columnist of the Atlanta Constitution, enthusiastically
backed Arnall’s proposal. He agreed with Arnall that young people old enough to
fight for democracy should be allowed to participate in its construction. McGill also
emphasized the political potential of youth: “They would bring a lot of intelligence
and enthusiasm to politics. That was demonstrated in our recent primary. They
would provide a healthy leavening of the political mixture.”328 McGill’s editors
exhorted state lawmakers to accept youth suffrage legislation. They opined that
America “needs the clear-eyed, fearless, and idealistic thinking of her young
people.” Furthermore, Georgia would benefit from the “powerful effect” the votes of
youth would exert “in lessening the stranglehold of ‘machine politics’ in many areas
where it now controls the ballots for the benefit of a privileged few.”329
Arnall’s vote-at-18 pitch became the “liveliest issue” of Georgia’s 1943
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legislative session.330 In late January, the Southern Association of Colleges and
Secondary Schools reaccredited the state’s universities after Arnall personally
assured the group that his reform package would block future governors from
tampering with higher education.331 Arnall’s feat earned him much political capitol
with state lawmakers. As his reorganization plan for Georgia’s government breezed
through the General Assembly, Arnall predicted, “Give me the backing of the boys
and girls and we will save the state.”332 On 9 February 1943, a joint oversight
committee unanimously approved a bill that lowered the voting age from 21 to 18.333
The next day, in a “ribald” gathering, the Georgia Senate overwhelmingly consented
to the 18-vote measure, 39-8.334 Disapproving senators expressed concerns that
changing state electoral law could allow black youth to vote and might politicize
high-school and college classrooms. Supporters of the 18-vote bill placed it within
the context of Arnall’s reformism. Senator Alpha Fowler (D-Douglasville)
maintained including young people as electors would “improve our government.”335
Many senators who voted in the affirmative expressed privately they opposed the
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measure but felt state voters should have a chance to ratify or reject it through
popular referendum.336 Arnall praised the Senate for acting “purely in the interest
of good government” and pledged to stump in every county of Georgia on behalf of
youth suffrage.337
The debate in the House was “riotous” and reaching the necessary 2/3
majority for passage of the 18-vote amendment proved difficult.338 Led by J. Robert
Elliott, former floor leader during the Talmadge regime, opponents attacked the
proposal as a plot concocted by the Communist Party and the Roosevelt
administration to “throw open the ballot box to everybody – 18, 19, or 20 –
regardless of their color or whether they had paid their poll tax.” Representative
M.G. Hicks thundered that passing the bill would make Georgia a “hotbed for every
subversive influence under the heavens.” Mrs. John B. Guerry, one of two female
lawmakers, charged the measure “would give the right to vote to those not best
fitted to vote, those the armed services are rejecting.”339 Advocates of the 18-vote
countered it was a necessary part of Arnall’s effort to de-Talmadgize state
government. Representative Ben W. Fortson contended, “Youth could bring a
wholesome effect of open-mindedness and lack of cynicism to the ballot.”340 Other
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legislators played the old enough to fight-vote card. Spence Grayson, one of the
bill’s main proponents, professed, “I would feel ashamed of myself if I stood here in
civilian clothes and voted to deny the right of the ballot to beardless youths who are
driving tanks and manning machineguns on the battlefields.”341 Some lawmakers,
like House Speaker Roy Harris, indicted pro-Talmadge forces for “pure cussedness
and selfishness” in their vengeful efforts to stymie youth suffrage. On 2 March
1943, the House accepted the proposition 126-60 (19 not present) – twelve votes shy
of the 2/3 majority legally required to pass constitutional amendments. During that
night and into the next day, Arnall, Harris, and House floor leader Adie Durden
pressed the absentee representatives for their support and cajoled those legislators
wavering on the bill. The buttonholing and arm-twisting succeeded. On 3 March,
the House voted 149-43 to submit the youth suffrage measure for referendum.
The 18-vote proposal was one of 28 amendments presented to Georgia voters
for approval during the August referendum. Governor Arnall, House Speaker
Harris, and Senate President Frank Gross organized the Georgia Committee for
Good Government to push electoral acceptance. Arnall campaigned around the
state, emphasizing how each amendment on the slate would reform, streamline,
and/or modernize state and local government. Supporters of the youth suffrage
portion highlighted its national significance. Arnall said he was “especially proud”
Georgia had influenced other states to ponder their electoral-age laws.342 And he
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asserted throughout the run-up to the referendum, “Eighteen is not too young to
learn at first hand the business of self-government, which is the American tradition
of all government; nor is 18 too young to assume some of responsibilities that are a
part of the right of citizenship in our State and our Nation.”343 The Atlanta Journal
editorialized that voter approval of teenage voting would indicate to the nation a
new “open-mindedness” in Georgia: “Willingness to consider new ideas on their
merits and to thresh them out in a forum of free discussion is a mark of intellectual
courage and political growth. . . .This is democracy, thinking democracy in place of
static prejudice.”344 If passed, Georgia Tech’s student newspaper predicted, the 18vote might “mark the beginning of voting franchise for 18-to-21-year-old youths all
over the country. From Georgia the idea would, no doubt, spread rapidly from state
to state, especially with public opinion supporting all men in the service, be they 18
or 35. Thus the question should be debated on the basis of nationwide benefit – not
thinking of Georgia alone.”345
Georgians pondered both the national and statewide consequences of
allowing 18-year-olds to vote. Arguments for and against the amendment were
framed by the countrywide “old enough to fight, old enough to vote” debate but were
also fixed within the context of Georgia politics, particularly the question of whether
Arnall’s reformism could erase the taint of Talmadgism. The bulk of the pre-
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referendum chatter considered whether teenagers collectively possessed sufficient
preparation for effective electoral participation. Advocates of the amendment
cleverly posed the “old enough” thesis as both a deserved reward for services
rendered and an earned privilege for aptitudes demonstrated. As a man from
Winder, Georgia, reasoned,
To fight and defend their country is a responsibility which
has been thrust upon 18-year-old youths. Suffice it to say
that they are living up to expectations; they are ‘making good.’
Then, again, 18-year-old youth, as a class, are making use of
their opportunities to inform themselves, and as a consequence,
they’ll be well fitted to help take care of the interests of the
state and the nation. It goes without saying, that if youths
are granted the right of suffrage, they’ll not only be voters of
thought, but voters of action as well.346
Other supporters praised young Georgians for their “educational maturity,” “mature
judgment,” and “clear-minded, progressive, and well-informed” viewpoints –
attributes that youth had demonstrated “in helping clean our state of some of the
most outstanding rottenness from which we had so severely suffered.”347 Governor
Arnall contended,
At the age of 18, most young men and young women are selfsupporting, self-reliant, and able to judge reasonably well for
themselves. They are old enough to serve their country on
battlefields, in airplanes, and on the seas. They are old enough
to work as riveters or cartridge-loaders or typists. They are
also old enough to assume the responsibilities of their citizenship and to learn the lessons of public life by participation in
346
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public affairs.348
Many 18-vote sponsors agreed with Arnall that the advance of democracy in
Georgia and America required youth enfranchisement. “The best way to teach
democracy is to practice it,” WSB-Atlanta radio commentator John Paschall
asserted, “When our boys and girls return from their posts of duty in many parts of
the world, they will have some understanding of the kind of world in which they
wish to live. . . .We trust them in a Flying Fortress, surely we may in wisdom,
justice, and moderation, trust them in the ballot booth.”349
Opponents of the amendment retorted that the physical abilities that made
young men good soldiers did not necessarily imply that young people possessed the
cognitive qualities that defined good voters. A woman from Atlanta insisted, “Mere
fighting does not empower a boy with judgment as how to handle state affairs, not
to mention national.”350 Another Atlanta inhabitant pointed to the War
Department’s supposed preference for “reckless and daring” teenage draftees willing
to “rush into a fight without considering the consequences or counting the costs” as
evidence that adolescents could not be trusted to cast ballots sensibly.351 Many 18vote foes conceded that contemporary youths were better educated than previous
generations, but they contested the notion that educational advances automatically
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yielded a more prudent teenage elector. “The test of a good voter,” a man from
Hapeville, Georgia, declared, “is experience and intelligence, not merely some
schooling.”352 The political naïveté of well-read but callow teens, some argued,
exposed them as corruptible prey for devious politicians; a Rome, Georgia, resident
reminded his fellow citizens, “Mussolini and Hitler established their dictatorships
through youth movements.”353 Anti-18-vote Georgians dismissed claims of “the
youngsters of this day and generation being wiser and maturing earlier” than their
forefathers; “This is pure nonsense,” an Atlantan held, “nature is just like it has
always been.”354 Amendment adversaries unwittingly employed a key contention of
G. Stanley Hall to buttress their position. The quickened pace of modern life had
magnified, rather than diminished, the puerile disposition of teenagers; hence, a
prolonged adolescence unencumbered by grown-up obligations would allow
immature juveniles the time to develop their private, public, and political personas
freely and fully. “Let us not burden, unsolicited, our boys and girls with the cares
and responsibilities of voting, during their last three years of adolescence,” a man
from Decatur, Georgia, implored, “Spare them, during this interim between bloomtime and maturity, from the cares of state.”355
Georgia adults chose to incorporate 18-, 19-, and 20-year-olds into the
electoral body politic. By a count of 42,284 to 19,682, voters ratified the youth
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suffrage measure. It carried 128 of Georgia’s 159 counties, including Eugene
Talmadge’s home county of Telfair.356 Arnall was “jubilant” that all twenty-eight
reform amendments had passed referendum but claimed to be, “Especially delighted
that Georgia leads the nation in lowering the voting age to 18.”357 “I’m glad Georgia
is first in something at last,” Arnall rejoiced, “I’m tired of us always being at the tail
end.”358 The Atlanta Constitution editorialized that “this state started something
that is going to bring nation-wide repercussions.”359 Americans widely commended
Georgia’s accomplishment. A man in New York City praised it as evidence of a new
“enlightened progressivism” in the South.360 The Christian Science Monitor
congratulated the “Cracker State” for being “First in peaches, first in watermelons,
first to give the vote to 18-year-olds.”361 National publications predicted Georgia’s
action might spur state and federal legislation to standardize eighteen as the
national electoral age.362 Some periodicals hailed Arnall as a rising political star.
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In smashing “the statutes on which Talmadge had built his dictatorship,” journalist
Rufus Jarman extolled, Georgia not only “regained her self-respect” but America
reaped a “good politician” dedicated to public service rather than personal graft.363
Arnall said that he would press for an 18-vote plank in the 1944 Democratic
platform and urged young people across the nation to “look to me for leadership” in
gaining suffrage rights.364
Georgia’s approval of youth suffrage re-launched national discussions of the
voting age issue. Soon after the August referendum, other states moved to reconsider previously shelved youth suffrage bills, and ten states requested formal
copies of the 18-vote amendment from Georgia officials.365 Georgia’s ratification
also appeared to alter national opinion regarding youth suffrage. A September
1943 Gallup poll showed a majority of Americans (52%) approved teenage voting for
the first time.366 A second September survey indicated that 18-vote measures might
pass easily in six of the ten states with the largest number of votes cast in the 1940
presidential election (New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, California, Michigan, and
New Jersey) if their statehouses brought the youth suffrage issue to voters as a
referendum.367 Gallup attributed the change in public sentiment to the
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“considerable” national attention Georgia’s referendum garnered and the “effect of
the war” on communal attitudes, particularly the “cry that if a man is old enough to
fight at 18 he is old enough to vote.”368
Federal congressmen also seemed to be newly energized about establishing a
uniform voting age. After a bout of youth suffrage filings early in 1943, federal
action in the 78th Congress waned due to the exigencies of war, particularly the runup to the Allied counterattack in North Africa and invasion of Italy. Congress had
also spent much time in the spring approving the Current Tax Payment Act, which
established the modern “pay-as-you-go” system of withholding taxes from individual
paychecks.369 Days after Georgia’s August referendum, Senator Frederick Van
Nuys (D-IN), chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, said that Arthur
Vandenberg’s resolution would be allowed a public hearing after Congress returned
from vacation in September.370 The Associated Press reported, “The issue of
making 18, 19, and 20-year-olds eligible to vote seemed headed for noncontroversial
treatment by Congress.” It noted that Vandenberg’s amendment “thus far has
drawn no public criticism from members of either party.”371 By the end of August,
the 18-vote measure had attracted so much support that the radio debate program
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voting-age issue because of a “lack of congressional opposition.”372 The Senate,
though, held no hearings on Vandenberg’s measure; it focused instead on anti-poll
tax and soldier-vote bills that had passed the House before Congress’s summer
break.
In October 1943, the House Committee on the Judiciary sent an 18-bill to
Emanuel Celler’s subcommittee on constitutional amendments for review. On 20
October, it held a public hearing to discuss Jennings Randolph’s measure, House
Joint Resolution 39. Only two people testified: Randolph and Ellis Arnall. Both
men cleverly posed the “old enough” thesis to justify youth suffrage as both
recompense for patriotic service and recognition of adolescent ability. Randolph
argued the “intrepid” war service of young people on the battlefield and homefront
not only made youth deserving of voting rights but demonstrated that the
traditional stereotypes maligning adolescents as irresponsible, irrational, and
immature to be “meritless.”373 According to Randolph, Georgia’s August
referendum and the two September Gallup polls indicated growing public support
for reducing enfranchisement ages. Because of the opposition by state legislatures,
however, he believed that a federal amendment would be necessary to set a national
voting age. Randolph predicted that an 18-vote amendment would eventually be
established, like that for the Nineteenth Amendment, after a successful
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“educational campaign” convinced adults that “youngsters” were qualified to vote.374
Randolph concluded, “I am very firmly convinced, and I would not have sponsored
this amendment were I not of the considered opinion. . .that today we have a great
youth population within this age bracket which is entirely capable and eager for
participation in our Government as voters.”375
Governor Arnall concurred with Randolph’s assessment of youth capabilities.
He declared, “No one can convince me that a young man or young woman of 18
today does not have a power of understanding that transcends that of a 21-year-old
man or woman of a generation ago.”376 Arnall, too, played the “old enough” card as
his main claim for championing the 18-vote. He burnished his case with a “true
story” about an injured, underage ex-sailor who won a statewide essay contest on
why Georgia should lower its voting age by writing: “I was at Pearl Harbor. I
participated in the Battle of the Coral Sea. I was wounded 22 times fighting for my
country. I am not yet 21. Do you not think I have won the right to vote?”377
Dubious committeemen, particularly Emanuel Celler, questioned the “old
enough” hypothesis. After Randolph stated that the lowering of the draft age
convinced him that teenage combatants deserved to vote, Celler inquired, “Let us
suppose – God forbid – that the exigencies of would turn against us and . . .we
would have to reduce the draft age to 16, as is the case in Germany today. Would
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you say the voting age should likewise be reduced to 16?” Randolph responded, “No,
Mr. Chairman. I would not advocate the lowering of the voting age to 16. I feel
there is a point below which we should not go.”378 Estes Kefauver (D-TN) got
Governor Arnall to admit that Georgia precisely chose eighteen as its suffrage age
because of its correlation to high-school graduation rather than its connection to
military service. Immediately afterwards, Cellar challenged, “Is it fair to offer that
as an argument, that if a boy is old enough to fight he is old enough to vote?” Arnall
retorted,
I do not desire, first of all, for the eminent chairman of this
subcommittee to allow my argument to be drawn into one line
only. You will recall I have submitted a number of reasons,
such as participation in government being fine training in
citizenship, and the ardor and candor of youth will bring to
the ballot box, and other reasons. But another reason is that
if a young man risks his life for his government, he is entitled
to vote.379
The southern members of the panel peppered Randolph and Arnall with
queries about the possible constitutional harm of a federal voting-age amendment to
the rights of the states to determine elector qualifications. Hatton Sumners, (DTX), chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, alleged that H.J. Res. 39
“proposes an abridgment of the powers of the States. . .to take from their
governmental discretion, does it not?” Randolph said the amending process, as
specified in the Constitution, respected local prerogatives by mandating ratifying
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action by at least three-fourths of the states.380

Governor Arnall deftly parried the

legal queries posed by Sumners, Kefauver, and Sam Russell (D-TX). He agreed
with the congressmen that H.J. Res. 39 impinged states “to some extent” but
concurred with Randolph that the Constitution’s Article V procedure provided
“adequate safeguards” for state discretion to determine voter requirements.381 He
riposted, “we have talked too much about states’ rights and not enough about state
responsibilities.”382 Arnall did not indicate whether his state had a responsibility to
extend its new 18-vote law to black Georgians. He defined a “good citizens” as
someone who combined “moral fitness and intellectual ability” with “an interest in
his Government” and “the ability to understand that issue upon which he may
vote.”383 Some black Georgians fulfilled Arnall’s definition of a “good citizen” but,
obviously, were denied democratic participation for reasons irrespective of
capability or age but wholly lashed to the Peach State’s right to set the legal
prerequisites for voting.
The pointed questions about federal intrusion upon a traditional state
prerogative clearly indicated that most members of the subcommittee, especially the
southern Democrats, opposed federal legislation to create a national voting age.
Nor did the hearing on H.J. Res. 39 attract much attention. Fifty years afterwards,
Randolph recalled that only eleven people attended it, including the subcommittee
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members and no major newspaper or periodical covered it.384 The House Judiciary
Committee took no further action on Randolph’s amendment. No lawmaker filed an
18- or 19-vote proposal during the second session of the 78th Congress (10 January
to 19 December 1944). And public calls for lowering suffrage ages quieted in 1944
and 1945 as the battle against the Axis barreled toward crescendo. For all intents
and purposes, national consideration of youth suffrage during the war ceased with
the closing of the October 1943 subcommittee hearing.
House inaction on youth suffrage fit Congress’s propensity to short shrift
social issues. Between 1939 and 1945, two core concerns dominated congressional
deliberations: American participation in World War II and the continuation of New
Deal socioeconomic programs. Like in the 1930s, Democrats maintained control of
Congress throughout the war years. Influential leaders inside Congress,
particularly Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn (D-TX), Senate majority leader
Alben Barkley (D-KY), and House minority leader Joseph Martin (R-MA), gradually
relinquished governmental control over foreign and military policies to the
Roosevelt administration. Though Congress delegated sweeping powers to
executive and administrative agencies to meet the emergency, it did not become an
anachronism or rubber stamp according to political scientist Roland Young. He
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argues Congress remained influential as it exerted vigorous oversight of
bureaucratic operations and strict management over domestic legislation. Young
highlights the vital role Congress played in mobilizing the resources needed to fight.
Through the meticulous conscription of men and the generous appropriation of
money, Congress raised the armies, materials, and funds that the White House
requested to conduct the war.385
Mobilization measures frequently provoked controversy because they became
entangled in the ongoing political struggle over the New Deal. Historian Richard N.
Chapman suggests that the persistence of party politics was Congress’s most
notable contribution to the war, for the suspension of politics would have meant the
adjournment of democracy.386 Debates within and between Congress and the
Roosevelt administration over domestic policy, inflamed the ideological and regional
factionalism endemic to prewar arguments about the New Deal. Political historians
and scientists agree that Roosevelt’s recovery and relief programs initially received
ubiquitous legislative support and important congressional cooperation.387 During

Roland Young, Congressional Politics in the Second World War (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1956). Young wrote from first-hand knowledge of the legislative process in
Congress. During the war years, Young served as a staffer on the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations and as a member of the American Political Science Academy Committee on Congress.
385

Richard N. Chapman, Contours of Public Policy, 1939-1945 (New York: Garland
Publishing, 1981).
386

Most studies of the New Deal consider Congress as an afterthought to the seminal
machinations of Franklin Roosevelt. Though Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. claimed FDR as the
Machiavellian figure driving the New Deal, he acknowledged that Congress “played a vital and
consistently underestimated role in shaping the New Deal.” Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming
of the New Deal (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958), 554-555. William E. Leuchtenberg concurs with
Schlesinger’s assessment of Roosevelt’s decisive sway and adds that “despite the growth of the
Presidency, this was a period in which Congress had great influence.” William E. Leuchtenburg,
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1933-1940 (New York: Harper, 1963), 327 n. 3. Even the
387

133

his second term, internecine battles between New Deal Democrats and a bipartisan
coalition of rightist congressmen both narrowed the reformist proposals of the
administration and allowed Congress to reestablish its independence and authority
in relation to the presidency.388 The informal “conservative coalition” of antiadministration Democrats (predominantly rural and largely southern) and antiNew Deal Republicans (mostly rural and midwestern) materialized around a shared
fidelity to anti-statism. Historian James T. Patterson emphasizes that the coalition
never formally united as a caucus, but, after 1937, it successfully frustrated FDR’s
attempts to broaden the New Deal, pack the Supreme Court with liberal judges, and
consolidate federal authority within the executive branch. Patterson finds that the
first obligation of many coalition members was to their state or district (especially
in garnering pork barrel funds to develop local economies) and not necessarily to
advance a conservative agenda.389 The need for federal aid in the South and rural
areas, the discrediting of isolationism, and the necessity of centralized planning in
the run-up to war stunted the coalition’s quest to thwart the New Deal.
During the war’s early years, FDR’s conservative opponents endeavored to
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check his growing power, slash his programs, and bruise him at the polls. The
grand strategizing required to win the war necessitated political deference to the
White House. Conservatives criticized Roosevelt for adopting a presidency-centered
governing tack that disdained intergovernmental consultation, empowered
executive agencies, and asserted unprecedented executive powers. To smooth
relations, Roosevelt appointed many rightward-leaning businessmen to the
planning agencies in charge of wartime production and named a Republican, Henry
Stimson, to be Secretary of War. But the GOP did not offer FDR or his majority
party a formal pledge to cooperate or an explicit promise of support, unlike within
Britain’s parliament, and it often attacked the administration’s economic regulation
and social welfare policies.390 Southern Democrats generally backed the president
on war matters and rural development but contested his social justice initiatives
and continuation of the reformist and redistributive elements of the New Deal.391
Republicans, led by Senator Robert Taft (R-OH), and dissident Democrats, led by
Senators Harry F. Byrd (D-VA) and Walter George (D-GA) and Representatives
Edward Cox (D-GA) and Howard A. Smith (D-VA), argued certain New Deal
agencies, particularly the ones that put people to work, should cease because
continuation would cripple national defense by siphoning essential human and
financial resources from the war effort. American voters listened attentively to their
complaints about an over-intrusive bureaucracy as civilians experienced the hassles
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of getting a proper draft classification or a new coupon book for gasoline. The
results of the 1942 elections emboldened Republicans (who were confident of a
strong conservative upsurge in the nation) to reach out to southern Democrats (who
had become leery that Roosevelt and other northern liberals within the party might
submit to black demands for desegregation) to forge a powerful voting bloc within
Congress.
Although Democrats retained numerical control of both the House and
Senate, the conservative coalition managed between 1942 and 1944 to carry out
retroactive revenge on the New Deal. Two of the first three programs liquidated,
the Civilian Conservation Corps (defunded in June 1942) and the National Youth
Administration (eliminated in July 1943), had been particularly helpful to
adolescents and fond to FDR. Conservatives contended the employ of youth
manpower by the armed forces and defense industries made the CCC and NYA
nonessential expenditures. Historians John A. Salmond and Richard A. Reiman
find little, if any money was saved by their elimination. They point out
congressional conservatives made it perfectly clear that the true targets were the
agencies themselves as much as the funds. Salmond and Reiman conclude that the
war budget provided conservatives a political rationale, not a financial reason, to
gut the CCC, NYA, and any other New Deal programs they loathed.392
Politics also provided conservatives a reason to rebuff the patriotic appeal of

John A. Salmond, The Civilian Conservation Corps, 1933-1942: A New Deal Case Study
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1967) and Richard A. Reiman, The New Deal and American
Youth: Ideas and Ideals in a Depression Decade (Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press,
1992).
392

136

the “old enough to fight, old enough to vote” rationale supporting youth suffrage.
Southern Democrats, as exemplified in the 1943 House subcommittee hearing,
obstructed all congressional attempts to expand voting opportunities as infringing
upon states’ rights. While spouting paeans to the valor of those citizen-warriors
defending democracy, they actively opposed legislation to abolish poll taxes, set a
national suffrage age, and establish uniform regulations to accommodate soldier
voting as unconstitutional federalization of electoral qualifications. Of course,
racism factored into their obstinacy; southern Democrats fought against any plan
that might enfranchise blacks either as combatants or civilians, especially those
engineered by their northern-liberal partymates. Republicans worried that
enfranchising 18-, 19-, and 20-year-olds would hand the Democrats long-term
electoral hegemony. Many GOP devotees agreed with Arthur Vandenberg, their
senatorial stalwart, that youngsters at war should gain electoral recompense. Most
Republicans, however, knew what opinion polls had revealed since the 1930s and
throughout the war years. American youth consistently sided with the Democratic
Party and considerably favored liberal approaches to government.393 The

Washington (D.C.) Times-Herald, an unfailingly conservative newspaper,
summarized GOP views when it lambasted youth suffrage as another New Deal
“scheme” masqueraded as a “reform” that would sully the electorate with a “large
number of less experienced and less wise voters” but would solidify the Democratic
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base “not only into our 1944 election, but also into our political system for all future
elections.”394 Predisposed to a philosophy of limited government and states’ rights
and concerned with a coagulating northern-urban-liberal consensus within national
politics, the conservative coalition flexed its muscle against any federally-backed
extension of voting rights – even to brave adolescent servicemen.
Youth suffrage also suffered from a lack of executive interest. Whereas
Eleanor Roosevelt backed it, her husband never stated publicly whether he did. In
his speeches and fireside chats, Franklin Roosevelt mobilized support for issues
related to young Americans (such as lowering the draft age and permitting soldiers
to vote) by overtly articulating the necessity of each measure. He also championed
the use of teenage manpower to aid the civilian and military war efforts. But FDR
remained mute on the subject of adolescent enfranchisement even though young
people expressed overwhelming approval for him and the Democrats. The strains
and stresses of the war made it difficult for Roosevelt to maintain his New Deal
coalition, but he and his advisors neglected to enfranchise eager youth. Many
scholars have marveled at the cunning of FDR and his political gurus on Capitol
Hill to compel lawmakers to adopt administration policies. They conducted much of
that work confidentially, mainly via private chats and telephone conversations,
because Roosevelt, unlike modern presidents, held no regularly scheduled meetings
with legislative leaders or employed a permanent congressional liaison office.395
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Given their wont for the clandestine, FDR and his operatives may have tried quietly
lobbying behind the scenes on behalf of the 18-vote. But the image of Roosevelt as a
political maestro, bending docile and hostile lawmakers to his legislative will, does
not hold for the cause of youth suffrage.
The disinclination of Roosevelt for youth suffrage could also be attributed to a
belief that time spent on securing 18-vote legislation was a distraction to directing
the war effort. Preoccupied by the war, the president expended most of his energy
on the formation of military strategy, diplomacy, and foreign policy. He gave some
attention to domestic affairs, prioritizing economic and financial interests over
social welfare/justice matters. Historian John Morton Blum contends that FDR
consciously subordinated national issues to the Allied pursuit of victory.
“Disinclined therefore to engage in causes he considered peripheral, divisive, and
probably futile,” Blum states, “he ordinarily gave only rhetorical attention to
questions of social or economic justice, including those that the progressive minority
within his own party were eager to advance.”396 Scholar Nancy Beck Young finds
federal lawmakers were not so quick to deemphasize domestic affairs since they
were electorally beholden to their constituents. But like the president, Young
concludes, most congressmen did not think conflicts over social matters important
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enough “to waste their political capital on, especially when struggles about the
economy were intense and, from their perspective, more relevant to the war
effort.”397
The indifference the president and most legislators showed toward the issue
of suffrage ages indicates they thought it not meaningful enough to consider in the
context of fighting a global war. Compared to the soldier vote and anti-poll tax bills,
the resolutions to set a federal age of enfranchisement were nonpartisan and
noncontroversial. Yet there did not appear, unlike the other suffrage measures, to
be a pressing need to modify constitutional law to expand civil liberties for youth.
Gallop polls and other public opinion barometers revealed that many Americans
sympathized with the view that youth war service merited a revisiting of voting age
statutes. They concurred with the sentiment that denying young people suffrage
was probably unfair and maybe unjust. “It would be a strange democracy,” Frank
C. Walker, Roosevelt’s Postmaster General and Chairman of the Democratic
National Committee, asserted, “that singled out for disfranchisement the citizens
who are giving the greatest service for democracy.”398 Yet there was no mobilization
of popular will (except in Georgia) to reset voting ages because the vast majority of
Americans and lawmakers did not see teenagers as a distinctively aggrieved class of
citizens. Most people maintained that the denial of adolescent suffrage, no matter
how seemingly undemocratic, simply was not morally or politically urgent enough to
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warrant purifying legislative action. As a high-school senior from Cincinnati
maintained on the radio program “America’s Town Meeting on the Air”:
Every time in history that there has been a movement to extend
the franchise, it has been with the purpose of including some
new group heretofore entirely unrepresented. The Negro’s fight
to vote meant that a whole new element, a new race, in fact, with
its own ideas and its own wishes was at last given the opportunity
to express itself. But to assert that the 18-year-olds represent
some special group which does not find expression in American
Government is to create a false illusion.399
The idea that youth should vote confronted a suspicion whether youth could
vote. Many citizens sympathized with view that adolescents deserved to vote
because of their commendable war service. Many more people doubted that
teenagers possessed the sense to vote judiciously. Youth suffrage advocates labored
to establish the central point that adolescents, whether engaged in combat or not,
could be entrusted with ballots. “We have a sense of responsibility; we are
intelligent; we are mature,” proclaimed a young man from Chicago on a national
radio broadcast.400 Acculturated to view adolescents as anxiety-ridden and
irresponsible, most adults and the majority of public authorities were skeptical that
youths could perform electoral duties responsibly if enfranchised. Even Eleanor
Roosevelt admitted, “I realize that at 18 a great many young people are not mature
enough to take part in government.”401
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Many Americans held great faith in the capabilities of young people, like
Sergeant Bernard Friedenberg, to make the tough combat decisions necessary for
victory. However, most adults distinguished between responding to battlefield
conditions and analyzing political choices. Emanuel Celler (D-NY), for instance,
maintained,
How could the average youth of 18 evaluate properly
intricate questions of economics and government, the
politics and strife involved in a national campaign? It
might be contended that a lad of 21 or over would labor
under similar disadvantages. Probably so, but in a lesser
degree. The three years between 18 and 21 – three formative,
impressionistic, highly absorptive years – make a great difference.402
The adults like Cellar who opposed lowering voting ages simply distrusted that
adolescents possessed enough age-forged wisdom to give electoral consent wisely. As
a man from New Jersey expressed in a letter to the Washington Post: “Even if
service in the armed forces by a boy of 18 increased his ability to act intelligently as
a voter, which is very doubtful, that is no reason for altering our Constitution to
permit all boys and girls of 18 to vote for all time to come. They have not had
sufficient experience to form sound judgment on national and local affairs.”403
Teenagers, too, disputed whether draft-age youths could vote responsibly. A highschool senior from Ocala, Florida, asserted during a national radio debate: “Surely,
the 18-to-20-year-olds constitute one of the greatest fighting groups in the world.
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But because a man is a good fighter, that doesn’t make him a good voter.
Recklessness, impetuosity, and dare-deviltry, the very best qualities which make
him a great fighter, none of which depend upon reasoning, would tend to make him
a poor voter.”404
Youth suffrage sponsors fervently challenged the doubts about the capacity of
adolescents to cast ballots maturely. Many 18-vote allies argued that advances in
child development and education (particularly in social studies and citizenship
training) made contemporary teenagers equally or better qualified to vote than
their parents. George D. Stoddard, president of the University of the State of New
York and New York State Commission of Education, claimed modern high schools
amply prepared 18-year-olds to meet their democratic responsibilities: “Their
intelligence, energy, and sense of participation adequately counterbalance the
wisdom and life experience of voting citizens in the latter decades.”405 A high-school
senior from Ithaca, New York, added, “the very qualities of youth that make them
good soldiers – alertness of mind and body, quick thinking, and, above all, good
judgment – are the very qualities that would make them good voters. The other
recognized assets of good voters – intelligence, responsibility, and education – are
the qualities of youth as well as adults.”406 Some supporters questioned how
responsibly enfranchised adults tendered their votes. For example, William E.
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Mosher, Dean of the Graduate School of Public Affairs at Syracuse University,
criticized the “widespread ignorance and indifference of our fellow adult citizens”
regarding the principles and practices of “effective democratic citizenship.”407 Other
18-vote exponents wondered if any objective data existed to substantiate adult
claims to age-inherent electoral maturity. A man from New York City asked: “Who
is prepared to prove, by any set of standardized scientific tests, that the attainment
of legal maturity entails the acquisition of political wisdom? If there is no such test,
the present age of 21 should quite as rationally be raised as retained immovable.
Contrawise, if there is no scientific proof that it should be immovable there is no
inherent argument against lowering it.”408
Many advocates for lowering voting ages alleged the maturity concern was a
canard that clouded the real issue: the unfairness of denying suffrage to a citizen
class who proved responsible enough to serve the war effort willingly and
admirably. Several backers pointed out that, although adolescents might be legally
minors, their war effort made them de facto adults. A Brooklyn resident writing to
Congress through the New York Times declared, “You have taken the 18-year-olds
out of the realm of childhood and made them men. Why must you impose
restrictions on these men?”409 Other supporters asserted that the laudable war
service of teenage soldiers and workers entitled them to political enfranchisement;
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as an elementary school principal from Norfolk, Virginia, argued: “Certainly
today’s 18-year-olds have every claim to the right of the vote. They are fighting that
their country might live. In the Nation’s factories and fields they participate in the
productive life of their country. Simple justice demands that they be permitted to
take part in determining what kind of life it shall be.”410 The democratic rhetoric
that informed adult appeals to youth service, however, yielded to the public
reservations about the electoral faculties of adolescents.
Many citizens also had doubts about the depth of youth support for their own
enfranchisement. An August 1943 survey conducted by the Institute of Student
Opinion of 86,000 high school students from all forty-eight states found 53% against
lowering the voting age.411 Other polls indicated vacillation among young
respondents when asked if their age peers had enough knowledge and acumen to
vote intelligently.412 Teenagers debated the issue in spirited forums hosted by high
schools and radio stations.413 Few of the discussions pondered the constitutional or
federalist theories regarding the authority of Congress to declare a national
franchise age. Most often, adolescent panelists contemplated whether the
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mitigating qualities of youth, among them juvenile behavior and the struggle to
understand consequences, should disqualify teenagers as electors.414 “Such honesty
is refreshing,” the editors of the New York Times remarked, “whether well-founded
or not. Some people now old enough to have the franchise would do well to consider
whether they, making up their minds rather casually at the polls on issues before
them, have regarded the ballot with the same awe and respect as these boys and
girls who decided they were not yet worthy of the voting privilege.”415 Adults
listening to the deliberations or reading youth comments questioning the readiness
of adolescents to vote wondered if young people wanted enfranchisement or if it was
being forced upon them by self-interested politicians. Alonzo F. Myers, professor of
education at New York University, charged the 18-vote hullabaloo sprung from the
“emotionalism” of war and the crass “political opportunism” of lawmakers groveling
for votes.416
Some young people did independently advocate for suffrage. Prompted by the
draft age discussions in September 1942, Harold R. Moskovit, 36-year-old president
of the Affiliated Young Democrats of New York, organized “Votes for Youth,” a nonpartisan drive that sought enfranchisement for all persons between 18 and 20. 417
Moskovit envisioned flooding statehouses and Congress with teams of high-school-
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and college-age activists pressing for passage of “right to fight, right to vote”
legislation. Votes for Youth never became the national lobbying operation that
Moskovit anticipated. It remained from its inception a petite publicity organ that
periodically drew attention to youth suffrage through mass mailings, press releases,
and personal visits (usually by Moskovit) to lawmakers, student governments, or
newspaper editors.418 Unlike women suffragists, sponsors of lowered voting ages
separately pleaded the case, which atomized the endeavor into small, disjointed
petition cells. Because advocates never joined in league, there was no coherent
attempt to mobilize young people on behalf of their own enfranchisement en masse.
Supporters of the 18-vote appeared to bank on a hope that legislative authorities
would recognize the millions of teens performing vital war services with a reward of
collective voting rights. The lesson from Georgia was unlearned: with no
centralized group to organize public advocacy, the case for youth suffrage fell flat.

Since the final bomb of World War II, scholars have traced the wartime
contributions of various American social groups. Historians generally agree with
Richard Polenberg’s assessment that the war “radically altered the character of
American society and challenged its most durable values.”419 For youth, the war
created new opportunities and posed old challenges. National mobilization offered
young people great prospects, but they were also burdened with greater
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responsibilities. Adolescents did not experience the war passively. They insisted on
getting involved as actors in their own right and not as appendages to adult
ventures, even despite the skepticism of public authorities regarding their abilities.
Adolescents expressed hope, similar to other social groups, that exceptional war
service might improve their sociopolitical status. Teen-aged Americans eagerly
strove to prove capable of fulfilling the economic, military, and civic responsibilities
of war to overcome the prejudice of age-based chauvinism. The war experience
showed that young people possessed a great adaptive quality to face most any
situation and an acute capacity to analyze complex issues in sometimes harrowing
circumstances. The armed forces trusted millions of young troops, like Sergeant
Bernard Friedenberg, to make the hard battlefield calls necessary to win the war.
Some of the decisions they made affected limb; others determined life. Youths who
had shouldered the burdens of service at the front, on the farm, and in the factory
considered themselves entitled to the privileges and prerogatives of adulthood –
including the opportunity to make electoral decisions.
Because adolescents had seemingly earned the right to vote, prospects for
youth suffrage initially looked bullish. Many teenagers served commendably, and
most adults agreed their contributions greatly aided the war effort. Several
members of Congress supported extending the franchise to adolescents. Opinion
polls showed the public appeared to concur with the notion that young people
deserved voting rights. Many adults agreed with the argument that it was grossly
inequitable to ask youth to work and fight for democracy and then deny them a full
148

electoral share. Adolescents argued enfranchisement was vital to effectuate
democratic citizenship, that not to vote would undermine the reason they had been
taught in school the Allies had to vanquish fascism: to preserve self-determination.
Indeed, the promises of democracy animated the 18-vote cause more than the
expected rewards of war service; as one advocate asserted: “Democracy can grant
one incomparable reward – the right to be governed by the consent of the governed
– represented by the full franchise that goes with citizenship. . . .If our younger
youth are big and brave enough to fight for us, they are good enough to say who
shall represent them and what direction our government shall take under the
Constitution.”420
But federal lawmakers did not extend suffrage to youth. Other, more
pressing and important war issues impeded the effort to lower the voting age. The
nascent conservative coalition of congressional Republicans and Southern
Democrats held firm that any changes to suffrage qualifications, including age,
must originate in the states. Neither President Roosevelt nor members of Congress
appeared willing to devote the time and energy to shepherd a youth suffrage bill
through the legislative process while supervising the war effort. In addition, there
was a fundamental incongruity between their nationalistic rhetoric and legislative
deeds. White House and Capitol Hill officials sincerely praised America’s citizensoldiers fighting the battles of democracy and paid dutiful homage to the republican
principles motivating the drive to exterminate fascism. But their commitment to
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democratization extended only to already-enfranchised adults. Supporters of the
anti-poll tax and soldier vote legislation believed that if adult servicemen were good
enough to fight for the nation, they were good enough to be accorded the full
exercise of their existent franchise. Washington lawmakers did not afford 18-, 19-,
or 20-year-old troops the same accommodation despite being legally old enough to
defend American democracy. Without expressing any sense of irony related to the
votelessness of adolescent combatants or civilians, the editors of the Chicago

Tribune charged:
The exercise of the franchise within the hundreds of encampments in this country should serve to emphasize to the men
in service the difference between their free republican government and the methods of the enemy countries. It is regrettable, however, that the exclusion from the voting of certain
of the men who are willing to give their lives for their country
will also emphasize the fact that we are setting out to evangelize the world without first having practiced all that we
preach.421
Young Americans who worked and fought for democracy considered
themselves worthy of electoral privileges. Adults, however, declined to accept
adolescents as political stakeholders because they doubted the capacity of teenagers
to proffer consent sensibly. The political assimilation of youth, similar to their
immersion into war work, was directly proportional to the degree adults allowed
them meaningful involvement. Whereas adults entrusted trained, but untested,
teenagers to make purposeful choices on the job and in combat, they doubted
educated, but inexperienced, 18-to-20-year-olds would make sensible electoral
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decisions in the voting booth or at the ballot box. Americans might have believed
the denial of youth suffrage unfair considering adolescent war service, but neither
lawmakers nor their adult constituents reckoned the 21-vote an unjust violation of
rights that required legislative resolution. Public authorities may have valued the
service of adolescents, but they did not deem teenagers vote-worthy.
Working without the force of unified leadership or the strength of national
organization and within a society unwaveringly focused on the war effort, 18-vote
sponsors could not convince enough legislators to overturn the convention of delayed
electoral adulthood. Patriotic petitions, righteous appeals, and superlative service
simply were not enough; the case for re-conceptualizing the bounds of adolescence
had to be made before recalibrating voting ages could occur. Adolescents
shouldered the heavy responsibilities of mobilization along with adults, but the
confines of traditional age boundaries and the curbs of the “storm-stress” stereotype
cramped the liberating possibilities of combat and defense work. By not allowing
adolescents to join the war on their own timelines, adults took from youth the sense
of collective unity and individual self-worth accorded other social groups who
enlisted for duty on their own terms. Establishing a uniform national voting age
was not accomplished during World War II. But youth suffrage found a champion,
Ellis Arnall, and he would carry the cause into the postwar era.
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CHAPTER IV
CITIZEN OR OUTLIER:
TEENAGERS AND SUFFRAGE, 1945-1960

Democracy can be cruel to misfits. The reason it’s cruel is you’re told you can be
anything, and there’s enough evidence around you of people getting ahead that you
believe it’s true. So when you don’t, it’s crushing. The more democratic a society,
the more humiliating the failure.
Charles Peters, founder of The Washington Monthly422

On 14 September 1952, nearly 100,000 New Yorkers flocked to the Mall in
Central Park for America’s first “Citizenship Day.” Its origins lay in 1939 with the
delivery of an unsolicited song called “I Am an American” to Arthur Pine, the head
of a public relations firm in New York City. Pine arranged for the tune to be played
on the national radio networks of ABC, Mutual, and NBC, and its popularity
inspired the New York Journal-American to organize “I Am an American Day” at
the World’s Fair held in the city. The promotion proved so successful that, in 1940,
Congress designated the third Sunday in May as national “I Am an American
Day.”423 The main purpose of the celebration was to salute “all who, by coming of
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age or naturalization, have attained the status of citizenship.”424 Some people
reckoned it a pseudo rite of passage, in a nation devoid of one, for it gave special
recognition to persons who attained full citizen status by becoming eligible
electors.425 In February 1952, Congress renamed it ‘”Citizenship Day” and moved
it to the third week of September to also commemorate the signing of the U.S.
Constitution.426
The people who filled the Central Park Mall for the first “Citizenship Day”
gala heard grand patriotic oratory by prominent political dignitaries. The Cold
War and the combat in Korea shaped the content of the day’s discourse. Each
speaker reminded the audience that only determined vigilance against communist
expansion would safeguard world peace and domestic felicity. James A. Farley,
former Postmaster General, glowingly venerated the liberties inherent to
“Americanism” by contrasting them to the constraints imposed by Marxism. He
declared, “We are not told how to vote and we can belong to any political party we
choose. We are not forced to join any political party. We have a free hand and a
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free mind.”427 To New York City Mayor Vincent Impellitteri, the perils of
containing communism globally and thwarting subversion locally required national
mobilization akin to World War II. He implored the crowd to alert “our neighbors
and our neighbors’ children, that we need their help to make the great decisions of
our times.”428
The civic unity aroused by “Citizenship Day” contrasted the civil exclusion
experienced by America’s social minorities, including young people. Republicanism
postulated that the sustainability of self-rule depended upon states enfranchising
only those persons deemed capable of rational judgment. Determining who
possessed the requisite level of mental and emotional fitness engendered tense
debates. The employ of arbitrary markers of qualification, such as wealth, race,
gender, and age, identified which people democratic states considered competent
citizens and inept outliers. During the post-World War II era, the liberating
promises of democracy inspired disfranchised persons to demand the enforcement of
their citizenship rights. African-Americans, Hispanic-Americans, and other groups
held faith in the Constitution’s avowal of popular political rights and embraced the
rhetoric honoring the sacredness of suffrage. As citizen-stakeholders, they insisted
their consent be conferred as a check and influence upon governmental decisionmaking. With all deliberate speed, America’s republican system gradually granted
them electoral equality.
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Young people also desired enfranchisement, and they, too, encountered deeprooted social prejudices that blocked their paths to full political citizenship. The
popular sentiment formed during World War II that adolescents should be granted
suffrage because of patriotic service faded quickly at war’s end. Postwar debates
over lowering voting ages examined whether young people could proffer consent
sensibly and responsibly. The social hysterias of the era amplified the usual adult
qualms about youth capacities. After the war, adolescents achieved unprecedented
social attention thanks to the “baby boom.” During the 1950s, a discrete “youth
culture” materialized that set adolescents apart from adult culture. The formation
of youth culture crystallized “teenagers” as distinct social personae with their own
lifestyles, outlooks, goods, fads, music, and slang. The rising youth demographic
tide begat for teenagers an economic and cultural clout heretofore unknown in
American history. Though businessmen cashed in handsomely on the consumer
demands of adolescents, parents and politicians became ever-more alarmed by the
collective want of youth to flout the norms, values, and behaviors of the larger adult
culture. Addled by Cold War paranoia, adults detected in the normal squalls and
anxieties of adolescence a potential national security hazard. The naïve credulity
allegedly inherent to youth supposedly made them acutely susceptible to communist
charms. Civic concerns that the immaturity of “teenagers” and the criminality of
“juvenile delinquents” might subvert the nation not only heightened traditional
worries about adolescent rebelliousness but also muffled contemporary calls to
enfranchise youth. To many adults, teenagers lacked the levelheaded faculties
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necessary for electoral cogency.
Young people also confronted political obstacles impeding electoral selfhood.
Postwar Americans broadly accepted that governments would protect individual
rights, provide basic welfare, and commit to international involvement. Presidents
Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower and members of Congress steered America
on a modest political course by striving to uphold those precepts while not
expanding the prerogatives of government too much. While Truman remained noncommittal to lowering franchise ages, Eisenhower publically endorsed establishing
eighteen as the national suffrage age. In May 1954, the Senate took the first
congressional floor vote on a youth suffrage bill. Southern Democrats rallied fellow
partymates to reject it as an infringement upon the states’ right to set voter
qualifications. In the context of federalist traditions and contemporary politics, the
18-vote resolution appeared to many lawmakers as just too constitutionally
ambitious – even to those legislators who, every Citizenship Day, extolled
enfranchisement as the essential democratic right. The Senate’s decision to uphold
the 21-vote meant teenagers remained sociopolitical misfits: creative enough to
wield cultural influence but not capable enough to be granted electoral power.

The victory over the Axis powers fostered a dismantling of colonial empires
after World War II that allowed for the emergence of many modern democratic
states. Political scientist Samuel P. Huntington contends the historical pattern of
global democratization can be broken into a series of three waves and reverse
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waves. The first wave began in the 1820s and lasted until the mid-1920s; however,
some backsliding occurred as fascist, communist, or military dictatorships
overthrew some of the fledgling democracies. The second wave of democratization
started during World War II and was finished by the mid-1960s; many of the
democracies during this brief span succumbed to autocracy. In the mid-1970s, the
third wave of democratization commenced and continued through the 1990s with
the end of the Cold War. With the fall of communism, democracy became the most
common form of world government. The missionary zeal with which American Cold
Warriors preached the transformative virtues of democracy had much to do with its
global adoption. Huntington maintains the second-wave democracies emerged
mainly as a result of purposeful American efforts, supported by local partners, to
squash fascism and thwart communism through the implementation of federalism
(separation of powers), constitutionalism (rule of law), republicanism (popular
sovereignty) and capitalism (free markets). Though American action sometimes
relied more on coercion than persuasion, thirty-six formerly autocratic nations, by
his calculations, became functioning democracies by the mid-1960s.429 As a result,
Huntington concludes, democracy developed from a largely northern European to a
worldwide phenomenon over the course of the twentieth century.
The second-wave democracies established suffrage as a global right of
citizenship. In the past, disfranchised peoples insisted upon electoral equalization
to channel legitimate claims against the tyranny of imperialists or despots. In the
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postwar era, as sociologist Reinhard Bendix emphasizes, the claims for political
empowerment became part of larger strategies for national unification, the control
of dissidence, and the securitization of human rights.430 In December 1948, the
United States voted with forty-eight other countries to adopt the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.431 The United Nations drafted the Declaration to
articulate the inalienable personal and political liberties implied by the terms
“human rights” and “fundamental freedoms” that appeared in the U.N. charter.
The Declaration pronounced moral standards and legal entitlements designed to
protect the freedom, dignity, and quality of life for peoples and nations around the
world. Article 21, Clause 3 of the Declaration proposed: “The will of the people
shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in
periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and
shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.”432 The concept
of “universal and equal suffrage” nourished the global trend toward democratization
by insisting that the right to vote be granted to all qualified citizens. Member
nations, of course, retained the legal power to determine voter requirements.
Signatories of the Declaration understood that arbitrary disbarments due to gender,
race, class, ethnicity, religion, or sexual orientation should be eliminated. Serious
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struggles over suffrage and electoral procedures engulfed many countries, but, little
by little, the principle of “one man, one vote” developed into the world standard of
enfranchisement.
Though the Declaration never clarified if age represented an illegitimate
deprivation of full citizenship, lowering voting ages became part of the global
democratization process. Before its first national election in 1949, for example,
Israel dropped its voting-age threshold from 21 to 18.433 Brazil and Costa Rica set
eighteen as the national franchise age to standardize the administration of suffrage
laws.434 In Asia, establishing electoral ages grew out of American actions to
reconstruct governmental systems shattered by World War II. Japan’s postwar
constitution amended previous election laws by authorizing women’s suffrage and
lowering the franchise age from 25 to 20.435 The U.S. military government in South
Korea approved an election law that established the minimum voting age at twentythree.436
In Europe, a desire to avoid a future war enlivened actions to lower franchise
ages. Political activists asserted that broadening the voting base would serve as a
brake to prevent governments from plunging into the diplomatic calamities that led
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to warfare in 1939. Their logic stressed that the more democratic the nation, the
more accountable its leaders would be to the citizenry, which would, in theory,
lessen the future prospects of war. Other people argued that since the Allies armies
had fought to preserve democracy, national electorates should expand to include
previously un-franchised age groups who helped win the war. Within five years of
its end, Finland, France, the Netherlands, and Denmark each reduced their
constitutional voting ages, but none reached below age twenty.437
Europe’s communist countries were among the first on the continent to
promulgate eighteen as the official franchise age – long before the United States did
so. The 1936 constitution of the Soviet Union established eighteen as its minimum
voting age. After World War II, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany,
Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia each followed Russia’s example by
reducing the age of enfranchisement to eighteen.438 Of course, suffrage inside the
communist bloc meant nil politically without observance of popular sovereignty.
Soviet leaders, however, intended the age drop of enfranchisement to enlarge
membership in the Communist Party rather than to increase electoral participation.
The practical gain in solidifying regional control in Eastern Europe via expanded
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party constituencies also yielded a political profit beyond the Iron Curtain. For
those young Western Europeans who had become disillusioned by the democraticcapitalist model, Soviet policies that purposefully included youth in party politics
stoked interest in communism. Within some of Europe’s democracies, particularly
Greece, Italy, and France, communists made political inroads by rallying support
among adolescents through promises to enfranchise them.439 A Frenchman
complaining to the New York Times about the growing electoral strength of
Western European communists lamented that they “have actually stolen and
muffled the thunder which should be our own truth.”440
Leftist political groups in the United States were early postwar champions of
lower voting ages. In January 1946, the American Labor Party set a 17-point
legislative program that included a provision for reducing suffrage ages to
eighteen.441 Left-wing youth organizations became vocal in support of revising the
age of enfranchisement. In February 1946, the New York state branch of American
Youth for Democracy organized a protest at the capitol in Albany on behalf of youth
suffrage. Nearly 500 young people, “many of them in uniform and still more with
GI buttons in their lapels,” demanded, among other things, voting rights for all
persons over age eighteen.442 The youth bureau of the diminutive Liberal Party

Wall Street Journal, 15 May 1946, 9; Washington Post, 15 May 1945, 9; and Chicago
Tribune, 30 January 1946, 13.
439

440

New York Times, 8 December 1951, 9.

441

Ibid, 3 January 1946, 29.

442

Ibid, 26 February 1946, 27.

161

called on lawmakers to revise voting ages, reckoning that “the contribution of the
18-to-21-year-olds to our country during the last war needs no emphasis.”443 In
1948, the National Youth Organization formed as an auxiliary to Henry Wallace’s
Progressive Party. The NYO sought “full assurance of civil liberties for Negro
youth, the right to vote at 18 . . . and freedom from war for all youth.”444 Arthur
Gilbert, chairman of the National Jewish Youth Organization, asserted politically
open-minded adolescents had gravitated toward Wallace and the Progressives
because the Republicans and Democrats “’destroy the full creative development of
youth.’” The Progressive Party’s 1948 platform indeed included a plank setting
eighteen as the national age of enfranchisement.445 In the context of the Cold War,
left-wing support of lowered suffrage ages colored the proposition with a radical
tinge that made many lawmakers around the nation wary of communist
encroachment. But, during the immediate years after World War II, when most
Americans were focused on economic issues, leftist advocacy carried on the 18-vote
cause when few citizens cared.
Former Georgia governor Ellis Arnall busily worked to keep the issue of
franchise ages on the nation’s political radar. Into the 1960s, Arnall encouraged
federal and state legislators to follow Georgia’s lead in expanding franchise
opportunities for youth. Arnall penned essays for periodicals, spoke in public
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forums, appeared on radio and TV programs, and testified at governmental
hearings to promote the revision of voting-age qualifications. He ardently disagreed
with the oft-expressed view that 18-year-olds were too immature, too gullible,
and/or too inexperienced to be entrusted with ballots. Arnall consistently
maintained his “faith in the young men and women of America” to be sensible and
dutiful voters if ever enfranchised.446 His advocacy of the 18-vote garnered
attention to youth suffrage; however, it did little to affect lawmaking during the
postwar years. He had acquired sizeable public capital as governor, but after being
termed-out of office in 1946, he saw his influence decline as he transitioned into the
private sector. Regionally, Arnall fell out of favor by supporting voting rights for
African-Americans. Nationally, he lost popularity by campaigning for Henry
Wallace.447 Nevertheless, he remained a valuable spokesman for youth
enfranchisement. Though Arnall did not directly inspire legislators or governments
to adopt lower voting ages, his persistent promotion of the 18-vote kept the issue
afloat.
Arnall avidly promoted youth suffrage as a curative to voter apathy. He
consistently asserted that “the idealism and candor of youth” could reenergize
American politics similar to how adolescents had shaken up European elections.448
Fervent political competition and democratization, including the lowering of
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franchise ages, fostered massively high voter turnout rates across Europe. A
December 1948 mayoral race in West Berlin, for example, saw 85% of eligible
electors cast ballots; whereas, only 51% of enfranchised Americans voted the
previous month in the presidential plebiscite.449 The 51% score marked a 5%
decline from the 1944 election and a 7% drop compared to the 1940 contest – and
represented the lowest turnout rate by percentage since 1920.450 In several states
that had voting-age populations equal to or less than West Berlin’s 1.5 million
persons, constituent turnout could only be described as anemic: South Carolina
(13.6%), Alabama (13.7%), Mississippi (15.5%), and Arkansas (22%).451 “We are the
freest people on earth, the most prosperous and the happiest,” U.S. Senator
Wayland Brooks (R-IL) avowed, “yet we show an amazing indifference to politics.”452
Political observers struggled to make sense of the “franchise delinquency.” 453
The Washington Post lamented that no analysis of the voting data could avoid the
“painful conviction that a vast number of Americans do not take our democratic
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system very seriously.”454 A college student from Providence, Rhode Island, who
had longed to “fulfill my obligation as an American citizen” by casting his first
presidential ballot, blamed public apathy on a disillusioning campaign that “seemed
to degenerate into a ‘lesser-of-the-four-evils’ affair” that left voters with no “positive
choice to make” among Harry Truman, Thomas Dewey, Strom Thurmond, and
Henry Wallace.455 The Chicago Tribune, which notoriously headlined the wrong
winner of the election – “DEWEY DEFEATS TRUMAN” – dismissed the shabby
polling numbers as “a plain indication that the campaign was a dud to everyone.” 456
The 1950 mid-term elections appeared equally uninspiring; only 41% of eligible
voters took part in the balloting.457
In contrast, European voter turnout soared. Italy averaged 90% participation
in its 1948 and 1951 national elections.458 Sweden’s 1950 elections garnered a 78%
showing by registered voters.459 And the 1951 plebiscite that propelled Winston
Churchill to a second term as British Prime Minister generated an 83% turnout
rate.460 European election returns so impressed President Truman that he scolded
his fellow citizens for their “laziness and indifference.” “Americans are mighty
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proud of their democratic system of government, but when it comes to voting,”
Truman admonished, “many other countries put us to shame.”461 Chastisement of
“vote slackers” by Truman and other authorities, however, did little to spur
participation.462
Civic leaders fretted over the public’s cool detachment from the electoral
process. They pondered one of the great paradoxes of contemporary American
politics: the United States was the first nation to endow its citizens with the powers
of self-government, but modern Americans, as reflected by voter turnout rates, did
not seem to cherish the privilege of self-determination. Considering the serious
international struggle America was waging against communism, many authorities
believed the problem of democratic ennui posed as serious a threat to domestic
tranquility as internal subversion. As Minnesota governor Luther W. Youngdahl
exhorted, “In these crucial days when democracy is endangered by an ideology that
holds the right of free elections in contempt, it is tragic to find the great percentages
of qualified American voters who fail to exercise their franchise at the polls. This
apathy, indifference, and neglect can undermine our heritage of ‘government by the
people’ unless we take steps to overcome it.”463 Political scientists labored to deduce
why qualified, enfranchised Americans chose not to exercise their suffrage rights.
Their studies sketched three types of non-voters: the lazy who did not get around to
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voting; the skeptical who viewed voting as futile; and the discouraged who were
prevented from voting by legal or practical difficulties. The scholars also found that
postwar economic prosperity had engendered a uniquely American version of
electoral apathy rooted more in contentment than hopelessness.464
University professors, newspaper editors, business executives, labor
chieftains, and government officials conferred frequently to share ideas about how
to inspire citizens to care and incite constituents to vote. Some pundits backed
coercive schemes, such as compulsory voting laws, that would punish qualified
electors who evaded their democratic duty.465 Other observers blamed widespread
ignorance of political affairs for the failures to exercise suffrage privileges.

The

Detroit News questioned whether the bulk of American voters possessed the
“elementary political knowledge as would indicate a minimum interest much less an
intelligent absorption in political processes.”466 The New York Times encouraged “a
greater effort, in the schools and elsewhere, to make the individual realize the
importance of voting.”467 A public school teacher who claimed vast experience in
political recruitment acknowledged, however, that “no amount of education or
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pressure-appeals will bring all of the [electors] to the polls.”468
A consensus developed that poor voter turnout emerged not only from
popular indifference but also from faults in the electoral system. Advocates for
political reform identified America’s byzantine electoral laws as the chief obstacle
holding back voter participation. John C. Cornelius, president of the American
Heritage Foundation (a conservative think tank based in Washington, D.C.), argued
revising voting regulations, particularly at the state level, was necessary because
many “were established in the last century and no longer meet current needs.”469
The authors of the U.S. Constitution allowed the states great discretion, in the
absence of a specific federal law or amendment, to establish the qualifications for
suffrage, the requirements for office-holding, and the schemes for casting ballots
within their jurisdictions. Allowing states to determine the terms of
enfranchisement, however, created an eclectic variance in eligibility standards
qualifying how, when, where, and which electors could vote.
Eager to expand the bounds of democracy, postwar reformers challenged the
three systemic obstacles they believed most impeded voter turnout. First, they
disputed the legality of those codes that purposely disfranchised certain peoples,
like Native Americans.470 They also contested the validity of those obligations,
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such as paying poll taxes and passing literacy tests, designed to whittle
“undesirable” groups from the electorate. In addition, they questioned the
rationality of rigorous registration and residential prerequisites that, in light of the
mobility of the modern American populace, disqualified and discouraged loads of
potential voters.471 U.S. Senator Francis Case (R-SD) lauded the reformism for
easing the hardships of those persons living “’behind the iron curtain of legal
technicalities that keep them from governing themselves.’”472
Supporters of youth suffrage sought to wrap lowering voting ages into the
electoral reform cause. Father Edward Dowling, a fervent anti-communist Jesuit
priest from St. Louis, implored Americans to practice what their nation preached to
the world by getting behind democratization projects that would enhance popular
sovereignty, particularly the elimination of “’outdated procedures’” such as the
Electoral College and the 21-vote.473 India Edwards, director of the Women’s
Division of the Democratic National Committee, advocated a “Voting Bill of Rights”
that proposed, in part, that “no American shall be denied an effective vote because
of race, color, or national origin, unreasonable literacy tests or excessive educational
requirement, dishonest registration procedures or elections, taxpaying or property
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holding requirements, unrealistic age requirements, or residence in the District of
Columbia.”474 To Dowling, Edwards, and other allies of adolescent
enfranchisement, the traditional 21-vote standard struck them as “unrealistic”
because it appeared incompatible with the contemporary endeavors to widen the
electorate and incongruous with the advanced education that modern youth
received. “For American life in the 20th century to deny the franchise till age 21,”
University of Illinois president George D. Stoddard declared, “is to hold back
persons who are capable of assuming social and political responsibilities.”475
Youth suffrage received strong support from professional educators. They
asserted ever-increasing high school graduation rates signified that 18-year-olds
were well-equipped to handle the obligations of enfranchisement. 476 Historian
Andrew Hartman contends that the impetus of the Cold War spurred government
officials to mobilize teachers and students in the geopolitical contest for global
hegemony. He notes that educational programs evolved over the course of the
postwar period. From the end of World War II to the early 1950s, most schools still
employed John Dewey’s progressive education theories as the main pedagogical
model. Most every district abandoned progressive education after critics scored its
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student-centered approach as the cause of poor academic results. Between the early
and late-50s, educators emphasized “life adjustment” classes that offered pupils
lessons in the practical know-how for becoming happy and productive citizens.
After the launch of the Soviet satellite Sputnik, federal officials insisted school
administrators craft a more technological curriculum to produce mathematically
and scientifically smart Cold Warriors. As a result, Hartman concludes, the
traditional belief that the primary purpose of American schools was to educate
young people for responsible conduct as adults got subsumed into the political cause
of developing the intellectual manpower needed to combat communism.477
To cultivate the qualities of mind and heart required to sustain Americanism,
educators created “civics” courses that intended to train students in “democratic
citizenship.” Similar to the “life adjustment” pedagogy, civics classes strove to
provide young people enough political knowledge so, as adults, they could
adequately perform their citizen duties. In 1955, sociologist Herbert Hyman
observed that the American process of introducing youth to their nation’s politics
relied more on indoctrination than education. He coined the term “political
socialization” to describe how communities fostered ideological conformity through
the perpetuation of an ethos that stressed the importance of institutions and
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political authority while disparaging imagination and personal license. 478 Civics
curricula lay emphasis on imparting the norms, values, and behaviors of Americanstyle democracy through a mixture of hagiography (studying the epic deeds of the
great men of America’s political history), catechism (teaching the basic democratic
principles as a set of incontrovertible verities, especially as compared to
communism), and patriotism (coaching a dogmatic defense of America’s way of life
against communist denigration or incursion).479 Public officials found ways to
funnel young student-citizens into civics classes. Some states, like Maryland,
advised school districts to include Civics as a part of the core curriculum.480 Other
states, such as Missouri, steered pupils towards Civics, History, and Government
courses by mandating the completion of competency examinations over the U.S. and
state constitutions within such classes as a requirement for graduation from public
high schools.481
Schools enhanced the citizenship training by sponsoring extracurricular
activities that reinforced the importance of civic engagement within a constitutional
democracy. For instance, teachers reminded children of the communal duty to aid
misfortunate persons by coordinating campaigns on behalf of the March of Dimes or
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UNICEF. Administrators arranged teams of students to take part in the mundane,
but important, workings of democracy, such as assisting voter registration drives,
phoning people to remind them of an upcoming election, offering babysitting
services for mothers, and helping voters at polling places.482 Mock elections, usually
held in conjunction with presidential or gubernatorial campaigns, informed teens
about the candidates and issues and allowed teachers to tutor them in voting.483
Some school districts, particularly those in the Northeast, partnered with
Citizenship Education Project sponsored by the Teachers College of Columbia
University. The CEP worked with public schools to embolden citizenship by
teaching adolescents about democratic ideals through hands-on civic activities, such
as public service work and political volunteerism. A group of teenagers in Pearl
River, New York, who had gone through the CEP program, for example, organized a
successful campaign that convinced voters to pass a bond issue for building new
schools. Another set of CEP-trained students in South Orange, New Jersey, so
impressed local officials with their proposal to construct a youth recreational center
that they were allowed to help plan the project.484
While principals and faculty exposed youths to the democratic process, they
stifled expressions of student opinions within the schoolhouse. In the heightened
tensions engendered by the Cold War, the excited, often poorly framed, political
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utterances of adolescents that had been formerly considered different or weird were
sometimes construed as radical or subversive. Some students organized their own
events outside of school to articulate their views. Young people hosted community
forums to discuss local problems or national concerns.485 Youth groups staged
model legislatures to practice the intricate mechanics of speech-making, politicking,
and lawmaking.486 President Truman encouraged a group of YMCA “boy
governors” visiting the White House to continue rehearsing “the responsibilities
that are necessary to carry on a government . . . In a few years the responsibility is
going to be in your hands.’”487 Not every attempt to stimulate enduring interest in
electoral affairs worked, of course; some adolescents remained indifferent to politics
and civic duties into adulthood and old age. For the majority of teenagers, however,
partaking in the classes, forums, and elections, even if pretend, inculcated a spirit of
civic guardianship necessary for the perpetuation of republicanism. “Participation
of youth in the democratic life,” a 1953 National Education Association resolution
trumpeted, “prepares students for responsible citizenship.”488
Many people maintained that well-schooled adolescents should be allowed to
demonstrate their citizenship training in the voting booth. Truman’s first attorney
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general, Tom C. Clark, submitted, “I have a boy 18 and I think the right to vote
would add to his consciousness of civic responsibility, as it would to all boys and
girls in that age group.”489 Youth suffrage advocates argued the interest of high
school graduates in politics dampened waiting three or four years for
enfranchisement, which, in their view, fostered perpetual electoral disengagement.
At a historical moment “when grownups are staying away from the polls in such an
alarming manner,” Washington Post columnist Malvina Lindsay observed,
capturing the “youthful enthusiasm” of teenagers could stoke “a widespread, steady
buildup” of long-term electoral involvement.490 An Arlington, Virginia, attorney
asserted that if 18-year-olds were enfranchised “the younger blood would help stir
more interest in national politics.”491 Adolescents, when solicited by adults,
confirmed an ardor for civic involvement. A University of Illinois student believed
a lower suffrage age would bring into the electorate “a great many more voters who
are interested in civic problems.”492 A Manhattan teen affirmed that citizenship
training had fostered an “enthusiasm” among teenagers for community affairs that
“more than makes up for their lack of maturity.” A Brooklyn youth insisted that
“age is not the only criterion for maturity . . . many adults in the[ir] thirties are
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irresponsible when they vote.”493 “If the 18-year-olds could vote,” a Newark, New
Jersey, high-schooler predicted, “younger people would urge more of the adults to
get out and vote. We would also show them exactly how important it is to vote.”494
Ellis Arnall pointed to the positive electoral contributions of Georgia youth as
proof that the benefits of reducing suffrage ages would ripple through any political
system. He declared that adding adolescents to Georgia’s voting pool had a
“tremendous” impact on state elections and government because “young people take
a more active interest in politics . . . and want to become active at once.”495 As an
example of the youth effect, Arnall credited the establishment of the 18-vote in 1943
as the catalyst for eliminating Georgia’s poll tax in 1945.496 Because the Peach
State decreased its franchise age, Arnall concluded in his book, The Shore Dimly

Seen, “Georgia today has the broadest electoral base, not only of any Southern State
but of any State in the Union. . . .This experiment in broadening the base of
democratic participation in government will be helpful to every State of our
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Union.”497
In the decade after World War II, no state answered Arnall’s call to
enfranchise adolescents. Delegates to New Jersey’s 1947 constitutional convention,
for example, defeated a resolution to establish eighteen as the state’s voting age.498
Between 1946 and 1954, bills to reduce suffrage ages were offered in 21 of the 48
states.499 Only the 1952 proposals in Oklahoma and South Dakota made it through
their respective statehouses to citizen referendum, and adult voters rebuffed
each.500 Rejection of the propositions could be partly blamed on the voting-age issue
getting caught in the wake of more pressing state concerns. For instance,
Oklahoma voters also denied authorizing a 125 million-dollar bonus to World War
II and Korean War veterans and a special sales tax to fund welfare programs as
well as nixing the 18-vote measure.501
The ineffectual state action reflected federal indifference to youth suffrage.
Only seven times from 1946 to 1952 did congressmen put forward resolutions to
establish a national voting age: two in the Senate (both on the same day in 1947)
and five in the House (four filed by New York Democrat Arthur G. Klein). None of
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the bills were reported out of committee.502 Most Washington officials considered
enfranchising adolescents of slight importance compared to managing the domestic
economy, maintaining internal political stability, sustaining military preparedness,
and containing communism. Congressional action also got hindered by concerns
that declaring a federal age of enfranchisement might create sticky legal messes;
e.g. many states tied jury service to voter eligibility. Several lawmakers fretted
that a promulgating a national voting age, either by statute or amendment, might
necessitate a change to the Fourteenth Amendment since it fixed representation in
Congress on the basis of male citizens at least twenty-one years old.503
Harry Truman remained unenthusiastic about the prospect of lowering the
voting age. Like previous presidents, Truman promoted opportunities to expand
the franchise. He urged Americans to vote in greater numbers, supported federal
protection of suffrage rights, convinced the Defense Department to streamline
absentee voting for soldiers, and called for the residents of Washington, D.C. to be
enfranchised.504 Yet he never made a formal statement in support of youth suffrage
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nor did anything substantive to rally the public or push the 18-vote in Congress.
The nearest Truman came to endorsing adolescent enfranchisement occurred at an
informal question-and-answer session with Chicago high school students in April
1946. Truman told the group that he “didn’t see why any intelligent boy or girl of
18 should not have the right to vote if they prepared themselves since they proved
in time of war that they can shoulder citizenship’s highest duty.” 505 He refused,
however, to commit to sponsoring 18-vote legislation. “As far as I can discover,”
Truman’s administrative assistant, Charles S. Murphy, wrote to a White House
staff member inquiring about how to answer requests for the President’s views on
reducing voting ages, “neither the President nor the Administration have taken a
position on this issue beyond saying that it is a matter for state decision.”506
Truman’s cool response to youth suffrage mirrored the national mood. A June
1946 Washington Post survey of Maryland, Virginia, and District of Columbia
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residents found 52% of respondents opposed lowering voting ages from 21 to 18.507
A February 1947 poll conducted by George Gallup showed 60% against the 18-vote.
Gallup concluded the results revealed “a marked shift in public opinion since 1943,
when sentiment favoring youth suffrage was at its height.”508 Whereas lawmakers
pondered the political and legal problems reduced voting ages might cause, many of
their constituents wondered if adolescents had enough educational preparation to
warrant enfranchisement. Some people agreed with a Nebraska school
superintendent who avowed, “’With the social studies and school discussions what
they are today, many an 18-year-old is better qualified to vote than are his
parents.’”509 University of Illinois president George D. Stoddard added, “There is no
magic power in 20 or 19 or 18, but the last figure represents a young person farther
along, thanks to science, education, and democratic procedures, than the 21 year old
of the preceding century.”510 Other adults, like a man from Silver Spring,
Maryland, contested the logic that contemporary teenagers could vote more
intelligently because they were “better educated” than past generations.
“Government,” he argued, was “more complicated also, and a year or two of high
school social studies is meager prerequisite for suffrage.”511 The editors of the
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the 18 year old today is more advanced than the 21 year old of the last century.”
They concluded, “Modern education has its points, but the early acceptance of adult
responsibilities by young people can hardly be counted among them.”512
Young people, too, appeared conflicted about whether they had acquired
enough education to be responsible electors. A Chicago youth who graduated with
honors from a public high school admitted that “he knows too little about present
social and political problems to take advantage of a lower voting age if it were
established.”513 Another honors student from Washington, D.C. countered that “a
fellow in high school usually knows more about what’s going on in Government than
a lot of adults. A lot of things are discussed in civics and history classes, you
know.”514 Adolescents also seemed to lack full confidence in the intelligence
quotients of the teen masses. A Newark, New Jersey, girl opposed lowering voting
ages because most teenagers, in her estimation, lacked “the seriousness required to
choose good candidates for government offices. Eighteen-year-olds are too easily
swayed to be able to make individual decisions.”515 Another young female from New
York City claimed “the ability to cast an intelligent ballot was primarily an
individual matter,” but she conceded that “a two-and-a-half-year high school history
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course was not sufficient foundation for political intelligence.”516 Doubts about the
aptitudes of potential teenage electors were confirmed by reports that during the
first year of the Korean War “more than 500,000 men were turned down for military
service because they failed the educational examinations.”517
The general concerns about teen brainpower affected national conversations
about youth suffrage during the Korean War. In June 1950, the Cold War erupted
into a shooting war when forces from communist North Korea invaded South Korea.
Under the assumption that the Soviet Union or China had instigated the attack,
President Harry Truman obtained United Nations sponsorship of a collective effort
to defend South Korea. Sixteen nations, including many North Atlantic Treaty
Organization allies, sent troops to Korea, but the United States deployed most of
the combatants, furnished most of the weapons, and planned most of the military
strategy. The first U.S. soldiers rushed to Korea, however, were underprepared
and suffered major defeats during the initial three months of the war. Shortly after
a joint US-UN force successfully counterattacked and drove the North Korean army
back to the border at the thirty-eighth parallel, the war fell into a stalemate.
Americans grew increasingly frustrated with the impasse. Some people believed
inept leadership caused the deadlock; others blamed the pampering and cosseting
young soldiers had experienced as children. As Lieutenant Colonel John Michaelis,
commander of the Army’s 27th Infantry Division, grumbled, “These kids of mine . . .
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spent a lot of time listening to lectures on the differences between communism and
Americanism and not enough time crawling on their bellies on maneuvers with live
ammunition singing over them. They’d been nursed and coddled, told to drive
safely, to buy War Bonds, to give to the Red Cross, to avoid V[eneral] D[isease], to
write home to mother – when someone ought to have been telling them how to clean
a machine gun when it jams.”518
The concerns of Michaelis and other officers about the battlefield
consequences of mollycoddling postwar boys revived the issue of universal military
training (UMT). After the cessation of World War II hostilities, the federal
government stopped drafting men – like it had done at the end of World War I. The
growing specter of communist expansion moved President Truman to advocate
universal military training as a means of national preparedness in lieu of
continuous conscription.519 In every legislative session between 1945 and 1948,
Truman asked Congress to create a system subjecting all males who graduated high
school or turned eighteen to one year of training either in the regular army or
National Guard. Upon completion of the training, the men would serve six years in
the reserves. Many Americans opposed Truman’s plan as advocating peacetime
conscription. Some congressmen thought UMT needless within a national defense
strategy based upon atomic power. Other lawmakers deemed Truman’s suggestion
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too inflammatory in a time devoid of active warfare. Congress even let the Selective
Service Act of 1940 expire, as legislated, in March 1947. Congressional inaction
spurred Pentagon officials to discuss the possibilities of forming a national program
based in high schools to improve the physical fitness and martial skills of young
males.520
The communist uprisings in Greece and Turkey that inspired the Truman
Doctrine and the diplomatic crisis in Germany that instigated the famous airlifting
of supplies to West Berlin roused Congress to reinstate the Selective Service
system. In June 1948, Congress adopted another Selective Service Act. The
measure temporarily reestablished local draft boards and authorized conscription as
needed to meet military force requirements.521 Federal officials intended the
renewal of Selective Service to provide the United States with a ready supply of
manpower should the nation ever need to supplement active and reserve duty
personnel. The 1948 legislation continued the basic scheme of universal
registration, selective conscription, and draft classification administered by local
boards as devised in the 1940 statute. However, the 1948 measure changed the
mandatory enrollment ages from eighteen to forty-five, as previously designated, to
nineteen through twenty-five. It also allowed 161,000 18-year-olds to volunteer for
twelve months of service in any of the armed forces branches.522 But it did not
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create a system for universal military training despite pleas by Truman and the
Pentagon. The first draft under the auspices of the 1948 act was conducted in June
1950 with the outbreak of the Korean War.
The combat struggles in Korea re-stoked Pentagon interest in universal
training. In August 1950, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson and Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Omar Bradley warned the Senate Armed Forces Committee
that America faced a manpower crisis if Congress failed to approve UMT. They
speculated that the invasion of South Korea might be the precursor to a larger
communist attack fomented by the Soviet Union in Europe or somewhere else.
Johnson and Bradley argued UMT would be a great deterrent to Soviet plans.523
Johnson’s replacement, George C. Marshall, testified in January 1951 on behalf of
UMT. With the outcome of the Korean War still in doubt, Marshall emphasized the
importance of trained reserves as a vital piece to America’s national security.524
In June 1951, Congress amended the 1948 Selective Service Act (which had
technically expired in June 1950 and had been kept active via continuing
resolution) and re-titled it the Universal Military Training and Service Act. Despite
its title, the bill authorized a selective, not universal, draft of eligible males that
would last four years (or until 1955). Conscripts would serve 24-month tours of
duty, with the first four months dedicated solely to basic training, and instituted an
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eight-year obligation for combined active duty and membership in the reserves.525
Congress inserted a “blueprint” for UMT into the act, expecting a detailed plan to be
drafted at some point.526 In March 1952, it rejected a proposed training scheme as
unnecessary. By that time, truce talks were about to commence; hence, the theory
that Korea would be the antecedent to all-out communist assault elsewhere
appeared increasingly unlikely.527 Interest in UMT gradually waned. Historian
Russell F. Weigley notes that in the midst of the Korean conflict the army shifted
away from the massive troop structures employed during World War II toward a
sleek and nimble force prepared for limited engagements. Plus, a growing reliance
on air power and nuclear weapons made the need for a mass of trained reservists to
repel large-scale attacks unnecessary.528 The scheme for offering every youth
training in martial basics was never devised, but continued worries about “soft”
youth stirred federal investments into physical education classes and the
establishment of the President’s Council on Youth Fitness in 1956.529
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The deliberations over universal military training sparked a hot debate about
draft ages. The Selective Service Act of 1948 established nineteen as the minimum
conscription age. As U.S. troops struggled during the initial months of the Korean
War, Selective Service Director Lewis B. Hershey hinted that Congress should
consider returning the draft age to eighteen as it had been during World War II.
Hershey conceded that his suggestion to reinstitute the 18-draft would nudge
Congress into a “’dangerous field,’” but he insisted that tapping that “’very rich
source of manpower’” was necessary to build the 3-million-man army President
Truman wanted.530 During the same January 1951 testimony in which he
supported UMT, Secretary of Defense Marshall formally asked Congress to lower
the age of conscription to eighteen because, as he declared, “We are confronted with
a world situation of such gravity and such unpredictability that we must be
prepared for effective action.”531 Through the spring, the House and Senate
reviewed Marshall’s request. Militarily, it made sense; the service branches,
particularly the Army, needed the additional manpower (estimated to be a little
more than one million 18-year-olds) to prevent communist takeover of the Korean
peninsula.532 Politically, Marshall’s appeal proved explosive.
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Almost from the moment Marshall posed his idea to draft 18-year-olds, irate
citizens bombarded federal officials with heated objections. A White House
summary of 300 letters sent to President Truman dated 5 January to 21 January
1951, for instance, showed only seventeen in favor.533 A high school student from
Dearborn, Michigan, impatiently asked him why teenagers must “be drafted at all?
Are there not enough other men in the whole wide world to choose from without
robbing the cradle? Men who have the right to vote are the ones that should be
fighting for their country and not these mere boys who have just graduated and are
entering the world as a new generation.”534 Pacifists and peace groups complained
a return to the 18-draft, in combination with the installation of America’s national
security state, would cast a permanent militaristic pall over the nation and foist an
“undemocratic program” of martial indoctrination on young people.535 Educators
claimed it would wreak havoc on the educational life of the nation by stripping
colleges of potential students and reorienting high school curricula away from
scholastic instruction towards military-influenced vocational preparation.536
Parents, particularly mothers, argued eighteen was too tender an age to send green,
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undeveloped boys into violent combat overseas before they could embark upon
adulthood. “Should they be forced to give up their future plans,” a housewife
demanded of Representative Charles W. Vursell (R-IL), “when they are not
considered old enough nor intellectual enough to give their vote as to who the
leaders of our Government will be until they are 21 years old?”537 Lawmakers
considered manpower sources other than the 18-draft (such as re-calling World War
II veterans who had served less than ninety days in uniform, reexamining males
classified as 4-F, and enlisting married men under thirty who had no children) to
balance the desires to meet Pentagon needs and muffle public complaints.538 In the
end, Congress compromised: it set age 18½ as the conscription age under the
Universal Military Training and Service Act.539
The dispute over the draft age prompted another round of public
conversations regarding suffrage ages. Like the World War II dialogues, the “old
enough to fight, old enough to vote” aphorism controlled the discourse. The majority
of Americans who linked soldiering and voting maintained the extension of suffrage
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to draft-eligible teenagers was a matter of simple fairness. As Illinois state senator
Everett Peters summarized: “Any person of an age to be called to the country’s
service has a right to vote for or against the persons governing him.”540 The nature
of the ballot-bullet debate, however, differed in the Korean War era. During World
War II, Americans mainly discussed whether youths should (ought to) vote at all.
As reflected in public opinion polls, most citizens outside of Congress believed that
young people deserved to vote because of stellar war service. During the Korean
War, people mainly disputed whether teenagers could (had the ability to) vote
sensibly. The squabbles over youth qualifications considered if adolescents, in light
of the battlefield difficulties in Korea, had the intellectual and emotional capacities
to cast levelheaded ballots. Those deliberations became clouded by comparisons
between youth generations. Whereas adolescents during World War II were
remembered as tough, dedicated, and serious, Korea War-era teenagers were
perceived as soft, apathetic, and juvenile. Parents and politicians alike divided over
the question whether contemporary young people possessed the sober judgment
expected of electors. In September 1951, George Gallup sensed the public
uncertainty when he reported that “popular sentiment at present is about evenly
divided” regarding youth suffrage: 47% for, 49% against, and 4% undecided. 541
To buttress the overarching claim that young persons responsible enough to
undertake warfare should be enfranchised, 18-vote advocates emphasized the
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mental and physical development of the teenage troops fighting in Korea. “The
only possible excuse for not giving [youth] the voting privilege is one of maturity,” a
man from Ponca City, Oklahoma, charged, “and in a world in which fighting for selfpreservation has become a dominant requirement, who can say that the inducted
youngster does not possess essential qualifications for representing that
maturity?’542 Some supporters stressed that contemporary warfare required highlevel decision-making by young soldiers. “Modern warfare is mechanical and
technical,” a mother from Paterson, New Jersey, wrote to Representative Victor
Wickersham (D-OK), “Today’s soldier must be a responsible individual, a mature
person.”543 Others highlighted the advanced motor skills required of young
combatants. Senator Blair Moody (D-MI) testified before a Senate subcommittee
that “our jet planes are moving so fast these days that a pilot is considered old when
he gets in his middle twenties because of the need for swift reflexes. . . .If they are
old enough to fight, if they have sufficient maturity to be entrusted with jet
airplanes and assigned to foxholes to defend our liberties, then they are old enough
to vote.544 Several people suggested marrying the voting age and the draft age.
Though enfranchising 18½-year-olds would create a logistical headache for local
voting registrars, a woman from Washington, D.C. extolled its psycho-emotional
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benefits. “Anyone who has been closely associated with boys just out of high school
at 18,” she wrote, “knows that six months, just then, is an amazingly worthwhile
‘simmering down’ period.”545 A few groups, such as the Junior Statesmen of
America, called for an extension of voting rights to all members of the armed forces
regardless of age.546 The Chicago Tribune seconded the plea to enfranchise all U.S.
troops by acknowledging that battlefield prowess had exposed an acumen not
normally ascribed to adolescents. “The peacetime 18-year-old frequently is too
immature to use the ballot intelligently,” it editorialized, “This is not true of the 18year-old who is defending his country. Anyone old enough to fight is old enough to
share in government.”547
Critics of the “old enough to fight, old enough to vote” position chipped away
at the contention that capable soldiering implied competent voting. Most
adversaries rejected the parallel between performing military duties ably and
casting a ballot intelligently. The editors of the Wall Street Journal dismissed the
correlation as a “beautifully sentimental non sequitur.” They opined:
It is impossible, of course, to determine an age at which
every person becomes mentally qualified to choose executors
of government. . . .We have settled on 21 years as the qualifying
age in the belief that then most persons can do some thinking
545
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and are less likely to be deceived by specious claims to statesmanship than at any earlier age. No one imagines that that
theory holds true universally. But it is the long considered
judgment of our people and as such it cannot be upset by
attempting to draw a false analogy between voting and
military service.548
Many 18-vote opponents refused to accept the syllogism that voting requires mature
abilities, some young soldiers have demonstrated high-level skill-sets under duress,
therefore, all teenagers between 18-and-20-years-old were qualified to vote. Some
people asserted that the corporeal ability to fight bore no relation to the cerebral
fitness to elect. As a man from Magnolia, Arkansas, insisted: “The catalytic action
of physical maturity and duty and responsibility to defend the country physically
does not bring about . . . the political maturity to vote.”549 Still others disagreed
with the claim that battlefield decision-making evidenced the capacity for
individual judgment required at the ballot box. “[T]he very qualifications which
make an 18-year-old a fine soldier – aggressiveness, daring, unquestioning
obedience to command,” the Morgantown (WV) Dominion-News editorialized, “may
well unfit him to cast an intelligent vote.”550 Members of the General Federation of
Women’s Clubs roundly refused to endorse lowering suffrage ages because they
548
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believed soldiers “were given orders and not expected to think for themselves.”551 A
handful of citizens, like a man from Delta, Utah, recommended raising the draft age
rather than reducing the franchise age because, in his opinion, “youths of 18 are not
mature enough for either task.”552
Adult uncertainty about adolescent maturity impeded the progress of youth
enfranchisement during the Korean War era. Many Americans concurred with the
sentiment of a “sincere 20-year-old” from Florida who declared young soldiers had
earned suffrage rights for all youth for having carried “the responsibilities of our
country on our shoulders.”553 Just as many people, including adolescents, doubted
whether enough teenagers had enough sense to justify enfranchising them. For
example, several members of the 1956 senior class at Newark (NJ) Central High
School (who entered as freshman during the time of the UMT and draft age
debates) disagreed over the question whether military service validated teenage
suffrage. One student thought that “any person who is physically fit to fight for his
country has also to be mentally fit. If he is mentally fit to safeguard the welfare of
his country, why is he not mentally fit to vote?” While another classmate insisted
that “just because a boy is physically old enough to fight, it does not mean that he is
mentally old enough to vote.”554 The public’s inability to reach a clear consensus
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regarding the psycho-emotional acumen of adolescents checked the patriotic
sentiment to grant youth the right to vote and stalled legislative action to
enfranchise adolescents.
While the citizenry partook in a lively discussion about draft ages and voting
ages, Congress generally ignored the teen enfranchisement issue as it oversaw the
war effort in Korea. Only three lawmakers, Senator Blair Moody (D-MI) and
Representatives Arthur Klein (D-NY) and Clyde Doyle (D-CA), offered 18-vote
resolutions in the time between the first arrival of U.S. forces in Korea in July 1950
and the election of Dwight Eisenhower in November 1952. The House of
Representatives neglected to consider Klein’s or Doyle’s proposals.555 Moody’s bill,
however, garnered a hearing – the first by the Senate on any youth suffrage
measure. In June 1951, Michigan governor G. Mennen “Soapy” Williams appointed
Moody to serve out the unexpired term of Arthur Vandenberg who died of cancer
the previous April.556 Williams apparently named Moody to the post because he
was familiar with the inside workings of federal politics having covered them as the
Washington correspondent for the Detroit News, which was owned by Moody’s
uncle, William Scripps. In February 1952, Moody filed an 18-vote amendment (S.J.
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Res. 127) that repeated verbatim Vandenberg’s motion from a decade earlier.557
On 27 June 1952, the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments
allowed Moody and Ellis Arnall to speak on behalf of the bill. Senator Moody
buttressed his proposal with the basic pro-18-vote arguments. He said he based his
resolution “on the conviction that the best way of teaching citizenship to our young
people is by permitting them to participate actively in the important tasks of
citizenship.”558 Moody asserted that “phenomenal advances” in modern education
made contemporary 18-year-olds “more capable of performing the voting obligations
of citizenship than were their fathers and grandfathers at the age of 21. . . .They
have learned the facts and acquired the information on which to base an intelligent
choice.”559 He maintained that America needed the “idealism and vigor” of youth as
well as “their new ideas, their selfless devotion, and their pioneering spirit” to
combat the “widespread apathy toward the problems of our unstable and abnormal
world.”560 Moody noted that 20% of “our Army’s strength is composed of men
between 18 and 20. These men are, by force of circumstance, mature enough to
assume the obligations of full citizenship.”561 He finished his presentation by
insisting that only enfranchisement would prevent young people “from losing
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interest in public affairs between the time they leave school and the time they are
eligible to vote.”562 Arnall earnestly shored each of Moody’s points with affirmations
trumpeting the electoral abilities of young enfranchised Georgians. He attested,
“Many of the fears that used to be expressed by people about youth voting in my
State were dissipated when it was put into effect. All of the bad things they said
about it did not materialize, none of the bad ones. All of the good ones we predicted
for it did come about.”563
On Monday, 1 July 1952, the full Senate Judiciary Committee voted viva voce
to report out Moody’s 18-vote amendment.564 When it reached the floor for
consideration on 3 July, Senator Andrew Schoeppel (R-KS) requested that S.J. Res.
127 be passed over.565 Under the Senate’s standing rules, the first two hours of
each new working day are dedicated to conducting routine business, such as
introducing bills, concurrent resolutions, and committee reports. An important task
during that time is to confirm the day’s legislative calendar. During the reading of
the pending business, the majority and minority leaders (or their designees) either
agree or object to unanimous consent requests asking for a bill to be considered by

562

Ibid, 64.

563

Ibid, 68.

Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States to Grant Citizens of the
United States Who Have Attained Age 18 the Right to Vote, 82nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1 July 1952, Senate
Report 2036. See also Congressional Record 98 (1 July 1952): 8707; New York Times, 2 July 1952,
20; Wall Street Journal, 2 July 1952, 1; and Washington Post, 2 July 1952, 10. The 1952
564

publications did not indicate the viva voce tally. In January 1954, the Associated Press reported
Moody’s proposal “was approved, 4 to 3, by a bare quorum of the Judiciary Committee.” See Chicago
Tribune, 23 January 1954, 1 and New York Times, 23 January 1954, 6.
565

See New York Times, 2 July 1952, 20 and Congressional Record 98 (3 July 1952), 9105.

197

the Senate. A “pass over” dismisses a piece of legislation, either temporarily or
indefinitely, from floor consideration.566 On Wednesday, 3 July 1952, Minority
Leader Styles Bridges (R-NH) designated Andrew Schoeppel as his proxy.
Schoeppel had a busy morning negating bill proposals. He lodged twenty-three
objections before voicing the pass over to S.J. Res. 127.567 Schoeppel’s action
jettisoned a measure that was temporally and politically fated to fail. With the
second session of the 82nd Congress due to adjourn on Saturday, 7 July, there was
not enough legislative time to move Moody’s constitutional amendment through
both the Senate and House. Schoeppel’s maneuver also helped his Republican Party
deny the Democrats a potential legislative score just before plunging headlong into
the 1952 presidential campaign – particularly on an issue that the GOP candidate,
Dwight Eisenhower, pledged to tackle if elected.
The ramp-up to the 1952 election generated party interest in adolescent
enfranchisement. Both the Democrats and Republicans viewed young people as a
potentially influential constituency in a period of deep political competitiveness.
During the postwar years, the United States witnessed one of the rare instances of
divided partisan government in its political history. From 1896 to 1946, America
had experienced divided government (i.e. different parties in control of the
legislative and executive branches) in only three of twenty-five congresses. From
1946 to 1960, the political party not occupying the White House controlled four of its
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seven congresses. The 1956 electoral outcomes marked a historical rarity: for the
first time since 1876, a president was elected without majority control of
Congress.568
This era of shifting congressional majorities and divided government
engendered a spirited competition between the Democratic and Republican parties
to enlist new young members. Party chieftains took note of the era’s changing
social patterns, especially the rising percentage of adolescents in the general
population and the movement of young adults to suburbia, and tailored appeals to
those demographic cadres. The recruitment of young people contributed to a
political climate more attuned to youth issues than in the past. In particular, both
the Republicans and Democrats believed that championing the 18-vote would yield
partisan benefits. In 1946, the editor of the Wilmington (DE) Morning News
predicted that future actions to lower the voting age would be motivated more by
“political considerations” than patriotic sentimentalism, democratic idealism, or
authentication of adolescent acumen. He postulated that lawmakers would “[take]
the gamble” to support youth suffrage only if they had “good reason” to suspect that
it would bolster “the relative strength of the two major parties.”569
The Democratic Party worked to boost its existing advantage in youth
allegiance. In 1946, for example, South Carolina Democrats decided to reduce the
age of eligibility for their all-white primary elections to eighteen, although state law
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applicable to general elections kept the threshold at twenty-one.570 Coming out of
World War II, the majority of adolescents, like the bulk of the adult electorate,
aligned with Democrats. A January 1946 Gallup poll revealed that 65% of 15-18year-olds and 62% of persons aged 21-to-29 identified as Democrats.571 Those
results were understandable considering that other surveys showed postwar youth
favored liberal policies and statist approaches to governing.572 In addition, an
entire generation of young people had only known Democratic rule. In reporting on
soldier reaction to Franklin Roosevelt’s death, Gene Currivan of the New York

Times observed that his passing “was particularly affecting” among those troops
“not yet of voting age” but who had matured during the New Deal. A frontline
infantryman from Ohio told Currivan, “’I can remember the President ever since I
was a little kid. America will seem a strange, empty place without his voice talking
to the people whenever great events occur.’”573 Comfort with FDR-style liberalism
and a desire for continuity of leadership fed youth devotion to the Democrats in the
years after World War II. George Gallup underscored that the political significance
of youth fidelity to the Democrats was linked to demographics. Normally, eight to
ten million adolescents became eligible to vote between presidential elections. “If
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only 50 per cent of these young people turn out at the polls,” he noted, “their vote of
almost two-to-one Democratic would be enough to offset a substantial defection
among older voters.”574
Since Roosevelt’s first election in 1932, the Republicans had banked on men
“in their late forties, fifties, or sixties” to carry the party.575 To win elections, GOP
strategists trusted their oldsters would turn out at the polls in greater proportion
than younger voters. Census Bureau statistics, however, undercut the plan. Based
on current population trends, the American electorate would become younger and
more female with each future election cycle.576 Motivated by the irrefutable
demographics, the Republican Party labored to break the Democrats’ hold on young
people. Their efforts began with the resuscitation of the Young Republican National
Federation, which began in 1931 but became moribund during World War II. The
Republican National Committee tasked the Federation with organizing Young
Republican Clubs across the nation. Between 1946 and 1949, the number of states
hosting clubs grew from 18 to 46 (and the District of Columbia); anyone between
ages fourteen and thirty-nine could join. To rope in new young members, local clubs
hosted civic education programs and social events, such as picnics, dances, athletic
contests, and sleigh rides.577 The Young Republicans also sought to increase their
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presence on college campuses. Ralph E. Becker, chairman of the Young Republican
National Federation, cited two motives for cultivating university cells: to combat
pro-Democrat, left-wing student groups and to capture new young electors. Becker
stated, “’More students of voting age are attending our universities and colleges
than ever before. Approximately 60 per cent of the 2½ million students, most of
them veterans of World War II, are of voting age. This strong potential group is
only part of the 47 million young Americans between the ages of 21 and 40 who will
be eligible to vote this year.’”578 Many Republicans worried that the Democrats’
political dynasty would persist if their efforts to recruit young people flopped.
During Harry Truman’s second term, however, the Democratic Party saw its
popular support slowly dissipate. Truman had attributed “our party’s success in
years past, and the proud tradition it bears today, to the genuine spirit of youth
which is inherent in its philosophy.” And he pledged “to retain the imagination and
idealism of youth in our approach to the perplexing problems of government.”579
More and more citizens reckoned the energetic methodology and activist philosophy
of Truman and his Democrats as too statist in an era devoid of crises akin to the
Great Depression or World War II. In particular, many Americans rebuffed
Truman’s attempts to expand social welfare, create a universal health care
program, and protect the civil rights of minorities as an overextension of federal
power. Other people criticized the party’s legislative agenda as languid and
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outdated. Even Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr. blasted his Democratic comrades during
the 1948 campaign as “lazy” for “trying to meet today’s problems with yesterday’s
programs,” namely, his dad’s.580
As the Democrats scuffled to rebrand their approach, internal clashes over
political philosophy began to fracture the party membership, including its youth
devotees. In the 1948 elections, Truman faced two in-house revolts. From the left,
former vice president Henry Wallace led the new Progressive Party. From the
right, South Carolina governor Strom Thurmond headed the “Dixiecrat” insurgents
who had stormed out of the Democratic Party convention after it placed a civil
rights plank onto the national platform. Young people got caught in the wake of
the power struggle. The Progressives siphoned off those left-leaning youths
(typically from urban areas) who were attracted to Wallace’s call for full voting
rights for blacks and adolescents and alienated by what they perceived as the
Democrats’ rightward-shift toward hawkish foreign policy. The Dixiecrats carried
away young conservative southerners whose partisan loyalties were more regional
than political. For young moderates, the internal strife belied the promises of
Democratic chieftains to “heed the voice of youth” in party affairs.581 As the
disillusion with the intraparty squabbling grew, many young people reconsidered
their political allegiance. Even the youngest delegate at the 1948 Democratic
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national convention, 18-year-old Truman Williams of Douglas, Georgia, admitted
that he “might be forced” to cast his first presidential ballot for Republican
presidential nominee Thomas Dewey: “’I can’t see [voting for] Truman. I am
definitely against Henry Wallace.’”582
After Harry Truman’s miraculous comeback victory in 1948, the Democrats
struggled to retain the former strength of its youth following. During the 1950s, a
cohort of young people came to political maturity more ideologically uncommitted
than the previous generation.583 The student council president of St. John’s
University in New York City affirmed that his classmates and age peers elsewhere
disdained “’the ignorant element that follows either party blindly.’”584 “’High school
students may reflect their parents’ political beliefs,” a social studies teacher in
Maryland conveyed, “but they sure don’t want you to know it.’”585 Several factors
can explain why postwar youths coolly refrained from reflexively assuming the
political affiliation of their families, particularly if they were loyal Democrats. The
intense socioeconomic debates of the 1930s that had forged the hard-core
partisanship of their Democratic parents had been tempered by the peace and
prosperity of the postwar years. Because of an upsurge in internal migration,
increasing numbers of American children grew up in the suburbs. The suburban
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emphasis on conformity, communal acceptance, and conservative politics
encouraged many youths to adopt the political habits and prejudices of their
neighbors.586 The Democrats’ domestic program also suffered under a wave of
anticommunist hysteria that impugned statist liberalism as radicalized socialism.
Beginning in the late 1940s, polling data indicated that the political affinities of
young people had started to drift rightward along with the rest of the nation.587
“’I’m a Southerner, a Dixiecrat, and believe in states’ rights,” a 21-year-old female
student at Southern Methodist University averred, “but the Republicans are now
more what the Democrats ought to be.”588 Gallup polls in 1950 and 1951 showed
the Democrats continued to attract the majority of young, first-time voters, but the
number of them declaring as Republicans or independents increased.589 By the
presidential election of 1952, high school and college students self-identified nearly
equally as Republicans and Democrats.590
During the 1952 campaign, both Democrats and Republicans tried to rally
the support of young people. The Census Bureau estimated that approximately
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98.4 million Americans were age-qualified to vote; 7.5 million were youths who had
turned old enough to cast ballots for the first time.591 Each political party aimed to
broaden its partisan base by capturing the youth bloc of votes and recruiting underage adolescents. Part of the tactics relied on savaging the policies of the opposing
party as an imminent threat to the future lives that young people imagined for
themselves.592 Both parties also invited young people to take an active role in the
election process. For example, the Republicans and Democrats included youths in
campaign work, such as voter registration, preparation and distribution of
campaign literature, rally organization, campus mobilization, membership
recruitment, stumping for candidates, fundraising, policy planning, vote soliciting,
and poll watching. Maryland Democrats even hosted “political birthday parties”
that, akin to the Citizenship Day galas, celebrated those youths who reached the
age of enfranchisement.593 By meshing the experience of party regulars with the
enthusiasm of the amateur volunteers, the Democrats and Republicans hoped not
only to rouse an apathetic adult electorate but to show young people that, in the
words of a Chicago committeeman, “’Politics should be a young man’s game too.’”594
Since voteless youth had no electoral skin in the game, both parties actively
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championed reducing suffrage ages. Democrat and Republican strategists hoped
that adolescents would show their gratitude by joining the party they believed
would best fulfill the pledge to enfranchise them. At an April 1952 campaign stop
at the University of Miami, Senator Estes Kefauver (D-TN) became the first
presidential contender to announce his support for lowering the national voting age
to eighteen.595 Known as a crusader against organized crime and government
corruption, Kefauver had become the front-runner for the Democrat nomination by
defeating Harry Truman in the New Hampshire primary, which caused Truman to
quit the competition. During a June radio interview in New York City, Kefauver
again advocated giving voting privileges to 18-year-olds. “’They are better qualified
to vote today than I was at the age of 21,” Kefauver said, because of the wide access
to political information provided by modern mass media. He further asserted that to
continue the 21-vote tradition risked “dampening their intelligent interest in
government.”596 Internal party politics caused Kefauver to lose the nomination to
Illinois governor Adlai Stevenson.
Stevenson also backed the 18-vote. As a candidate for the Illinois
governorship in 1948, he embraced a state party plank calling for a constitutional
amendment to reduce the Land of Lincoln’s franchise age to eighteen.597 As
governor, he endorsed a drive launched by University of Illinois students to change
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the state’s legal age of majority, including voting rights, from 21 to 18. “’I’m
emphatically in favor of conferring full citizenship rights at 18,” Stevenson
asserted.598 Part of Stevenson’s presidential campaign strategy in 1952 sought to
glean votes from new first-time electors and of-age university students by
underscoring his intellectualism.599 Though critics dubbed him an “egghead” for his
professorial demeanor (and baldness), college students and urbane young people
gravitated toward Stevenson. Future U.S. Senator Paul Simon (D-IL) recalled that
Stevenson appealed to youth because they recognized he was “young himself,
always growing, always eager to explore and probe untried paths.”600 Throughout
the campaign, Stevenson reminded young people that his administration would
tackle long-standing socioeconomic matters by employing novel methods, which
included providing youth new opportunities for meaningful political action. In
September, Stevenson proclaimed his support for a reduction of the franchise age to
eighteen but acknowledged that the matter “’presents difficult questions with
respect to Constitutional amendment.’”601 His squishy, overly analytical positions
on the issues of the campaign, as exemplified by the hedging on the 18-vote, were
contrasted by the firm, plain-spoken stances of the GOP candidate Dwight
Eisenhower.
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Eisenhower maintained a comfortable lead in the polls throughout the 1952
campaign. His prestige as former Supreme Allied Commander during World War II
made him an idol of many Americans, including young people. His civic esteem
combined with the public’s frustration with the Democrats’ handling of the Korean
War to propel Eisenhower’s candidacy. Among the many assurances he made as a
presidential contestant, Eisenhower affirmed that his administration would “’bring
the youth in[to]” the governing fold by offering a “’vigorous, appealing, dynamic
program’” that would utilize “’their freshness and their vigor.’”602 At a June press
conference in Detroit, Eisenhower said he backed lowering the legal voting age to
eighteen.603 The following day in Denver, he succinctly explained his reason: “’If a
man is old enough to fight he’s old enough to vote.’”604 On the campaign trail a
month later in Iowa, Eisenhower stated that he would sponsor an 18-vote federal
amendment in Congress if elected.605 After he won the Republican nomination in
August, several GOP stalwarts wondered if a 62-year-old political novice had the
energy and skills to pull enough young “first voters” and electors under 30 away
from Stevenson to win the presidency.606
Eisenhower’s rout of Stevenson proved party worries to be unfounded. More
people voted, 55 million, than ever before in a presidential election, which several
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pundits attributed to Eisenhower’s fame.607 His swamping of Stevenson (55% to
45% of the popular vote and 442-89 in the Electoral College) roused a popular
majority reminiscent of Franklin Roosevelt’s elections. Eisenhower offset
Democratic strength in the cities by scoring well in the growing suburbs, and 20% of
the votes cast for Ike came from registered Democrats, including a large chunk from
the South by winning Florida, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.608 Even more
gladdening for the GOP, Eisenhower’s landslide swept the party into majority
command of both houses of Congress; not since 1930 had the Republicans controlled
the White House and Capitol Hill. And in another bit of good news, a poll released
less than a week before Election Day revealed that 65% of 18-to-21-year-olds
supported Eisenhower for president.609 The election data appeared to show that his
spectacular triumph might yield a generation of Republican dominance.
Americans, young and old, obviously liked Ike, but most people still remained
registered Democrats despite his big victory. To regain the majority status the
Republicans once had, Eisenhower and party leaders adopted a two-pronged
approach to woo more people to join. First, the GOP worked to expand its
membership base by creating new auxiliaries (like Citizens for Eisenhower) that
leveraged Ike’s popularity to recruit new constituents, especially white
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suburbanites and black southerners. Second, the party attempted to broaden the
appeal of its principles and policies by softening its image as a club of rich, antigovernment curmudgeons.610 Both prongs of the strategy relied on leveraging
Eisenhower’s popularity and program for party gain; indeed, not only did millions of
Americans personally like Ike, they also accepted his “dynamic conservative”
philosophy. As Eisenhower explained, his approach charted a “middle way” that
tried to balance the liberal prescription for an activist government with the
conservative predilection for balanced budgets and local alternatives to federallyrun programs.611 His brand of moderate Republicanism and the grassroots work of
the recruiting bureaus slowly began to revitalize the GOP.
Part of the effort to rejuvenate the Republican Party called for following up
on Eisenhower’s pledge to enfranchise juveniles. During the first three months of
the 1953, Republican-controlled statehouses in California, Illinois, Iowa, and New
York debated bills to reduce state franchise ages from 21 to 18.612 In March, U.S.
Senator William Langer (R-ND), chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
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proposed a constitutional amendment that would declare eighteen as the legal
suffrage age for all elections.613 Two months later, Leonard W. Hall, national
chairman of the GOP, announced that President Eisenhower and Vice President
Richard Nixon had “endorsed enthusiastically” the legislative efforts to establish
eighteen as the national voting age. Hall expressed no preference to the method of
adoption, claiming he would “support all valid proposals” at the state or federal
level “with every effort at my command.” After stating that young people had been
“more vigorous” than older groups in backing Eisenhower’s campaign, Hall framed
the 18-vote as an issue of maturity rather than recompense for military service.
Hall asserted,
The old argument that young people between the ages of
18 and 21 are not sufficiently matured to exercise the right
of suffrage is as dead as a dodo bird, in my opinion. It has
been my observation that the age of maturity has steadily
been lowered in recent years. I am further convinced of it
by the views of the President, who, after all, led the greatest
army of youth ever assembled during World War II, and his
judgment on the matter profoundly impresses me.614
Two days after Hall’s pronouncement, Representative Kenneth Keating (R-NY)
introduced a constitutional amendment in the House of Representatives that would
enfranchise all 18-year-olds.615 Keating claimed the “backing of our enlightened
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President and Vice President” prompted him to put forth his measure. Echoing
Chairman Hall, Congressman Keating said the demonstrated maturity of
contemporary youth proved them capable of voting sensibly. Keating averred,
An 18 year old today has greater maturity of judgment
than his grandfather had at 21. There are exceptions,
of course, but that generalization would apply to ninetenths of our youth. Improved educational facilities and
their wide use are important contributing causes. In most
schools young people are taught about the workings of
their government in their early teens. Everyone in public
life has enjoyed the stimulating experience of being questioned
by these bright, alert youngsters. Their questions are often
penetrating and searching to a degree every bit the equal
of their elders. There is no magic in the figure 21. In
determining the age at which a person should be permitted
the franchise, competency, not arithmetic, should govern.616
During the summer of 1953, considerable momentum built in support of
adolescent enfranchisement. In June and July, four more amendments were filed in
the House and Senate to establish a national voting age.617 On June 2nd and July
13th, the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments conducted hearings
on Langer’s resolution and another filed by Hubert Humphrey (D-MN).618 Both
bills received hearty praise for recognizing the cognitive capacities of modern youth.
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Rufus H. Wilson, national legislative director of the American Veterans of World
War II, summarized the views of those witnesses who championed youth suffrage.
He declared the 18-vote issue went beyond the “natural argument” of old enough to
fight, old enough to vote “inasmuch as we believe that the educational standard of
the United States has increased to a considerable extent over the last 150 years,
and that the teaching of various democratic ideals in high schools and colleges
certainly makes it obvious that the vast majority of people who are at this age do
have the necessary qualifications to allow them to cast their legitimate and proper
vote as a result of their convictions.”619
As the summer progressed, Republican operatives worked to inflate public
support for teen suffrage. At the yearly meeting of Girls’ Nation, Bertha Adkins,
assistant chairman of the Republican National Committee, encouraged the group to
get behind lowering the voting age to 18.620 At its national convention, the Young
Republicans National Federation offered its support to the cause.621 Meanwhile,
President Eisenhower, Vice President Nixon, and Chairman Hall pushed Congress
to pass one of the 18-vote bills. Republican lawmakers pressed the case that the
nation would benefit by tapping the talents of adolescents. Senator Alexander
Wiley (R-WI), for example, asserted that since many young people “had the
maturity, the responsibility, the judicial temperament, the understanding of men
Granting Citizens Who Have Attained the Age of Eighteen the Right to Vote: Hearings
before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, S.J. Res. 53 and S.J. Res. 64, 83rd Cong.,
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twice their age” they deserved to be “given some reins of responsibility today –
now.”622 Republican promotion of adolescent enfranchisement pumped public
sentiment for the 18-vote to an all-time high. A July 1953 Gallup poll showed 63%
of those people surveyed favored lowering voting ages to eighteen.623 Republicans
believed that their efforts to secure youth suffrage would reap a harvest of young,
loyal constituents. According to the Census Bureau, there were 6.3 million youths
between ages 18 and 20 potentially eligible to vote if they were enfranchised. 624
With so many virgin votes up for grabs, an unnamed GOP strategist admitted to the

Wall Street Journal, “”I’m surprised the Democrats didn’t do it long ago.’”625
Like in 1952, the legislative clock expired before the House or Senate could
approve any of the youth suffrage resolutions. On 3 August 1953, the first session
of the 83rd Congress adjourned. Under institutional rules, however, bills pending in
committee but not acted upon in the first session of a Congress could be considered
without re-filing during the second session. William Langer’s amendment
appeared the 18-vote measure most likely to be contemplated first upon the
resumption of the 83rd Congress. Because he chaired the committee processing S.J.
Res. 53, legislators presumed it would be quickly sent on to the full Senate early
next session.
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At the beginning of 1954, the chances for passing a youth suffrage bill looked
excellent. A Republican-controlled Congress seemed poised to advance a partysponsored 18-vote amendment that had historically-high popular support and
conspicuous backing from a well-liked Republican president. Among the twentytwo topics touched upon in his first State of the Union address (delivered 7 January
1954), President Eisenhower asked Congress to pass a constitutional amendment
establishing age eighteen as the official voting age in federal elections. “For years
our citizens between the ages of 18 and 21 have, in time of peril, been summoned to
fight for America,” the Commander-in-Chief declared, “They should participate in
the political process that produces this fateful summons.”626 The Washington Post
disagreed with the proposition to enfranchise 18-year-olds but commended
Eisenhower’s request as an “astute political move” to consolidate youth support for
the Republican Party.627 James Reston, Washington correspondent for the New

York Times, reported that the 18-vote proposal was one of “only two surprises”
(besides an appeal to strip the citizenship from any American convicted of
conspiring to overthrow the government) in the oration.628 It caught journalists
and congressmen unawares because Eisenhower had not commented publicly on
any of the voting-age bills before the 83rd Congress, and neither the president nor
any of his aides had indicated that his State of the Union would include remarks
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about setting a national age of enfranchisement.629 Newsweek claimed that “most
legislators are leery” of the 18-vote proposal, and the New York Times predicted
Eisenhower would have “more difficulty in securing” it than the other parts of his
legislative slate.630 By promoting the voting-age resolution within the speech,
however, Eisenhower signaled to Congress that it was “high on the list” of his
legislative priorities for 1954.631
In the hours immediately following the State of the Union (which ended
around 3:00 p.m.), Republicans and Democrats quickly introduced legislation to
carry out Eisenhower’s recommendation. In the Senate, three Republicans (Francis
Case of South Dakota, Homer Ferguson of Michigan, and William Knowland of
California), three Democrats (Robert Hendrikson of New Jersey, Estes Kefauver of
Tennessee, and Alton Lennon of North Carolina), and independent Wayne Morse of
Oregon joined to sponsor a constitutional amendment to enfranchise all citizens
who had reached age eighteen.632 Representatives Dwight Rogers (D-FL) and
William Widnall (R-NJ) introduced similar measures in the House.633 Rogers
claimed that he had already prepared his bill prior to hearing Eisenhower’s
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request.634 The three new resolutions of 1954 added to the eight measures still
pending from the 1953 session gave the 83rd Congress eleven possible voting-age
bills to contemplate – the most that any Congress would have to sift through before
the 90th Congress of 1967-68.
Eisenhower’s call to enfranchise adolescents inspired several states to
consider 18-vote legislation. One week after the State of the Union, South Carolina
Governor James Byrnes, a former Supreme Court Justice nominated by Franklin
Roosevelt and Secretary of State under Harry Truman, urged his legislature to
reduce the state suffrage age. “If today’s youths between 18 and 21 are not more
mature and better informed than persons of that age a century ago,” Byrnes
maintained, “we have wasted millions in education.”635 Several states, including
Virginia, Mississippi, and Maryland, mulled over 18-vote bills.636 The governors of
Massachusetts and Michigan also asked their statehouses to consider youth
suffrage legislation. Eisenhower’s proposal to reduce franchise ages received solid
bipartisan gubernatorial sponsorship. A New York Times poll revealed that 29 of
the nation’s 48 governors backed dropping their state’s voting age to eighteen; only
seven executives rejected the proposition outright. However, the supportive
governors overwhelmingly said it should be accomplished by state action rather
than federal amendment.637
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The auspicious state response to Eisenhower’s 18-vote pitch paralleled the
“particularly favorable” public reaction.638 Robust support came from familiar
allies. Ellis Arnall penned a special piece for the Washington Post, apparently
targeted at federal lawmakers, lauding the positive effects of youth electors upon
Georgia politics. “The people of the state have never had cause to regret their
decision,” he affirmed, “No responsible political leader, of any party or faction today
would suggest that the change has not benefited the state and all its people.”
Arnall concluded that the nation as a whole would “profit by the idealism, the
instinctive sympathy and generosity, the courage and the good intentions of young
voters.”639 The American Association of School Administrators adopted a resolution
supporting Eisenhower’s amendment request. The group claimed civics classes and
other programs that familiarized high-school students with the democratic process
had amply prepared youth for the “’assumption of responsible citizenship.’” 640 In a
speech to a New York City youth forum hosted by the Teachers College at Columbia
University, Eleanor Roosevelt again espoused dropping the age of enfranchisement
to eighteen nationwide.641 Praise for the cause of youth suffrage even came from
overseas. Afrikaner Nationalists from South Africa had advocated allowing 18year-olds to vote as part of the process of creating a republic independent from
British rule. “When a good democrat like Eisenhower decides that 18-year-olds
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should have the vote,” the main Afrikaner newspaper crowed, “then certainly there
can be no protest when nationalists here do the same.’”642
Opposition to Eisenhower’s 18-vote appeal emphasized its potential political
harm. Many critics insisted that the impulsiveness and gullibility of youth would
make them acutely susceptible to radical ideas and subversive forces that could
imperil the Republic. They highlighted recent historical examples of foreign
demagogues exploiting impressionable and inexperienced – but enfranchised –
young people to seize power. The day of the State of the Union, Representative
Emanuel Celler (D-NY) blasted the president’s proposal as dangerously “naïve,”’ He
stressed, “’It is significant that Hitler and Mussolini lowered the voting age to help
create their dictatorship.’”643 The editors of the New York Times, claimed the
“greatest factor” that allowed Hitler, Mussolini, Lenin, and Mao to rise to power
was “their success in capturing and misusing the youth of their countries, especially
among the student groups whose book learning had not yet been tempered by
practical experience.” They reminded their readers that young people “in times of
stress, if not in this country then in others, have proved themselves the easiest
victims of demagogues propounding easy solutions through direct action leading to
tyranny.” 644 Sponsors of the 18-vote found the notion of adolescents as witless
dupes insulting. “The idea of getting the young people of America to do any goose-
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stepping around seems to me to show an utter lack of comprehension of American
youth,” Representative Kenneth Keating (R-NY) maintained, “I don’t think you can
regiment the youth of this country in this way. In fact, I think just the opposite is
true. You can’t dictate to the young people the way you can to some of the older
people. They have more independence of judgment.”645
The confidence in youth abilities expressed by Keating and other 18-vote
advocates clashed with the “grave doubt” other elected officials had about
enfranchising callow juveniles.646 Casting teenagers as credulous, which in the
context of the Cold War served to pique suspicions about their fidelity and
trustworthiness, underscored the uncertainty many politicians held regarding
whether adolescent enfranchisement would improve the quality of the electorate.
To some, like former president Harry Truman, the continued qualms about the
reliability, maturity, and capacity of young people seemed to necessitate lifting
rather than lowering suffrage ages. “’The more a man knows, the more intelligently
he can vote,” Truman contended, “’I do not think he has that knowledge at 18; 21 is
a better age; 24 would be still better.’”647 Truman’s comment seemed to play
directly into Republican plans to use the 18-vote amendment as a wedge issue. The
weekly newsletter of the Republican National Committee, “Straight from the
Heart,” debuted the week after Eisenhower’s address with the headline: “’Ike Likes
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Voters of 18: HST Says They’re Dumb.’”648 Sullivan Barnes, chairman of the Young
Republican National Federation, wisecracked that Truman’s call arose from the
bitterness over youth repudiation of the Democrats’ “alien socialist philosophy” in
1952. Barnes also said Truman’s suggestion to disfranchise 6.5 million 21-to-24year-old voters was “shocking.”649 No congressman, Republican or Democrat,
proposed legislation to raise franchise ages. In March 1954, however,
Representative Celler submitted an amendment barring citizens under age twentyone from voting in any election or primary.650 “Fixing the age of 21 as the age of
majority,” he declared, “is the result of the accumulated wisdom of the centuries. It
has been tested through the ages.”651 Celler’s resolution was the last suffrage-age
bill filed during the 83rd Congress.
By the time Celler offered his 21-vote measure, William Langer’s 18-vote
amendment had eased through the committee review process. In late January, the
Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments forwarded S.J. Res. 53 to the
full Judiciary Committee. All three Republicans on the subcommittee (Langer,
Everett Dirksen of Illinois, and John Butler of Maryland) endorsed the proposal.
The two Democratic members were absent from the closed-door meeting, but Harley
Kilgore of West Virginia later registered his aye vote, and Estes Kefauver was a
known supporter of the 18-vote. Several southern senators voiced opposition to
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changing franchise ages by federal action. Two Judiciary Committee members, Olin
Johnston (D-SC) and James Eastland (D-MS), maintained any change to voting
qualifications, including age of eligibility, should come from the states.652 Despite
their objections, on 15 March 1954, the Judiciary Committee voted 7-3 (with eight
members absent) to send Langer’s resolution to the full Senate – the first time any
legislation to establish a national voting age had gotten to the stage of floor
deliberation.653 The Washington Post noted that a tally indicating how each
individual committeeman voted on S.J. Res. 53 “was not officially announced,”
which the New York Times interpreted “as to foreshadow a bitter fight in
Congress.”654
Though the scrap over Langer’s amendment was forecast to be acrimonious,
Washington insiders expected it to be approved by the Senate. Opinion polls
identified a marked degree of public support for the proposal. A March 1954 survey
taken by George Gallup revealed adults endorsed the 18-vote by a wide margin
(58% to 34%); among 18-, 19-, and 20-year-olds, it received over a 2-to-1 majority
(64% to 31%).655 Gallup also undercut the claim that young people were not smart
enough to vote through a quiz of basic political knowledge given to five different age
groups: 18-20, 21-29, 30-39, 40-49, and over 50 years old. The results showed that,
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“on the whole, the 18 to 20 age group does far better than their elders.”656
Representative Charles Howell (D-NJ) contended Gallup’s findings were of
“considerable value” in proving to skeptical lawmakers that adolescents possessed
equal, if not better, educational qualifications than current adult voters.657 For
those congressmen concerned that lowering the suffrage age might
disproportionately benefit one political party, another Gallup survey found that the
allegiance of young people (51% Democrat to 49% Republican) almost duplicated
that of adults (50% Democrat and 50% Republican).658 The overwhelmingly positive
polling results emboldened congressional supporters of the 18-vote. On the eve of
Senate deliberation of Langer’s bill, Democrat Hubert Humphrey confidently
predicted it would pass. Not only did the public and President Eisenhower “want
it,” Humphrey said, but he personally knew a “number of Senators of both parties”
who supported the resolution.659
On 21 May 1954, the Senate debated S.J. Res. 53. A plurality of senators
approved the measure, 34-24, but it did not garner enough votes to receive the twothirds majority required by the Constitution for the authorization of
amendments.660 C.P. Trussell of the New York Times reported that the vote on
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Langer’s amendment “could not have been made on a worse day.”661 Trussell’s
insight proved prescient on multiple levels. May 21st was a Friday, the traditional
day of the week congressmen left Washington, D.C. to tend to political matters or go
home to family and constituents. In an era in which trains still predominated for
long-distance traveling, many lawmakers frequently departed after the completion
of morning business to begin their treks. The floor debate on S.J. Res. 53 began
around 2:30 p.m. and lasted, off and on, for nearly two hours. Within the first hour,
Senate majority leader William Knowland (R-CA) called for a quorum and ordered
the Sergeant at Arms to summon the missing legislators. During the roll call of
names, majority whip Leverett Saltonstall (R-MA) and minority leader Lyndon
Johnson (D-TX) announced that sixteen colleagues were gone on “official business,”
nine were “necessarily absent,” and four were “absent by leave of the Senate.662
Another six senators who had been present at the quorum call left before the vote
on S.J. Res. 53.663 Some of the staunchest supporters of the 18-vote bill were among
the absentees, including Harley Kilgore, Wayne Morse, and Hubert Humphrey.
After the Senate vote, a mini-tempest brewed whether Knowland deliberately
scuttled S.J. Res. 53 by intentionally scheduling it to be considered late in the
afternoon on the Friday before the Memorial Day recess. The timing of the bill’s
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calendar call was more accidental than purposeful. The legislation had been
passed over twice, first on 5 April and again on 4 May 1954, at the request of
Democrats.664 On Thursday, 20 May, the Senate agreed to a motion by Knowland to
take up the Langer’s amendment. Rather than immediately proceeding to debate,
Knowland instead chose to announce the legislative program for the days leading
up to the Memorial Day recess, slated to begin on Friday, 28 May. He stated his
priority to be the passage of an appropriations bill before adjourning for the holiday
break. Before consideration of that measure, Knowland wanted to finish
deliberations on other pending legislation, including S.J. Res. 53, beginning the
following day, Friday, 21 May. He received unanimous consent to start that day’s
business at noon.665 After discussing various legislative matters for over two and a
half hours, the Senate finally got to Langer’s amendment. At a June 2nd press
conference with President Eisenhower, Sara McClenden of the El Paso Times asked
him about rumors that Knowland had deliberately bungled the bill. She said she
heard chatter from “Senators on both sides of aisle” that Knowland’s “lack of
organization and purposeful planning” suggested he “didn’t intend for [S.J. Res. 53]
to pass.” Eisenhower disavowed the gossip by claiming that he “never had heard
any such – this was the first time I had heard such an idea.”666
The convoluted leadership issues unique to the 83rd Senate (1953-1955)
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shaped the milieu that framed the rumors about Knowland’s alleged managerial
misconduct. That Senate, unlike any other, endured extraordinary roster turnover
due to nine deaths and one resignation. Because of the personnel tumult, the 83rd
Senate witnessed continuous shifts in party majority. The elections of 1952
garnered for the Republicans hair-thin control of the Senate by capturing 48 out of
the 96 available spots. Democrats held 47 seats, and independent, but GOPcaucusing, Wayne Morse of Oregon held one. Even if Morse switched to the
Democrat side of the aisle to deadlock votes, Senate rules empowered Vice
President Richard Nixon to break any potential ties. State laws outlined varied
procedures for replacing federal lawmakers who could not complete their elected
terms. Most every state allowed governors to appoint interim congressmen until
another election (either specially-arranged or regularly-scheduled) could be held; a
handful of states mandated waiting until the next election cycle to determine the
new legislator. Whilst the states resolved who should fill the vacant legislative
posts, the Senate continued conducting business, and each new personnel
replacement altered the balance of institutional power. In two cases, Robert Taft
(R-OH) and Pat McCarran (D-NV), the deceased senator was replaced by a person
from the opposite party. And at several moments during the 83rd Senate, a death
reduced the interparty division to a tie or resulted in the Republicans temporarily
losing their slender margin of control.667
William Knowland became Senate majority leader due to Robert Taft’s
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passing. After Senator Hiram Johnson’s death in 1945, California governor Earl
Warren named Knowland to complete Johnson’s term as a favor to his father Joe
Knowland, a major campaign contributor and owner/editor of the Oakland Tribune,
an influential GOP organ in California. At 37-years-old, Knowland became the
Senate’s youngest lawmaker.668 After winning the seat outright in 1946, Bill
Knowland made his reputation as a hard-nosed partisan who specialized in
lambasting the Democrats’ containment strategy as too passive and their welfare
policies as too aggressive. He had a reputation for being curt with constituents,
pedantic in committee, aloof with colleagues, and pompous in public. In a profile for
the Saturday Evening Post, journalist Paul Healy tagged Knowland as the “grim
Senator from California” and noted that his fellow legislators teased him for “being
the Senate’s youngest fogy.”669 The left-leaning political journal New Republic
mocked him as the “boob in armor” for his self-aggrandizing jingoism. Knowland,
however, was a dyed-in-the-wool GOP loyalist. During the 1952 Republican
national convention, he earned the respect of party leaders for his attempts to
smooth the rift between the Taft and Eisenhower camps. As a reward, his
partymates elected him chairman of the Senate Republican Policy Committee (a
weekly steering group to map GOP legislative strategy) for the 83rd Senate.
At the opening of the 83rd Senate in January 1953, the GOP leadership
selected Taft as majority leader. In June, doctors diagnosed Taft with bone cancer
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in his right hip. Before he left Washington to begin treatments, Taft handpicked
Knowland to fill-in as interim majority leader.670 Taft did not consult senior party
leadership about his decision or give an official explanation of his reason to skip
over majority whip Leverett Saltonstall. Cabell Phillips, the Senate beat writer for
the New York Times, speculated that Taft bypassed Saltonstall for ideological
reasons. Phillips deduced that since Taft and Knowland had “seen eye to eye” on
most foreign and domestic issues, Taft saw Knowland as “a man more nearly of his
own kidney” than Saltonstall.671 In his autobiography, Saltonstall admitted that his
“feelings were hurt” over Knowland’s appointment “because no one in the
Republican leadership discussed the move with me.” But he also confessed, “I don’t
think I had the temperament for the job.”672 Saltonstall, a moderate East Coast
establishmentarian, was known as a “senator’s senator” for his courtesy,
cooperation, and tact.673 However, as Taft biographer William S. White contends,
Taft thought Saltonstall had done too much wheedling and not enough whipping.
Taft sensed that Knowland’s tenacity, partisanship, and shrewdness could both
thwart Democrat ambitions and unite a GOP still smarting from the intraparty
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bruises of 1952. White stated Taft regarded Knowland as “a man who would not in
any circumstance panic in the face of any internal Republican trouble and who
certainly would not deal with the Democratic minority any more gently than the
circumstances might require.”674 As Taft supposedly told Styles Bridges (R-NH),
the president pro tempore of the Senate, upon choosing Knowland to become the
next majority leader, “I’m going away and I’ve asked Bill to carry on for me. Nobody
can push him around.”675
Within two months of his appointment, Knowland faced being pushed out of
his post. In a span of seven days between July 24th and July 31st, 1953, the deaths
of Taft and Charles Tobey (R-NH) shifted the party balance in the Senate: 46
Republicans, 47 Democrats, 1 Independent, and 2 vacancies. On 1 August, two days
before the first session of the 83rd Congress was scheduled to adjourn and one day
after Taft died, Wayne Morse, who had bolted GOP ranks during the 1952
presidential campaign to support Adlai Stevenson, announced he would vote to keep
Republicans in control of the Senate during the next session. Three days later,
Senate Republicans unanimously elected the 45-year-old Knowland majority
leader.676 With Morse’s vote lost and looking to avoid throwing the Senate into
further turmoil, minority leader Lyndon Johnson (D-TX) stated he would not
challenge GOP control even if Democrats won the special elections for the two
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vacant seats, which, technically, would give his party a majority.677 The GOP
retained Tobey’s seat but lost Taft’s; that meant when the second session of the 83rd
started in January 1954, the Democrats held the majority 48-47. The election
results placed Knowland in a precarious position: never before (and never since)
had the official majority leader of the Senate been a member of the minority party.
During the first weeks of the second session of the 83rd Congress, Knowland
scrambled to shore his shaky situation. His first order of business was to set the
committee assignments; once completed, the Senate could get the legislative process
started with GOP lieutenants in place. On 11 January 1954, he forged an
agreement with minority leader Lyndon Johnson to change the institutional rules
regarding committee memberships. The previous rules limited each senator to two
committee assignments, but seventeen senators, fourteen of them Republican, held
a third assignment because of the flux in Senate membership during the previous
session. The new formula allowed four more Republicans to serve on three
committees, which gave the GOP one-vote majorities on each of the fifteen Senate
committees.678 In March, those Republican majorities helped William Langer’s S.J.
Res. 53 get reported out of the Judiciary Committee to the full Senate for floor
consideration.
Clayton Knowles of the New York Times stated that the new committee
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arrangement represented “a remarkable degree of Democratic largesse.”679
Benevolence, however, did not motivate Johnson to accept Knowland’s tender.
Johnson clearly understood the true nature of the Democrats’ Senate condition.
Wayne Morse’s alignment with the Republicans, plus the tie-breaking vote of Vice
President Richard Nixon, actually made the outnumbered Republicans the
“majority” party. Johnson also knew that the GOP’s slender margin meant
Knowland needed blocs of Democrat votes to fulfill Eisenhower’s legislative wishes.
With the 1954 mid-term elections on the horizon, Johnson calculated that he could
leverage Knowland’s wobbly “majority” for Democrat gain by gridlocking the Senate
at advantageous moments and hanging the responsibility for its futility onto the
GOP leadership.680
Republican leaders recognized Knowland lacked the political skills to match
Johnson’s tactical talents and parliamentary finesse.681 To help Knowland parry
Democrat maneuvers, President Eisenhower became more involved in senatorial
operations. During his first year in office, Eisenhower delegated much legislative
authority to experienced Republican lawmakers as he focused on fulfilling his
campaign promise to wind down the Korean War. They struggled, however, to turn
679
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Eisenhower’s electoral mandate into national policy, particularly in domestic
affairs.682 Consequently, Eisenhower decided to take more direct control over the
legislative agenda. In December 1953, he unveiled his plans to be visibly involved
in crafting, explaining, and lobbying for his programs. Eisenhower also pledged
renewed efforts to create more congenial personal relations with members of
Congress, particularly the leadership cadre of the House and Senate, to help carry
his proposals.683 The bulk of the legislation that Eisenhower advocated for 1954,
like the 18-vote amendment, was generally non-partisan. Columnist Marquis
Childs of the Washington Post described it as a “middle-of-the-road program . . .
designed to appeal to the great band of middle-of-the-road voters, which includes
not only Republicans but independents and Democrats.”684 Most of the bills
reflected the president’s moderate political philosophy and could not be classified as
obviously pushing a particular ideological slate.
The success of Eisenhower’s agenda relied on Republican congressional
leadership. Political scientist Henry Z. Scheele contends Eisenhower tapped House
Majority Leader Charles Halleck (R-IN) as his chief legislative lieutenant on
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Capitol Hill because, as the president wrote in diary, he considered Halleck “’smart,
capable, and courageous.’”685 House Speaker Joseph Martin (R-MA) became,
according to Time, “Ike’s grand legislative strategist.”686 Eisenhower marveled at
Martin’s political acumen and deeply valued his patient but persistent leadership.
In contrast, Eisenhower distrusted and disliked Bill Knowland, and the president
became one of the people the majority leader refused to let push him around.
Knowland thought his job required serving the needs of the Senate first and the
wants of the president second. Because Knowland believed he should speak to the
president for the Senate rather than address the Senate for the president, scholars
Neil MacNeil and Richard A. Baker maintain, “Knowland felt no obligation to his
party’s president, regularly finding fault with Eisenhower’s policies and
programs.”687 Knowland drew Ike’s ire by brazenly criticizing his approaches in the
media and on the Senate floor; he especially chided Eisenhower for failing to take a
stronger stand against communism in China, Korea, and Vietnam. Knowland
really got under Eisenhower’s skin during the weekly strategy sessions the
president hosted for GOP leaders. Knowland routinely scowled, grumbled, and
disapprovingly shook his head at administrative plans; sometimes, he angrily
interrupted the president mid-sentence. Eisenhower interpreted Knowland’s
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peevish tantrums as undisciplined egocentrism that, at times, crossed from
rudeness to insubordination. “In his case,” Eisenhower wrote in his diary about
Knowland, “there seems to be no final answer to the question, ‘How stupid can you
get?’”688
The mutual disdain between Knowland and Eisenhower underpinned the
rumors about an intraparty plot to undermine S.J. Res. 53. Clearly, Eisenhower’s
extensive program for 1954 had more trouble in the Senate than in the House.
Unlike Speaker Martin, political scientist Randall B. Ripley contends, Knowland
weakened his leverage as majority leader because he was “torn between being a
good soldier for Eisenhower and being a dedicated conservative.”689 Knowland also
struggled to keep his chamber in order. Too often, Knowland slavishly adhered to
the Senate’s custom of allowing extended deliberations rather than push a bill
along. His laissez-faire approach stroked the egos of vainglorious senators and
provided frustrated GOP right-wingers a stage to vent against the administration,
yet it also stalled legislative business. Knowland possessed tireless energy, but,
seeing himself more as a statesman than a politician, he appeared indifferent to
parliamentary deal-making. He also regularly failed to perform the routine
homework required for successful lawmaking, such as counting heads before
allowing a floor vote on a piece of legislation and maintaining a strict legislative
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calendar. And his humorless, abrasive personality certainly put off many senators,
including fellow Republicans.690
Ironically, historian Thomas M. Gaskin notes, President Eisenhower
“actually found it easier to deal with” Lyndon Johnson than Knowland.691 Johnson
fostered cordial relations with Eisenhower, and occasionally, Ike invited him to
have a nightcap in the White House. To the chagrin of his Democratic flock,
Johnson adopted a collaborative tack with Eisenhower, particularly on foreign
affairs. Historian Robert Caro explains that Johnson’s cooperation strategy sought
to neutralize the legislative influence of conservative Republicans, which Johnson
believed would so enflame internal GOP divisions that the public would overlook
their like for Ike and scorn congressional Republicans for failed statecraft ahead of
the 1954 mid-term elections.692 Of course, as scholars Neil MacNeil and Richard A.
Baker point out, Johnson’s “supportive bent stood in striking contrast to Senator
Knowland’s bristling independence.”693 Eisenhower routinely turned to Johnson to
get his key legislation adopted, including passage of the act to fund construction of
the St. Lawrence Seaway several days before the Senate considered S.J. Res. 53.
In the weeks prior to deliberations on the 18-vote bill, Knowland’s flawed
690
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headship and indifferent parliamentarianism had widened the rift between him and
the president. Knowland sided with GOP isolationists to support John Bricker’s (ROH) amendment to grant Congress regulatory power over all international
agreements made by the executive branch. Only a hastily-cobbled coalition of
liberal Democrats and GOP stalwarts kept the president from an embarrassing
defeat.694 Knowland failed to hold his Republican colleagues together for key
Eisenhower bills on Hawaii statehood and a revision of the Taft-Hartley Act. Nor
did he do much to rein in or cut off Joseph McCarthy’s unruly hearings on
communism in the Army.695 But more often than not, Knowland delivered for
Eisenhower. Historians Gayle B. Montgomery and James W. Johnson assert,
“Knowland supported Eisenhower a vast majority of the time,” particularly on
domestic policy.696 Political scientists George Edwards, Andrew Parrett, and Jeffrey
Peake find that the 83rd Congress only rejected six bills that the president
supported.697 In a review of its legislative record, journalist Roscoe Drummond,
longtime Washington correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor, reckoned
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that the 83rd had been “more responsive to the President’s requests on domestic
matters than any previous Congress since the first two years of the New Deal.”698
Even Eisenhower said he was “proud” of the 83rd for its record of “effective
accomplishments,” especially in areas, like tax reform, “that previous Congresses
have tried time and time again to do and they failed to do so.”699 Knowland might
have been stubborn when dealing with the president and sour about many of his
policies, but he was first and foremost a party loyalist. Like many Republicans,
Knowland favored youth suffrage, and he co-sponsored an 18-vote bill early in the
1954 legislative session in support of Eisenhower’s State of the Union appeal.700
When S.J. Res. 53 came up for vote, he worked on its behalf and, unlike many of the
more recent administration-sponsored bills, managed to unite all twenty-seven
Republicans present behind the amendment. Knowland’s scheduling of the bill was
certainly inopportune, and possibly inept, but not purposefully injurious.
The rumors of spiteful sabotage overlooked that Knowland probably harbored
more hard feelings toward William Langer than Dwight Eisenhower. In midJanuary 1954, President Eisenhower asked the Senate to confirm Earl Warren as
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.701 Since September 1953, Warren had served
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as the interim Chief Justice after Fred Vinson died of a heart attack. For seven
weeks, Langer conducted a “one-man campaign” to bottle up the confirmation of
Knowland’s friend and benefactor. Langer delayed action on Warren’s nomination
while supposedly examining his qualifications for the judgeship. Newsweek
reported he held Warren’s appointment hostage in committee until securing more
federal patronage for his home state of North Dakota. And, in unprecedented
fashion, Langer allowed inflammatory statements against Warren to be aired in
public during the Judiciary Committee’s vetting process.702 Before Warren’s
confirmation vote in the Senate, Knowland blasted Langer’s probe as the “’most
shocking’” and “’irresponsible’” investigation he could remember in his senatorial
career.703 Over two months passed between the approval of Warren as Chief Justice
and the vote on Langer’s 18-vote amendment. Though Knowland held grudges and
occasionally betrayed colleagues who he believed had wronged him, his animosity
toward Langer had no visible bearing on the defeat of S.J. Res. 53. In fact, they
collaborated on the Senate floor to try to persuade their colleagues to pass the
measure. As the majority leader of a body in which his party was actually in the
minority, Knowland simply could not get around a cold political reality: he did not
have the votes, even with every Republican present in support, to harvest a
legislative victory for his partymate or his president.
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Unfortunate timing, rather than malicious scheduling or purposeful
bungling, prevented Knowland from gathering enough votes to secure S.J. Res. 53.
On 17 May 1954, the Supreme Court ruled in Brown v. Board of Education that
state laws establishing racially segregated public schools were unconstitutional.704
The Court’s decision, announced a mere four days before deliberations on Langer’s
amendment, enraged southern congressmen, and their anger enflamed opposition to
the 18-vote proposal. From the start of the 1954 session, most southern Democrats
appeared to disfavor the federal route to establishing eighteen as the nation’s voting
age. A January poll conducted by the New York Times indicated a smattering of
southern support, as Alton Lennon of North Carolina and both Tennessee senators,
Albert Gore and Estes Kefauver, said they would vote affirmatively. A strong
contingent opposed Eisenhower’s call for a constitutional amendment, including
John Sparkman of Alabama (Adlai Stevenson’s running-mate in 1952) and three
senators “who carry great influence”: Harry Byrd of Virginia, James Eastland of
Mississippi, and Clyde Hoey of North Carolina.705 During the late winter and early
spring, southern state legislatures sent conflicting messages regarding lowered
voting ages. Mississippi’s statehouse rejected an 18-vote measure after opponents
claimed it would increase the number of African-American voters.706 Maryland
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lawmakers refused to report an 18-vote resolution out of committee.707 Kentucky
legislators, however, sent an 18-vote referendum to Bluegrass State voters for
approval over the objections of governor Lawrence W. Wetherby.708 A week before
consideration of S.J. Res. 53, Senator Olin Johnston of South Carolina slightly
darkened the afterglow of Kentucky’s action by reaffirming the majority viewpoint
of his southern cohorts: “’The federal government has no right to legislate for the
states on the question of the lower voting age.’”709
When S.J. Res. 53 came up for deliberation, Lyndon Johnson allowed his
mentor, Richard Russell of Georgia, to lead the Democratic opposition to the
amendment.710 The 57-year-old Russell spent more than half of his lifetime, from
1933 to 1971, in Congress, but was the “junior” U.S. Senator from Georgia for threefourths of his career because of Walter George’s long service. Russell’s colleagues
recognized him as the “dean” of the southern Democrats because of his intellect,
eloquence, integrity, affable personality, mastery of parliamentary maneuver, and
ability to forge compromises. By 1954, according to his biographer Gilbert C. Fite,
Russell had completed a metamorphosis from a moderate liberal to a conservative
on social legislation. He had been an ardent New Dealer, championing rural
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electrification, conservation, forestry, and agricultural programs. Russell never
married or had children but felt compelled by the abject poverty in his state to
combat the undernourishment of America’s youth. In 1946, Russell originated the
national school lunch program to promote adequate nutrition among school-aged
kids.711 By the late 1940s, however, Russell had become an opponent of Harry
Truman’s Fair Deal because he believed it overinflated federal involvement in the
private lives of citizens, particularly regarding racial concerns. As leader of the
Southern Caucus, Russell organized southern Democrats in the Senate to block any
and all legislation that threatened desegregation, such as anti-lynching laws,
integration of the armed forces and public schools, and fair employment practices.712
Citizens inundated Russell with comments regarding S.J. Res. 53. A few
letters, like one from a man in San Francisco, urged him to fight the measure to
prevent “extreme left-wingers” from radically altering the nation’s laws.713 Most
people, particularly adolescents, asked Russell to support the resolution. A highschool senior from Atlanta, for example, insisted that the Senate extend to
America’s youth the same electoral trust “Georgia has given us.”714 Russell’s stock
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reply underscored how the 18-vote “has worked out very well in my own state” but
emphasized that “each and every one of the states has adequate legal machinery for
fixing the age of suffrage at either eighteen, nineteen, or twenty years.”715 His everdeepening conservatism honed his sharp antagonism toward federal action to
establish a national suffrage age. Unlike Estes Kefauver and Adlai Stevenson,
Russell opposed congressional legislation to lower voting ages as a Democratic
presidential candidate in 1952.716 And he vocally contested Eisenhower’s call for
federal 18-vote legislation. Immediately after the president’s 1954 State of the
Union address, Russell lambasted his plea for a constitutional amendment as “an
invasion of states’ rights.”717 He later wrote to a state representative from Idaho:
I am very much opposed to the Federal Government
coercing any state in this field, and believe the President’s
recommendations only point to a classic illustration of an
instance where people should go to their state government
and promote the changes rather than to dictate to sister
states from Washington. I regard this tendency, and the
concentration of power here, as the greatest threat to our
individual rights and our form of government.718
Some letter-writers pleaded with Russell to look past his dogmatism to give the
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letter of the 18-vote amendment a fair evaluation. “I also believe in states’ rights,”
a 17-year-old girl from Chicago affirmed, “but don’t you think that in a National
Election it is for the National government to decide?”719
Russell’s correspondence shaped the carefully-parsed words he spoke during
floor debate on S.J. Res. 53. He expressed support for the principle of youth
suffrage and praised Georgia adolescents for their able electorship in the decade
since they had been enfranchised. Russell also agreed with 18-vote advocates that
young people possessed the mental, emotional, and educational fitness to vote.720
But he firmly opposed William Langer’s resolution on the grounds that determining
voter qualifications, including age requirements, was solely a state matter. The
crux of Russell’s argument was made plain in a repartee with fellow Democrat
Thomas Hennings of Missouri:
Mr. HENNINGS. I am sure the Senator from Georgia and
many other Senators would not assume an attitude of oldfogyism or rigidity to the extent of believing that the human
race does not make progress and suggesting that some boys
and girls 18 years of age have not attained sufficient maturity
and a sufficient degree of wisdom and judgment to exercise
the franchise. I believe there are many youngsters of 18 years
of age who can, perhaps, vote more intelligently than can some
who have attained a much greater age.
Mr. RUSSELL. I stated that that was not the issue at all,
that there is much merit to the contention that 18-year-olds
are qualified to vote, and my State permits them to vote. But
the question is whether we should have a Federal strait-jacket
719
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placed on the States by amending the Constitution which was
deliberately drawn to provide the States some elasticity in
requirements for voting.721
The Brown decision was clearly on Russell’s mind as he spoke out against
S.J. Res. 53. Robert C. Albright, Senate correspondent for the Washington Post,
observed that Russell was “still bridling at the Supreme Court decision outlawing
public school segregation” when he denounced the 18-vote proposal as an
“’inexcusable infringement’” on states’ rights.722 Russell complained that the
hearings on it in the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments inadequately
vetted the proposal. He had a point. The first inquiry on 2 June 1953 lasted ten
minutes, and the second on 13 July 1953 finished in thirty minutes. Only four
people testified (all in favor), and one of them (a political science professor from
Wabash College) volunteered to do so after Langer, chairman of the subcommittee,
asked at the end of the June hearing if anyone in the audience wanted to speak
publically on the issue. Of the four written statements submitted to the
subcommittee, three supported the resolution.723 Without directly referring to the
mountain of case documents involved in the Brown litigation, Russell, a lawyer by
training, charged, “So I say it is a sad commentary on our times that it is proposed
to have the Federal power invade the several States and prescribe the qualifications
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of the electors, and to have that done on such skimpy and inadequate hearings as
those which were conducted by the subcommittee in this case.”724
Russell’s criticism of the 18-vote resolution laid bare his and the white
South’s condemnation of the Brown verdict. He alleged that S.J. Res. 53 was “only
one more illustration of the theory of trying to carry on all government from
Washington.”725 Russell charged that the states “are fast losing their identity as
units of Government. Our once proud dual system seems to be giving way to the
view that all power should be concentrated in Washington, that only Washington
has the wisdom to direct and control the people of the United States in every detail
of their daily lives.”726 Russell postulated that congressional rejection of the 18-vote
bill might spur executive action to change state franchise ages by fiat, which would
give the Warren Court cause to “incorporate the order into a decision” that would
seek “to force compliance by the States.”727 In a press conference after the defeat of
S.J. Res. 53, Russell expressed “gratification” that it had been sent to the Senate as
a constitutional amendment. He pointed out that had it been submitted as a
statute, it would have passed muster since it gained a simple majority (34-24) –
then, he alleged, “the present Supreme Court would have seen fit to try to enforce
it.”728
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Republican sponsors of S.J. Res. 53 became openly frustrated during floor
debate that it would be thwarted by the sociopolitical grievances of southern
Democrats regarding a judicial matter that had little direct bearing on the votingage measure. Republican strategists staked passage on convincing enough nonsouthern Democrats to break party ranks and back the amendment. Because
Majority Leader Knowland lacked the personal charms and political muscle to
manufacture a favorable outcome, they hoped to parlay the public’s support of youth
suffrage and Eisenhower’s popularity into legislative success. As William Langer
declared, “[T]his is as good a time as any to press the amendment. With the public
support for the amendment increasing all the time, with the occupant of the White
House and the present majority leader in the Senate supporting it, this is an
excellent time to approve it. I am satisfied in my own mind that the issue narrows
down to the simple question: Eventually, why not now?”729
Republican pleas to take advantage of the ripe legislative moment on behalf
of youth suffrage, however, did not break the Democrat bloc. Because Senate
Republicans lacked a working majority, they depended on sizeable blocs of
Democrat votes to pass virtually every bill. In the weeks just prior to debating S.J.
Res. 53, Democrats had become less willing to go along with Eisenhower’s program,
reckoning there was no political profit in helping the GOP build up a legislative
record before the 1954 mid-term elections. Under the temporal circumstances
shaped by the timing of the Brown decision announcement, Republicans were
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unable to steer the deliberations away from the politics of states’ rights onto the
merits of enfranchising teenagers. Russell and his Democrat allies cleverly
redirected the floor debate to the federalist question every time a Republican offered
a reason why adolescents deserved to vote. When Langer referenced the opinion
polls that demonstrated broad public support for youth suffrage, for example,
Russell agreed that adolescents should be enfranchised, like in his state, but not by
federal action.730 When Langer and Knowland highlighted Eisenhower’s espousal of
the amendment, Thomas Hennings noted the president had recently stated that
nineteen might be a better franchise age than eighteen; if the chief executive was
unsure what the exact suffrage age should be, Hennings maintained, the Senate
could not impose age uniformity on the states.731 And when Knowland impatiently
thundered, “What in the world are those who are opposing the amendment afraid of
in submitting the matter to the 48 States of the Union? Why not let the States
express themselves?,” Carl Hayden (D-AZ) calmly interjected that, as of May 1954,
36 out of 37 state legislatures had already spoken by rejecting proposals to lower
voting ages.732
In the recent past, southern Democrats had employed parliamentary
legerdemain to defeat bills anathema to their interests or philosophy. Vanquishing
S.J. Res. 53 required no such trickery. Russell and his regional brethren simply

730

Ibid, 6963.

Ibid, 6967. For Eisenhower’s wavering on the proper voting age, see New York Times, 13
May 1954, 14.
731

732

Congressional Record 100 (21 May 1954): 6976.

248

repeated the chorus that the amendment constituted a gross violation of states’
rights. Enough of their non-southern partymates heeded the refrain so as to retain
the unity necessary to kill the bill. Clearly, the undertow of Brown v. Board of

Education snagged S.J. Res. 53 by pulling the deliberations away from what should
have been a discussion about the democratic justice of youth suffrage toward a
dispute about the constitutional principles of states’ rights. As Senator John
Kennedy (D-MA) concluded at the end of the floor debate, “Reluctance to amend the
Constitution is one of our most valuable safeguards and bulwarks of stability. . .
.[A]lthough the maturity and wisdom of those in this age group is not to be
deprecated – indeed, I would support such an amendment in my own State, and in
the Congress if it were supported by the experience and demand of many States –
there have not been demonstrated sufficient grounds for changing this basic
document today.”733
Neither a popular majority leader nor impeccable bill management could
have saved Langer’s amendment in the torrent of southern umbrage to the Brown
ruling. The accidental timing of its promulgation so close to the date of Senate
deliberation on S.J. Res. 53 inadvertently doomed the voting-age proposition.
“There wasn’t any visible connection between the Supreme Court’s anti-segregation
ruling and President Eisenhower’s proposal for a constitutional amendment to
lower the voting age from 21 to 18,” Newsweek observed, “but that made no
difference. All riled up over the court’s decision, the Southern Democrats had to let
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off steam some way. So they blocked the amendment in the Senate.”734 William
Moore of the Chicago Tribune reported that the “determined stand” of southern
Democrats against the resolution “was regarded by many as a slap at the
Eisenhower administration occasioned by their resentment over the recent Supreme
Court decision banning segregation in the public schools.”735 Southern scorn of Earl
Warren turned Eisenhower’s endorsement of the 18-vote into a detriment because
the president had chosen him to be Chief Justice. The rage the Court stoked among
southern senators also damaged Ike’s rapport with Democrat leaders to such a
degree that he could not mend the regional, partisan, and ideological divides, like he
had on other measures, to rescue Langer’s measure. Indeed, the Senate’s rejection
of the 18-vote bill withered the informal bipartisan coalition Eisenhower had
cultivated. In the days afterwards, congressional Republicans and White House
officials charged Democrat chiefs with duplicity for agreeing to help advance the
president’s legislative agenda – including youth suffrage – at the outset of the 83rd
Congress then reneging by constructing barriers to stymie most of the president’s
priorities.736 Some people blamed Russell directly for undermining S.J. Res. 53.
“You ought to be ashamed of yourself for having defeated it,” a man from Kansas
City, Missouri, charged, “I don’t like the Supreme Court’s decision any better than
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you do, but, don’t take it out on the younger generation.”737 Of course, Democrats
had planned from the beginning of the 1954 congressional session to stonewall GOP
domestic legislation whenever politically gainful. To southern Democrats still
smarting from the Brown case, thwarting an administration-backed voting rights
amendment appeared to be the proper political retort to shield the states from
another federal attempt to encroach upon constitutionally-protected rights.
Although the 18-vote measure failed, Eisenhower and the GOP gleaned a
smidgeon of satisfaction in the outcome. Republican support for adolescent
enfranchisement cut into a long-standing Democratic voting stronghold in
presidential elections: the 21-to-29-year-old demographic. In 1952, according to
George Gallup’s calculations, 49% of electors in that age class cast ballots for
Eisenhower; in 1956, 57% of them voted for Ike.738 “This shift is significant,” Time
maintained, “because 8,600,000 adults have reached voting age since 1952, and
more are coming fast.”739 The vote on Langer’s bill also begat a rare display of party
solidarity. Not one Republican in attendance voted against it, rallied by Bill
Knowland to fulfill their president’s request. The cohesion exhibited by the GOP on
behalf of an administration-backed amendment showed that conservative
Republicans could be more loyal to party than to ideology under the right episodic
circumstances. Since the late 1930s, GOP right-wingers had often allied with
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southern Democrats in a “conservative coalition” to suppress congressional attempts
to expand social welfare and civil liberties. Typically, as political scientist Mack C.
Shelley argues, southern Democrats were the swing bloc that decided whether the
coalition formed at all and determined if conservatives would be in the majority on
a particular vote.740 Scholars Ira Katznelson, Kim Geiger, and Daniel Kryder
contend, however, Republicans represented the swing votes on civil rights issues,
including the expansion of voting rights.741 The circumstances of S.J. Res. 53
turned the usual equations upside down, as united Republicans relied on
Democratic defections to halt southern attempts to derail the 18-vote amendment.
In the end, GOP leaders managed to capture only seven out of seventeen nonsouthern Democrats, which left the resolution five votes short of achieving the twothirds majority required for the acceptance of a constitutional amendment. Not
until 1970 did the Senate again consider a bill to establish a national suffrage age.

After the defeat of S.J. Res. 53, federal interest in reducing franchise ages
dwindled. In the midst of staring down the menaces of communism and smoothing
out the vicissitudes of capitalism, congressmen regularly snubbed calls for youth
suffrage. Between 1955 and 1960, only four 18-vote measures were introduced in
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the Senate.742 Ten resolutions were filed in the House, but seven of them were
submitted by the same three congressmen: Clyde Doyle (D-CA), Kenneth Keating
(R-NY), and William Widnall (R-NJ).743 Each of the bills died in committee.
President Eisenhower said he had “terrific interest” in young people and placed 18vote proposals on his post-1954 legislative agendas.744 Part of the president’s “zeal”
for reducing voting ages, journalist Robert J. Donovan of the Saturday Evening Post
stated, was his desire “to build the Republican Party up to a point where it can win
without him in 1960.”745 The polls revealing an uptick in youth support for the GOP
boded well, but Eisenhower failed to follow up by choosing not to push Congress to
adopt a national youth suffrage bill. He calculated that the legislative toil on behalf
of adolescent enfranchisement would ultimately be futile for two reasons. After the
83rd Congress and for the remainder of his term, Eisenhower faced a Democratcontrolled Capitol Hill staffed with southern committee chairman outwardly hostile
to any legislation that suggested voting rights expansion, including the 18-vote. In
addition, Eisenhower recognized that the majority of federal lawmakers viewed
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suffrage age requirements as “a matter for the states to decide.”746
Three states and one U.S. territory did choose to reduce franchise ages during
the Eisenhower era. Guam’s legislature voted in July 1954 to reduce its age of
enfranchisement to eighteen.747 In November 1955, Kentucky became the second
state to reduce its voting age to eighteen.748 On 3 January 1959, Alaska and Hawaii
joined the United States having different suffrage ages; Alaska set its age at
nineteen, and Hawaii at twenty.749 The actions of Kentucky, Alaska, and Hawaii
were noteworthy when compared to the number of states that considered youthsuffrage propositions. Between 1952 and 1960, thirty-seven state assemblies
entertained proposals to reduce franchise ages. However, a mere eighteen states
(Alaska, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Montana, Nevada, New York,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah,
Washington, and Wisconsin) experienced having at least one house of its legislature
vote affirmatively; the vast majority of voting-age bills never got past committee
review. Only Idaho (1960), Kentucky (1955), Oklahoma (1952), and South Dakota
(1952 and 1958) allowed plebiscites to reduce suffrage ages, with Kentucky
representing the singular success.750 The consistency of the rebukes strongly
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indicated, according to Congressional Digest, that “there was no compelling need or
widespread national demand” for enfranchising 18-year-olds.751
State lawmakers and their constituents rebuffed actualizing youth suffrage
because of broad adult skepticism about the maturity of adolescents. Dwight
Eisenhower claimed that his 18-vote proposals were inspired by his observations of
the maturity of young soldiers. Eisenhower’s military experiences rooted his “faith
and trust” in the ability of young people to take responsible actions, make sensible
decisions, and form considered opinions.752 As he said before the national
convention of 4-H Clubs in 1954: “’I personally think that your judgments in the
destiny of this nation are about as good as those of some of us who are many years
your senior.’”753 Other adults lacked the president’s conviction. Various grown-ups
agreed with 18-vote advocates that citizenship training and modern education
provided youth the academic credentials to proffer electoral consent as
knowledgeably as adults. Many parents and politicians also accepted the insights of
social scientists and businessmen that showed adolescents to be more
developmentally and cognitively adult-like than previously known.754 The steady
climb in public approval of the 18-vote in postwar polls reflected a sentiment that
751
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both the brawn and brains of youth justified enfranchisement. Nevertheless,
individual affirmations in response to the queries of a pollster did not indicate
collective interest in or widespread demand for the enactment of youth suffrage
among adults.

Not only did many authorities curtly dismiss the issue as

unimportant when compared to more serious concerns at home and abroad,
countless other adults flippantly disparaged it as unwise in the context of
contemporary angst about “teenagers.”
Prior to World War II, the word “teenager” did not exist as part of the
American lexicon. According to the Dictionary of American Slang, the United
States became the first nation with a specific word to distinguish the adolescent
cohort and the only country to consider it “a separate entity whose influence, fads,
and fashions are worthy of discussion apart from the adult world.”755 Age-based
cultural differences had existed since ancient times, but, as historian Thomas Hine
asserts, the identification of a discrete “teenage” lifestyle had never occurred before
World War II.756 By the mid-1950s, the teen world of high school and hanging out,
replete with academic and socioeconomic activities, had become a fairly finite social
orbit. To adolescents, the noun “teenager” captured more than an age in one’s life;
it encapsulated a distinct youth culture, an inimitable cohort identity with values,
understandings, and practices unlike that of children and adults. Teen culture
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drew heavily from socially marginal groups, such as working-class gangs and
African-Americans, who overtly or covertly opposed the conformity imposed by the
dominate middle-class culture.757 The most visible features of teendom seemed to
copy from these groups: the distinctive hair styles, special clothing (such as blue
jeans and t-shirts), use of slang and profanity, souped-up cars, smoking, drinking,
and unabashed sexuality. Because of the flowering of youth culture, all things
tagged with the adjective “teen” became the exclusive domain of adolescents, and
age became a primary determinant of social behavior equal to, and in some cases
greater than, race, class, gender, or ethnicity. According to postwar critic Dwight
Macdonald, teenagers had taken shape as “a caste, a culture, [and] a market.” They
were “not just children growing into adults,” he asserted, “but a sharply
differentiated part of the population” practicing “a style of life that was sui

generis.”758
As teen culture matured, the social distance between adults and adolescents
widened. Postwar America prescribed individualism, freedom of expression,
socioeconomic mobility, and self-determination as the antidote to the stultifying
tyranny of communism. Adolescents broadly accepted those aspects of Americanism
and trusted the precepts would also apply to them; as a 17-year-old New Yorker
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averred, “teen-agers are citizens and entitled to protection, too.”759 Age conflicts
arose, however, as teenagers insisted upon pursuing self-identity on their own
terms and adults demanded conformity to social norms.760 Many adults, even the
ones who listened to rock-n-roll “tunes” and bought youth-inspired “threads,”
lambasted the messages and mores of teen culture for flouting traditional values
and behaviors and disrespecting authority. An endless stream of adult-produced
essays and profiles portrayed young people as churlish hellions bent on nihilism.761
Such alarmist portrayals convinced millions of adults that an epidemic of “juvenile
delinquency” had swept over the nation. The archetype of the “juvenile delinquent”
as defiant, self-centered, and emotionally-troubled – which closely mirrored the
imagery of the “turbulent” adolescence described by G. Stanley Hall – fostered
judgments of teenagers as not just troublesome but rebellious. In a 1957 special
issue on youth, Cosmopolitan magazine mused, “Are Teenagers Taking Over?” and
conjured images of “a vast, determined band of blue-jeaned storm troopers forcing
us to do exactly as they dictate.”762 In the context of the fears about internal
subversion fomented by the Cold War, imagining adolescents as automatons in
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dungarees envisioned something sinister: the disintegration of sociopolitical
conventions historically defined by adults. Concerns about the potential for youth
to undermine American institutions appeared to so consume adults that, in 1959,
sociologist Edgar Friedenberg observed, “The ‘teen-ager’ seems to have replaced the
Communist as the appropriate target for public controversy and foreboding.”763
The social anxieties about teenagers framed the political concerns about
enfranchising them. In the context of the postwar “youth problem,” many parents
and politicians alike simply doubted that adolescents collectively possessed
sufficient judgment about their own wellbeing to make responsible electoral
decisions regarding the welfare of other people. They summarized their skepticism
by claiming teenagers unfit to vote because of their “immaturity,” by which,
depending on the context of its usage, adults meant youths were emotionally
disturbed, socially gauche, culturally insolent, personally inexperienced, and/or
politically naïve. A New York City resident, for instance, asserted that the “obvious
argument” against youth suffrage was that “juvenile fads, adolescent crazes,
schoolgirl hysteria and passing hero-worship are widespread evidence of political
immaturity.”764 A man from Des Plaines, Illinois, advocated lifting the voting age
“to 25 or even 30” because, based on his own adolescence, teenage minds were
addled by thoughts of “girls, dances, parties, boxing, vaudeville, and burlesque
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shows.”765 Some older people reckoned that enfranchising youth might destabilize
adultocracy. In 1957, Maryland’s House Judiciary Committee heard testimony on
legislation granting 18-year-olds voting rights. Committee members appeared to
support the measure until Elvis Presley’s name entered the debate. After Secretary
of State Claude B. Hellman stated that lowering franchise ages would “’encourage
greater responsibility among young people toward government,’” Representative
Daniel M. Murray challenged, “’Don’t you believe that most Elvis Presley fans are in
this age bracket? Do you think that’s a proper frame of mind for voters?’” Before
Hellman could respond, Representative Edgar P. Silver yelped, “’Presley could
conceivably be elected President” on the strength of the 18-to-20-year-old
demographic. The committee summarily killed the teenage suffrage bill.766
Legislative denials of adolescent enfranchisement fell within a body of legal
prohibitions on teen activities. Scholar Ronald D. Cohen contends that “adults’ fear
of youthful rebellion and their urge to control youth” prompted the promulgation of
such restrictive laws as curfews, loitering ordinances, and car cruising bans.767
Several cities even tried to neuter “Elvis the Pelvis” by barring rock-n-roll from the
airwaves.768 While adult authorities busily tried to stifle expressions of youth
culture, they chided teenagers for becoming a “silent generation” unconcerned about
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political matters, including youth suffrage. After sending another voting-age
request to Congress in 1955, Dwight Eisenhower commented that young people
“don’t seem steamed up” about their own enfranchisement.769 Whereas the
president lamented youth indifference as “sad,” other politicians believed it to be
damnable. In 1956, Maryland governor Theodore McKeldin blamed the “’apathy of
youth itself’” for the failure of the Old Line State to lower its voting age. Speaking
before a seminar of Young Democrats and Republicans, McKeldin demanded,
“’Where were you when the question was before the Legislature a few years ago?
Where were the 18-year-olds themselves – where were the 19-year-olds and the 20year-olds?’” when he and other state lawmakers led the charge.770 The adult
explanation for youth apathy asserted that pleasure-seeking teenagers had other
things on their minds besides voting. Hal Boyle of the Associated Press, for
example, observed that adolescents cared more about securing a drivers license
than suffrage. “They’d fight by fair means or foul – even ask dad and mom to help –
to preserve what they regard as youth’s inalienable right to drive a motor car,”
Boyle noted, “But several million teen-agers now have the opportunity to fight for
the greatest single privilege of American democracy, and, by and large, their
attitude seems to be one of indifference.”771
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Postwar youths were not uncaring about suffrage. Based upon polling
statistics, they were, as former Georgia governor Ellis Arnall insisted, “most active
and most anxious to vote.”772 During the 1950s, a handful of teenagers organized a
few small bands on behalf of adolescent enfranchisement. Several national youth
associations publicly supported reducing voting ages, but no countrywide youth-led,
18-vote movement developed, though the Future Voters of America tried.773 Teen
efforts to revise suffrage ages were unconsolidated, haphazard, and short-lived, and
their campaigns were limited to individual cities or states. Mostly, the young
advocates wrote petitions to influential lawmakers urging a reconsideration of
franchise ages; sometimes, they travelled to statehouses to pitch lawmakers in
person. Their endeavors to win adult endorsements of the 18-vote and to stir a
youth groundswell to the cause were equally fruitless. Most teenagers simply saw
no need to get agitated over an issue utterly out of their control. Whereas
indignation over adult-made political decisions fueled youth in the 1960s to clamor
for voting rights, the events of the postwar era stoked no such teen fury. Domestic
political matters sometimes irked and even angered adolescents, including their
votelessness, but they had been socialized in their homes and classrooms to handle
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troublesome matters democratically, i.e. by patient submissions within proper
governmental channels. Within a social milieu paranoid about youth subversion
and frenzied by depictions of juvenile delinquency, the vast majority of teenagers
grasped the futility of petitioning legislators for a redress of their electoral
grievances. Adolescents clearly understood that adult intransigence rather than
youth indifference was the central obstacle to the attainment of suffrage. As a
teenager remarked in 1954, “It seems everything we do has to be sanctioned by
adults.”774
The denial of adolescent enfranchisement epitomized the postwar tension
between adults and teenagers. The view of teenagers as a vital but alien social
group and the perception of teenage culture as vivid but deviant would derail the
political efforts to establish youth suffrage. Stereotyping teenagers as
dunderheaded and angst-ridden prompted numerous adults to suspect that
adolescents were psychologically and emotionally unfit to vote. Lawmakers saw no
compelling need to adopt youth suffrage legislation because of the fears and
uncertainties about enfranchising immature teenagers. As Puerto Rico’s Senate
succinctly declared upon declining a 18-vote bill in 1953: “We feel it a risk for
democracy to give voting rights to impulsive youth.”775 The travails of youth
suffrage in the postwar era evidenced that political regulations establishing who
can vote within democracies are lashed to social beliefs determining which people
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should vote. Young people believed adults would eventually see them as persons
rather than stereotypes and consider them as citizens rather than outliers. And
they trusted that authorities would one day uphold the inclusive, democratic
rhetoric civic leaders espoused every Citizenship Day by counting them as electors.
“The perpetuation of our freedoms will ultimately depend not so much on patriotic
oratory,” Oscar Benton, leader of the National Lutheran Council, declared, “as on
the attitudes we develop in the hearts of our youth.”776 During the 1960s, those
young people who had taken the rhetoric about self-determination to heart would
demand that adults practice what they preached by enfranchising teenagers.
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CHAPTER V
LIBERALS, YOUTH, AND THE 18-VOTE, 1960-1971
If you’re under 25, YOU are the MAJORITY, YOU can RUN the COUNTRY!
“Wild in the Streets,” (1968)777

To many Americans, 1968 appeared to be the year that the United States
would achieve domestic meltdown. A long train of internal pressures percolating
over the course of the decade seemed poised to dissolve the essential sociopolitical
elements that had ever-so tenuously held the nation together. Social, cultural, and
political fissures so harried feelings and shook nerves that many people behaved as
though a genuine revolution would begin at any moment. Adults, in particular,
worried that America’s young demi-monde, allegedly stoked by mindless hedonism
and dangerous nihilism, would push the country toward violent destruction. Many
of the movies in that polarizing year of 1968 tried to explain why an ever-increasing
number of supposedly good kids had rebelled against established authorities. While
the teen-pics of the 1950s chronicled the impish fascinations of youth culture (like
rock-n-roll, drag racing, and delinquency), the hippie-flicks of the 1960s detailed the
insurrectionary allure of the counterculture’s casual sex, psychedelic drugs, acid

Wild in the Streets, directed by Barry Shear (American International Pictures, 1968),
movie trailer, accessed 24 July 2015, http://www.youtube.com /watch?v=rRLwV2xafpk.
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rock, and radical politics. These hippie-exploitation movies cautioned adult viewers
that their images of adolescents needed immediate readjustment. Contemporary
youth were not, as played by James Dean, merely estranged progeny seeking
acceptance from parents; rather, they appeared to be alien creatures busily creating
an alternative universe that rebuffed adults and traditional mores.
“Wild in the Streets” offered moviegoers a campy slice of sociopolitical
paranoia.

Based on a 1966 short story by Robert Thom, “Wild in the Streets”

depicts the ascent of Max Frost, a 22-year-old rock star millionaire, to the
presidency of the United States.778 Frost’s climb to the White House begins with a
flash of insight when he hears a politician declare that voting ages should be
lowered to eighteen because 52% of the American population was under age 25.779
Frost decides to lead his “troopers” (i.e. devoted young fanatics) into the political
arena to gain power for disfranchised youth. He convinces Congress to accept a
constitutional amendment declaring fourteen as the national franchise age by
having his merry pranksters spike the Washington, D.C. water supply with LSD.
After Frost sweeps into the presidency riding the youth vote, he makes executive
decisions based on what his young majority wants, such as withdrawing U.S. troops
from Vietnam, disbanding the FBI, shipping surplus grain to third-world nations,
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instituting 30 as the new mandatory retirement age, and sending all persons over
35 to “re-education camps” where young guards force them to imbibe water laced
with LSD. With the adult population perpetually incapacitated, Frost has fully
consolidated his power, or so he thinks; in the film’s final sequence, Frost gets
surrounded by a pack of hostile children for killing a pet crawfish, and one
menacing-looking kid vows to “put everybody over [age] ten out of business.”
“Wild in the Streets” fizzled at the box-office despite its election-year
topicality.780 Released two months after Eugene McCarthy’s “children’s crusade”
pushed Lyndon Johnson out of the Democratic race for president, the movie exposed
the depth of the generational tension between adolescents and adults. It
underscored a paradox that had increasingly smoldered within American civic life
during the 1960s: while adults fetishized being young, they feared young people.
The film’s absurdist depictions of obsequious parents, feckless politicians, and
merciless teens resonated with those adults concerned about enfranchised teenagers
hijacking America, culturally and politically. Its dystopian portrayal of hippie
fascism certainly took the ‘60s catch phrase “Never trust anyone over 30” to its most
extreme consequence. To many grown-ups, Frost and his adolescent acolytes
symbolized a rebellious youth cohort not just aimlessly running amok, but one that
posed a subversive threat to America’s sociopolitical order. Their young foils
seemingly agreed with Frost’s mother who, when pressed by reporters to explain his
actions, exclaimed, “I’m sure my son has a very good reason for paralyzing the
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country.” Terry Clifford, film critic for the Chicago Tribune, surmised that the
“effectively smug, demagogic, and ruthless” young antiheroes in the movie would
deeply appeal to the “Now Generation” who had switched their collective focus
“from electric guitars to electoral college, from Clearasil to Congress.”781
“Wild in the Streets” presented an over-the-top, apocalyptic vision of the
consequences of youth suffrage. A New York City resident lambasted the film as an
“insult” for scaring adults into believing that “simplistic, sinister, and totalitarian”
impulses motivated potential youth electors.782 Yet the movie tapped into a sense of
“moral panic,” clearly palpable in 1968, that all young people posed serious peril to
time-honored conventions, domestic tranquility, and adultocratic command.783 As
Cornell University political scientist Andrew Hacker illuminated in July 1968, “Not
only do many adults fail to discriminate between non-rebellious and rebellious
youths, they fail to discriminate between the various types of rebellion; every
published vignette of dissent and disorder is added to the total impression of a
uniform and pervasive state of social chaos in the youthful sector of the nation.”784
Throughout the 1960s, the fear of unhinged teenagers electorally and politically
going berserk (i.e. voting irrationally and governing irresponsibly) kindled an fretful
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uncertainty within parents and politicians whether enfranchising adolescents would
energize or eviscerate the body politic.

A favorite parlor game of Americans tries to tag historical decades with a
pithy descriptor. The “gay” 1890s and the “roaring” 1920s, for example, supposedly
illustrate the cultural vivaciousness of those particular years. Such brands, of
course, speciously oversimplify; no decade can be described by an exclusive epigram.
Though “the Sixties” were one of the most exciting, fascinating, and troubling
decades in American history, popular evaluations have yet, thus far, to fix onto
those years a fashionable, one-word label. For many years, however, academic
assessments of the era remained singularly lashed to the “declension” thesis. This
interpretative framework postulates that the decade began bathed in a buoyant
optimism, symbolized by President John Kennedy’s call to service, civil rights sitins, and the rhetoric of the Port Huron Statement. At mid-decade, the hopeful
idealism reached its acme with the Mississippi Freedom Summer campaign, Lyndon
Johnson’s electoral landslide, the Free Speech Movement, and the transformative
legislation of the Democrat-controlled 89th and 90th Congresses (especially the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965). During the last third of the
decade, ever-escalating social dislocations at home and military incursions in
Vietnam curdled optimism and buoyancy into disillusionment, anger, and despair.
The declension thesis concludes that 1968 “delineated the end of the Sixties.”785
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That year, Americans endured the revelations of government falsehoods about
progress in Vietnam (as exposed by the Tet Offensive), assassinations of Martin
Luther King, Jr. and Robert Kennedy, LBJ’s decision to not seek re-election,
hostilities at Columbia University and other campuses, and a bloody riot outside the
Democrats’ national convention in Chicago. Those events fed the growing distrust
of public officials, the disintegration of the New Left and civil rights movements, the
embrace of violence by radical activists, the unraveling of the liberal consensus, and
the victory of Richard Nixon.786
In recent years, scholars have challenged the hegemony of the “good
sixties/bad sixties” canon. Several historians of the black freedom struggle, for
instance, claim the Black Power movement represented an evolutionary growth out
of, rather than dramatic departure from, the civil rights movement.787 Local and
regional case studies expose the idiosyncratic limitations of social movements often
portrayed as organizational and ideological monoliths controlled from bases in New
York City or San Francisco.788 Several works contest the notion of 60s activist
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movements as being exceptionally American by chronicling the global reach of
dissent, especially the international protests of 1968.789 Historians of women’s
rights, gay liberation, and the New Right propose that the story of the 1960s
entailed more than the rise and fall of the Students for a Democratic Society and
the triumphs and travails of liberalism.790 Significantly, these scholars champion
the concept of a “long 1960s” by tracing the origins of the feminist, homosexual, and
conservative movements back to the 1940s or 1950s and tracking their development
into the 1970s and beyond. These works suggest that the chronology of the 1960s
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sociopolitical crusades should be broadened; they also maintain that the idealism
and activism of the 1960s survived the implosion of SDS and the election of Nixon.
When to date precisely the start and finish of the “long 1960s” remains a fervent
historiographical subject.791
The topic of youth suffrage has been minimized, if not overlooked, within the
recent revisions of 1960s historiography. The protracted gestation of the Twentysixth Amendment certainly squares with the “long 1960s” interpretation. The effort
to enfranchise adolescents was not an exclusive cause of SDS or liberals for it
attracted broad, but not necessarily deep, support across various social, cultural,
ideological, and political spectrums. Nor was the quest to reduce voting ages a
particularly American venture; numerous nations, including communist countries,
enfranchised teenagers during the postwar era and into the 1970s. The course of
youth suffrage within the 1960s also contradicts the declension thesis. As the
decade ended, hopes for lowering the franchise age among 18-vote devotees had
never been higher. By 1970, genuine legislative progress toward granting
adolescents electoral rights had been made in Congress, and a lobbying campaign to
legalize youth balloting had coalesced for the first time. When the Sixties began,
however, the prospects for achieving the 18-vote appeared dim.
The decade’s first serious discussion of youth suffrage occurred in connection
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with the passage of the Twenty-third Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Proposed by Congress in June 1960, it became effective in March 1961 after
ratification by the states. The amendment allowed the residents of the District of
Columbia to vote in presidential elections and a vote in the Electoral College, but it
did not grant District residents representation in Congress.792 Upon the
amendment’s ratification, Congress empowered the Washington D.C. Board of
Commissioners to determine the city’s election laws; once promulgated, the laws
were submitted by the Board to Congress for approval.793 The age of
enfranchisement became an immediate flashpoint of contention. At the Board’s
initial meeting, held 3 April 1961, the commissioners heard recommendations from
local Democratic and Republican leaders. The Democratic spokesman, Joseph
Rauh, Jr., proposed a voting age of eighteen; the Republican, Carl Shipley,
countered with twenty-one as the suffrage age.794 In the days and weeks following
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the meeting, Rauh and Shipley fiercely accused each other of trying to rig municipal
voter laws, including suffrage age, to manipulate the allocation of Washington’s
1964 Electoral College representatives. At a Harvard Club luncheon, for example,
Shipley charged local Democrats had sinister reasons for supporting the 18-vote:
they wanted to “’scoop up a lot of irresponsible’” teenagers to inflate vote totals,
which, Shipley alleged, Democrats had traditionally done via “’fraud’” and
“’tombstone voting.’” Rauh countered Shipley backed a high suffrage age to “’keep
down the vote to try to pull out an election the Republicans can’t win.’”795
On 13 April 1961, the Commission adopted twenty as the minimum age to
vote after the Board’s lone Republican, Robert E. McLaughlin, agreed to yield his
party’s line. McLaughlin claimed he had been swayed by talks with Senator
Jennings Randolph (D-WV), well-known stalwart for the 18-vote, that contemporary
adolescents could cast ballots responsibly because they “’probably are more mature’”
than past youth due to the “’pressures of our civilization and our political life.’”796
Commission President, Walter N. Tobriner, acknowledged the Board’s compromise
as only a “’gesture’” because Congress held the final authority to fix the District’s
voting age, which the Washington Post editorialized “is not likely to be 20.”797
In May 1961, a special House subcommittee formed to consider the
Commission’s proposals. President John Kennedy asked its chairman, James C.
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Davis (D-GA), to set Washington’s voting age at 18 so as to enfranchise “’the
greatest possible number’” for the 1964 presidential election.798 Kennedy’s
encouragement of youth to get involved in public affairs served as one of his core
presidential themes. His 1961 inaugural address famously implored Americans,
especially those young citizens of the “new generation” to whom “the torch has been
passed,” to “ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your
country.” Kennedy never formally or publicly sponsored youth suffrage before his
request to establish eighteen as Washington D.C’s voting threshold. As a Senator
in May 1954, he voted against a constitutional amendment setting the national
suffrage age at eighteen. As a presidential candidate in 1960, the closest Kennedy
came to advocating under-21 voting came during an October rally at American
University when he told the students that he “’wished all of you lived in Kentucky,
where you could vote.’”799 During the campaign, Kennedy eagerly solicited the votes
of enfranchised college students and tapped campus Young Democrat clubs as a
source of campaign support.800 Upon election to the presidency, he sought ways to
expand civic opportunities for America’s youth. To that end, Kennedy established
the Peace Corps via executive order in March 1961 – the same month the Twenty-

Ibid, 17 May 1961, C1. The Twenty-third Amendment enfranchised close to 300,000
Americans. Census records counted some 59,000 District residents between ages 18 and 21. Ibid, 2
August 1961, B1 and 10 September 1961, B12.
798

Washington Post, 8 October 1960, A2. Kennedy visited Kentucky the next day and did
not mention any desire to expand the Bluegrass State’s 18-vote nationwide. See Chicago Tribune, 9
October 1960, 14.
799

800

New York Times, 2 October 1960, E11 and 16 October 1960, 73.

275

third Amendment became law.801
Kennedy’s actions to integrate young people into America’s civic life
underpinned his support for the 18-vote in the nation’s capital. On behalf of the
District Commission, Walter Tobriner testified before Davis’s subcommittee that it
backed the president’s position. When pressed by members why the Commission
now supported 18 as the District suffrage age, Tobriner said conversations with
administration officials convinced them that including teenagers in the presidential
election process would infuse D.C. youths with “’a feeling of responsibility’” that
might benefit the nation. Tobriner further argued that “’the greater danger is not to
allow them to have a voice.’”802 The “chilly reaction” of the subcommittee to
Kennedy’s request and Tobriner’s testimony indicated scant interest in establishing
eighteen as the franchise age.803 The editors of the Washington Post identified
Chairman Davis as the main 18-vote killjoy, though he represented a state that had
already enfranchised adolescents. They challenged Davis to undo a seemingly
undemocratic double-standard: “Will he now hold that the 18-year-old vote is
acceptable in his own district but not for the young people of Washington?”804 In
August 1961, Davis’s subcommittee reported out legislation that preserved twenty-
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one as the suffrage age in Washington.805
That same month, the Senate’s District Committee took up its own bill to
implement the 23rd Amendment. Supporters of the D.C. 18-vote actively lobbied the
committee. Commissioner Tobriner reminded them of a unique temporal issue
facing young Washingtonians: “’If we adopt a 21-year-age limit in the District,
where elections are held only once every four years, a person whose 21st birthday
came just after an election would have to wait until he was almost 25 years old
before he could vote.’” Joseph Rauh, Jr. reiterated President Kennedy’s view that
“’as many people as possible should vote in the Nation’s Capital.’”806 Senator
Jennings Randolph (D-WV), former chairman of the House District Committee from
1939 to 1945, urged his colleagues to enfranchise 18-to-21-year-olds because they
“’already bear the responsibilities of citizenship without its privileges.’” Senators
Kenneth Keating (R-NY) and Estes Kefauver (D-TN) seconded Randolph’s
entreaty.807 On 29 August 1961, the committee recommended eighteen as the
minimum voting age for Washington residents.808 Chairman Alan Bible (D-NV)
concurred with the Kennedy administration’s position of expediting youth
involvement in electoral politics. Bible stated, “The very strength and vigor of
America’s democratic heritage are dependent upon our young people being
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integrated into our democratic processes by being allowed to participate at an early
date commensurate with their abilities.”809
Political observers foresaw a tense fight over the differing ages of suffrage
based on what had transpired during the congressional debate on the Twenty-third
Amendment in 1959 and 1960. Northern Democrats had strongly supported
enfranchising District 18-year-olds, but Republicans and southern Democrats forced
them in committee action to logroll on the age qualification to secure passage of the
amendment.

Prior arguments notwithstanding, reconciling the age discrepancy

between the House and Senate measures proved simpler than anticipated. On 19
September 1961, the Senate voted 38-36 to accept an amendment to the Bible
committee’s proposal offered by Russell Long (D-LA) to establish twenty-one as
Washington’s suffrage age. Senate approval of Long’s amendment marked a clear
defeat for President Kennedy, the majority of the Senate District Committee, and
the 59,000 young D.C. residents between 18 and 21.810 Because the congressional
settling of which citizens would be enfranchised by the Twenty-third Amendment
did not get much discussion outside of the District of Columbia, there was little
national attention brought to the youth suffrage issue.
Congress’s failure to adopt the 18-vote for Washington, D.C. exposed a juicy
irony. Southern congressman utilized federal authority to deny a local government
its preferred choice of whom to enfranchise. Stark racism rather than defense of
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states’ rights inspired southern antagonism to the doling of the franchise under the
Twenty-third Amendment. “There has been heavy Southern opposition to
enfranchising the District of Columbia,” the New York Times reported, “because of
its large Negro population.”811 Though ratified by the states in only 286 days, no
southern state accepted the amendment. According to Congressional Quarterly,
southern refusal “was apparently motivated by the race issue;” in particular, the
fear that Washington would elect a city government dominated by blacks.812
Washington, D.C. was the only major American city in which African-Americans
constituted a majority of the population: 54% of the city according to the census of
1960 and 59.9% according to Census estimates for 1961.813 The Washington Post
reported that “among Washingtonians of voting age, there are actually more white
persons (248,000) than nonwhites (244,000),” but with D.C.’s growing black
demographic “this balance may shift by 1964,” the first year the 23rd Amendment
would take effect.814 A few weeks before the 1964 presidential election, Carlo J.
Salzano of the Chicago Tribune conveyed that southern congressmen were stalling
attempts to grant Washington, D.C. self-government “on the ground the Negroes
would take control.”815 Typically rural and conservative, white southern Democratic
811

Washington Post, 30 March 1961, 16.

Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation: A Review of Government and Politics
in the Postwar Years, 1945-1964, vol. 1, (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1965), 1516.
812

813

Newsweek, 3 April 1961, 32, and Washington Post, 1 October 1961, E2.

814

Washington Post, 1 October 1961, E2.

815

Carlo J. Salzano, “White House Neighbors to Vote at Last,” Chicago Tribune, 25 October

1964, A1.

279

congressmen apparently reckoned that expanding democracy in Washington,
including a lowering of its voting age, might markedly enhance D.C.’s national
influence as an urban, liberal, and black city. Normally slavish supporters of local
political decisions, southern Democrats defied the requests of Washington’s District
Commissioners to defeat, for the second time, an 18-vote proposal before Congress.
The D.C. youth suffrage issue of 1961, like the federal 18-vote amendment of
1954, got tangled in the obstructionist politics orchestrated by southern Democrats.
Though they constituted a numerical minority (e.g. only 128 of the 535 legislators
serving in the 87th Congress that met in 1961-62), southern Democrats possessed an
inordinate amount of institutional power.816 Political scientists Ira Katznelson and
Quinn Mulroy argue they formed a “structurally pivotal bloc” because of the need
for southern votes to pass legislation.817 Southern Democrats practiced what
Katznelson and Mulroy label “situated partisanship”: some legislative situations
called for the maintenance of regional needs, while others required acquiescence to
national party wants. Southern Democrats realized that the best way to maintain
white supremacy in their region was to retain majority standing within their party.
Only through sustained party status could southern Democrats receive the rewards
of congressional influence afforded by seniority. The key legislative question for
Congresses in the New Deal-Great Society era involved when, rather than whether
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or how, southern Democrats would choose to exercise their institutional advantage.
Katznelson and Mulroy contend southern Democrats most often affected the course
of national politics, especially in thwarting proposals related to social justice, when
they prioritized regional concerns over party interests.818 “Acting as it did,”
Katznelson and Mulroy conclude, “the South altered the vectors of lawmaking,
including the era’s most significant policy decisions.”819
Into the 1960s, southern Democrats constituted the main congressional
obstacle to the advance of youth enfranchisement. They consistently balked at the
use of federal power to expand voting rights and routinely flexed institutional
muscle to obstruct the extension of suffrage to disfranchised groups. The sway
southern Democrats held in congressional committees served as a key impediment
to franchise initiatives. The modern Congress relies on committees to shoulder the
burden of lawmaking. The authors of the Constitution assumed that an irregular
arrangement of temporary ad hoc panels could handle America’s legislative
workload. During the 19th century, the developmental complications of national
expansion spawned a system of permanent congressional committees to process the
increased volume and complexity of federal legislation. By the early twentieth
century, centralized majority-party control over legislative politics had given way to
centralized committee government. As Congress institutionalized the system, the
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number of standing committees multiplied until reaching a peak in 1913 of 61 in
the House and 74 in the Senate.820 In 1946, Congress overhauled the committee
structure via the Legislative Reorganization Act. The act’s main feature reduced
the number of standing committees to nineteen in the House and fifteen in the
Senate. Streamlining the committee scheme to better regulate the flow of
legislation seemed to fit the needs of Congress to check the increasing power of the
executive branch.
Consolidation, however, inadvertently enhanced the autonomy of the
committees and the power of their chairmen. Chairs possessed immense command
over legislative operations by holding undisputed control over the agenda,
resources, meeting times, structure, and staffing of committees. The deferential
culture of Congress reinforced their authority. In a study of the postwar Congress,
political scientist Richard F. Fenno, Jr. showed that sitting congressmen expected
new members to serve an apprenticeship period during which they refrained from
active participation in committee or floor deliberations. He found junior
congressmen usually acquiesced to senior lawmakers, especially committee chairs,
because an institutional culture predicated on reverence emphasized that deference
to, and the development of, congressional expertise would yield high-quality
legislation.821 After passage of the 1946 Act, the committees so commanded the
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lawmaking process that scholars called them “little legislatures.”822 Party leaders in
Congress labored to influence committee actions, but the chairmen, usually
southern Democrats, possessed enough institutional independence to operate
virtually as they wished.823
Southern Democrats often chaired committees in the postwar era because of
the inexorable workings of a rigid seniority system within Congress. “Seniority”
meant that longevity of congressional service, rather than individual ability or
personal work ethic, determined the assignment of committee posts. The unwritten
seniority system conferred chairmanships on the member of the majority party with
the longest continuous service on the committee.824 Because of good health,
political acumen, and mal-apportioned home districts, a number of southern
congressmen accumulated seniority. Because of the national electoral brawn of the
Democratic Party, they gained access to prestigious committees in disproportionate
numbers. Between Franklin Roosevelt’s victory in 1932 and Jimmy Carter’s defeat
in 1980, the Democrats controlled both houses of Congress during every session
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except two: the 80th (1947-1949) and 83rd (1953-1955). Regionally, Democrats
enjoyed a nearly 100-year political monopoly owing to the evisceration of the
southern wing of the Republican Party during Reconstruction. Within the oneparty South, those politicians who seemed to best deliver socioeconomic benefits to
and maintain racial segregation for white constituents managed to construct
lengthy legislative careers.825 Repetitive incumbency allowed southern congressmen
to accrue seniority, which gave them appointments and chairmanships on
important committees whenever the Democrats controlled the House and/or the
Senate. When John Kennedy took office in January 1961, southern Democrats
chaired exactly half (12 of 24) of the standing committees though they constituted
only 39% of their party’s congressional delegation.826
Since Franklin Roosevelt’s second term, southern Democrats had bolstered
their congressional clout through an unofficial governing coalition with conservative
Republicans (usually from the Midwest) based upon a common aversion to liberal
and statist legislation.827 The coalition usually materialized when southern
Democrats (who feared federal activism would promote desegregation) crossed party
lines to ally with conservative Republicans (who feared federal activism would
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provoke authoritarianism) to defeat social welfare, economic regulation, and foreign
aid bills. With their power magnified by the seniority system, the conservative
coalition regularly constricted congressional policy-making and repeatedly foiled
executive activism. An analysis of roll-call votes between 1953 and 1980 by political
scientist Mack C. Shelley II revealed the presidents in that era “had relatively little
impact on conservative coalition success” in foiling executive policy wishes.828 The
conservative coalition seemed to so dominate national politics that scholar James
MacGregor Burns described postwar America as a four-party political system in
which Democrats and Republicans each divided into a progressive-urbanpresidential wing and an obstructionist-rural-congressional oligarchy.829
Scholars often present the coalition (implicitly or explicitly) as a floor-voting
bloc united by an ideological predisposition to block liberal initiatives.830 Political
scientist John F. Manley argues that southern Democrats and Republicans often
informally coordinated tactics and strategy during both “the committee stage and
the floor stage” of the legislative process to achieve policy success.831 Though the
conservative coalition had no formal leadership, staff, or structure akin to other
congressional caucuses, Manley contends its ability to block bills in committee
828
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before they reached either the House or Senate floor was its most powerful
institutional weapon against liberal or statist measures. Government scholar Roger
H. Davidson holds that the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 unintentionally
strengthened “the grip the conservative coalition held upon the legislative
apparatus.”832 The consolidation of committees reduced the number of chairmen,
which emboldened power of the remaining chairs – the majority of whom were
southern Democrats. Their alliance with conservative Republicans, the iron-clad
rules of accumulated seniority, and the national electoral muscle of the Democratic
Party in the postwar era allowed a handful of southern chairmen to dominate
congressional policymaking.
The names of Howard Smith (D-VA, House Rules), Wilbur Mills (D-AR,
House Ways and Means), Richard Russell (D-GA, Senate Armed Services), Harry
Byrd (D-VA, Senate Finance), and James Eastland (D-MS, Senate Judiciary)
epitomized the period of southern-controlled, committee-centered government.
Eminent historian of Congress, Donald A. Ritchie, notes that they, like other
chairmen, “acted as barons who ruled their committees in styles ranging from
despotic to democratic.”833 This southern gang of chairmen formed a ruling elite that
subscribed to an interpretation of American government in which the institutions of
Congress were designed more to thwart than to promote action. House chairs
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routinely smothered progressive, reform-minded bills in committee; if Senate chairs
could not do so, southern Democrats (sometimes in concert with their GOP allies)
could talk measures to death on the legislative floor. The ability of chairmen to bend
institutional rules to facilitate the South’s needs turned Capitol Hill into a citadel
for defending white southern interests and made congressional committees the
front-line guard against perceived federal over-reach into regional affairs.
The command of southern chairmen over the national legislative agenda
cleaved the Democratic Party. Since the 1920s, the Democrats had been a party
divided by region, religion, culture, and ideology. The southern, native-born, white,
rural, Protestant conservative branch found little common ground with the
northern, immigrant, urban, Catholic-Jewish liberal wing. This unruly amalgam
managed to coalesce behind the electoral bids of Franklin Roosevelt but fractured
over his New Deal policies and Harry Truman’s efforts to expand them. While
northerners sought to enact legislation that would directly address the nation’s
most vexing socioeconomic issues, southerners united to resist any and all efforts
that might impinge states’ rights or allow the federal government to reshape
sociopolitical practices in their region. Liberal Democrats grew more and more
perturbed with the obstructive shenanigans orchestrated by southerners to defend
white supremacy. During the late 1940s and 1950s, they watched their southern
partymates block or water down bills related to education, housing, desegregation,
fair employment practices, and voting rights. Southern Democrats, often in league
with conservative Republicans, regularly torpedoed undesirable liberal legislation
287

via wily procedural maneuvers such as committee holds, points of order, and
quorum calls.834
Democratic party leaders grew increasingly exasperated with the obstinacy of
their southern brethren. The two Texans who led congressional Democrats for the
majority of the 1950s, House Speaker Sam Rayburn and Senate Majority Leader
Lyndon Johnson, carefully straddled the liberal-northern and conservative-southern
divisions within the Democratic Party. Rayburn and Johnson believed that the
survival and enhancement of the New Deal agenda should be their party’s chief
legislative goal. They did not envision themselves as programmatic innovators nor
as organizational reformers but as brokerage politicos who would advance
Democratic policy ends through the means of accommodation and compromise. The
sum of their individual talents equaled a formidable congressional team. The
knowledge of Rayburn and Johnson about the norms and folkways of Congress,
their working relationship with key lobby groups, their persuasive powers with
fellow lawmakers, and their personal friendship yielded significant legislation,
including the Interstate Highway and National Defense Education Acts, increased
funding Social Security and the minimum wage, and the passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1957.
The power of the conservative coalition tempered the legislative activism of
Rayburn and Johnson. Conservatives used their control of committees to dominate
House proceedings and resorted to filibusters to stymie Senate business. Non-
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southern Democrats believed the conservative coalition operated as a cartel
unjustly manipulating the levers of power to sustain ideological and individual selfinterests. They chafed as southern committee chairmen and their Republican
confederates manipulated the legislative agenda of Congress to push conservative
initiatives.835 Rayburn and Johnson had to bargain, cajole, and persuade southern
chairs to follow the party’s legislative wishes, but, often, their committees refused to
adopt the slate of Democrat-preferred priorities. The frustrations with
organizational obstructionism inspired liberal Democrats (who, over the course of
the 1950s, had become the party’s congressional majority) to demand that Rayburn
and Johnson do something to check the conservative southerners who dominated
the committee leadership positions. Rayburn and Johnson hesitated to tinker with
institutional rules or intraparty regulations that might limit the authority of the
chairmen, however, out of fear that a southern backlash might splinter the party.836
The mid-term elections of 1958 served as the catalyst that sparked the
congressional reforms during the 1960s that curbed southern power. Sensing
popular discontent over a sharp recession, an unemployment spike, and the
launching of Sputnik, Democrats aggressively accused President Dwight
Eisenhower of feckless policy-making and slack administering. Voters in 1958
handed the GOP its worst electoral defeat in twenty-five years. Democrats gained
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fifteen members in the Senate (raising their majority from 49 to 64 of the 98 seats)
and forty-eight in the House (increasing their majority from 234 to 282 of the 436
seats). All of the Democratic newcomers hailed from outside of the South, and,
because of them, the former Union states had as many Democrats in Congress as
the old Confederate states. Most of the greenhorns were liberals (giving the
Democrats their largest liberal majority since 1936), and many were younger than
the lawmakers they replaced.837 Several of them, such as Representatives John
Brademas (D-IN), Ken Hechler (D-WV), James O’Hara (D-MI), and Dan
Rostenkowski (D-IL) and Senators Thomas Dodd (D-CT), Clair Engle (D-CA), Philip
Hart (D-MI), Edmund Muskie (D-ME), and Jennings Randolph (D-WV), would play
prominent roles in changing congressional operations, passing civil rights
legislation, and/or championing youth suffrage.838
Soon after the elections of 1958, liberal Democrats began to unravel the
establishmentarianism that had permitted the conservative coalition to dominate
Congress. Former U.S. Senator Fred Harris’s (D-OK) insider account of Congress’s
inner workings details how legislative titans such as Sam Rayburn, Wilbur Mills,
Lyndon Johnson, Everett Dirksen, and Richard Russell presided over an “inner
club” that commanded lawmaking. According to Harris, that clique controlled the
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nation’s legislative business because its members were insulated from public
pressure due to longevity of service and empowered by the seniority-based
hierarchical norms of Congress.839 Political scientist Kenneth Kofmehl contends
liberal Democrats eventually broke the entrenched institutional dominion of this
“Establishment” by forming themselves into a viable activist bloc.840 Their ends
were plain: to increase the rate of Congress’s productivity and improve the quality
of its performance. Their motives were clear: to install a philosophy of lawmaking
that emphasized active problem-solving. Their means were direct: to give more
congressmen a “piece of the action;” i.e. to expand policymaking power and
participation to wider circles of legislators. According to historian Julian E. Zelizer,
the lawmakers who pushed for structural reforms saw the institutional culture of
the seniority system and the organizational hegemony of the committees as
impediments to solving the social justice problems that persistently plagued the
nation.841 Little by little, they chipped away at the power of senior congressional
leaders and worked to clear the procedural clogs southern Democrats and their GOP
partners had created to stymie the policymaking process.
In September 1959, liberal Democrats in the House of Representatives
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formally organized a caucus, the Democratic Study Group, to spearhead efforts for
institutional reform. Political scientists Arthur G. Stevens, Jr., Arthur H. Miller,
and Thomas E. Mann assert that creation of the DSG “marked the first sustained
effort to counter the conservative coalition” by House liberals.842 Led by Richard
Boling (MO), Lee Metcalf (MT), and Frank Thompson (NJ), the DSG labored to
redefine the omnipotent role of the committees and reduce the hegemony of their
chairmen – particularly Howard W. Smith of the Rules Committee. The Rules
Committee played a critical role in the lawmaking process of the House of
Representatives. It controlled whether a piece of legislation would be taken up by
the House. If the Rules Committee allowed a proposal to be pondered by the full
body, it determined the schedule of legislation for consideration. It also set the floor
guidelines that framed the amount of time allotted for discussion and the types and
number of amendments that could be offered to a bill. Because all House measures
required specific rules for deliberation, the chairman of the Rules Committee
possessed life-or-death power over legislation.843
Howard W. Smith of Virginia, a cantankerous and racist septuagenarian first
elected to the House of Representatives in 1930, chaired the Rules Committee from
1956 to 1966. Congressman Carl Albert (D-OK), who served as Speaker of the
House in the 1970s, described Smith as a “Tenth Amendment congressman. .
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.brought up believing that Yankees, carpetbaggers, Republicans, and foreigners
were enemies of his people and the way of life they enjoyed.”844 Smith gained wide
respect among his colleagues for his parliamentary prowess, especially his
knowledge of House rules and how to use them ingeniously to block bills potentially
harmful to white southerners. During most of Smith’s reign, the twelve-member
Rules Committee consisted of eight Democrats and four Republicans. Smith and
fellow southerner William Colmer of Mississippi (the next senior Democrat)
frequently aligned with the four conservative GOP members to deadlock the group
in 6-6 votes. Committee guidelines stipulated that bills had to receive a simple
majority of 7-5 to reach the House. The other Democrats on the committee, Bolling,
Tip O’Neill, and Homer Thornberry, became increasingly frustrated by Smith’s
power as head gatekeeper of House legislation to forestall Democratic policy
initiatives. Smith’s obstructionism was particularly galling since liberal Democrats
had steadily increased their majority on Capitol Hill after 1956 and a progressive
had captured the White House in 1960 by promising vigorous federal action to
tackle America’s tough socioeconomic problems. The iron law of the seniority
system, however, prevented Smith from being dislodged from his chairmanship.
Because he was so publicly antagonistic to John Kennedy’s proposals and
worked so openly with conservative Republicans, Sam Rayburn and the DSG boldly
moved to weaken Smith. In January 1961, they proposed increasing the size of the
Rules Committee from 12 to 15. The three new seats were to be allocated to junior
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Democrats. The “packing” ploy intended to neutralize Smith by ostensibly giving
the majority party an 8 to 7 working margin within the committee. After intense
lobbying by President Kennedy, Vice President Lyndon Johnson, and Speaker
Rayburn (who each wanted the New Frontier legislative agenda to have fair
consideration), the House narrowly (217 to 212) approved enlarging Rules to fifteen
members. The change was only supposed to be applicable to the 86th Congress. But
in 1963, the new Speaker, John McCormack (D-MA), convinced the House to adopt
a resolution (235-196) that set fifteen as the permanent membership.845 The
“packing” scheme tilted the Rules Committee in a liberal direction and withered
Smith’s obstructionism, thereby setting the stage for the historically transformative
civil rights, voting rights, and social welfare legislation passed during the 1960s.
The change to the Rules Committee did not garner immediate returns for the
18-vote. Before 1970, no youth suffrage bill ever reached Rules because they were
bottled up in the House Judiciary Committee by its chairman Emanuel Celler.
Known for his genial disposition, hard-nosed partisanship, and arch-liberalism,
Celler (b. 1888) became the fourth longest-serving congressman in House history by
representing the New York City boroughs of Brooklyn and Queens for fifty years,
1923-1973.846 His Columbia University law degree and the heterogeneous
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demography of his district prompted Celler to seek a position on the Judiciary
Committee, which holds oversight purview over immigration and civil rights
legislation.847 As chairman of Judiciary from 1949 to 1973 (except for 1953 and 1954
when the GOP controlled the House), Celler became a staunch advocate of liberal
causes. He vigorously fought for the Twenty-third and Twenty-fourth Amendments,
the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, 1964 and 1968, the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1965, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
Just as ardently, Celler opposed bills enfranchising adolescents. His anti-18vote position remained firm for the entirety of his legislative career. The father of
two daughters, Celler consistently maintained that teenagers simply lacked the
mental maturity to cast a sensible vote. He emerged as a chief critic of youth
suffrage during World War II. On a national radio program, he argued that “the
average youths of 18 could not properly evaluate the intricate questions of
economics and government, though they might be splendid physical specimens for
fighting forces.”848 He lampooned Dwight Eisenhower’s 18-vote proposal as
“’immature and naïve’” for enfranchising credulous juveniles susceptible to
demagoguery as a reward for their military service in Korea.849 In March 1954,
Celler offered a constitutional amendment barring all persons under age twenty-one
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from voting in any election or primary as a counter to Eisenhower’s measure.
“’Voting is as different from fighting as chalk is from cheese,” Celler stated upon
filing his bill, “Young men under 21 are more pliable and more amenable to
indoctrination. Instant and unquestioning obedience may be most desirable from
soldiers in the battlefield, but in a voter such obedience would be most undesirable.
Self-interested groups and corrupt politicians would find such obedience a fertile
playground.’”850
During the 1960s, Celler stepped up his advocacy for federal voting rights
laws on behalf of disfranchised minorities. Before then, Celler accepted state
jurisdiction over deciding the lawful prerequisites for enfranchisement – except in
the case of poll taxes. In 1949, Celler argued before a House subcommittee that poll
taxes should be outlawed as an undue financial obstacle to electoral participation.
When asked if he supported additional federal impingements upon state voter
requirements, Celler replied that he had “’sufficient confidence in Congress to
believe that it would not remove reasonable qualifications such as character –
preventing criminals from voting – age, length of residence, and intelligence.’”851
Though not a crony of Howard W. Smith, Celler put himself in de facto league with
Smith’s efforts to impede suffrage expansion due a shared philosophical accord for
the right of states to set the legal determinants of enfranchisement.
As the civil rights movement exposed the struggles of southern blacks to vote,
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his multiracial constituents prodded Celler to reverse his stance on states’ rights.
He came to see state stipulations for residence requirements and literacy tests more
as undemocratic restrictions than acceptable prerequisites. Celler instigated the
bill that eventually became the Twenty-third Amendment; he even served as the
“principal sponsor” of the Twenty-fourth Amendment banning poll taxes as a
prerequisite for voting in federal elections.852 During House debate on the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, according to historian Robert V. Remini, Celler steadfastly
“demanded that the trickery and legalisms and coercion that blocked the voting
rights of blacks in the [S]outh ‘must be smashed and banished.’”853 But Celler
refused to budge on teen suffrage. Scholars Charles Whalen and Barbara Whalen
find that his obstinacy exasperated some of his younger colleagues. They knew,
however, that Democratic leaders would not diminish Celler’s command or pack the
Judiciary Committee as punishment for his inflexibility on the 18-vote because of
his senior status and unyielding commitment to civil rights legislation.854 Free from
institutional or party pressure, Celler stymied all House efforts to reduce the age of
enfranchisement.
The longtime chairman (1956-1978) of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
James Eastland (D-MS), appeared equally adverse to youth suffrage. Known as the
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“Authentic Voice of the White South,” Eastland became the cigar-chomping
caricature of segregationist intransigence.855 Inside the corridors of Congress,
Eastland was called “The Chairman,” and through his committee passed more than
half of the legislation filed in the Senate. Historian Chris Myers Asch notes that
Eastland’s fair handling of judicial nominations earned the grudging respect of his
liberal colleagues, which blunted much of their disgust at his ardent defense of the
South’s Jim Crow system.856 Until Senate leaders figured out how to circumvent his
powers in the 1960s, Eastland mercilessly killed numerous pieces of civil rights
legislation.
Eastland was not as outspoken as Celler in his opposition to reducing voting
ages, but he was more strident in his commitment to states’ rights. Most anytime
the Senate considered a bill to expand suffrage, Eastland excoriated the action as
an unlawful federal power grab. “The proposed legislation now before us,” he
charged in a rebuke of the voting rights provisions within the Civil Rights Act of
1964, “usurps and arrogates to the National Legislature a constitutional prerogative
that has been fixed and vested in the several States since the formation of the
Union.”857 Like other southern Democrats, Eastland categorized the 18-vote as one
part of a congressional civil-rights campaign designed to cripple states’ rights and
kneecap white supremacy. In a 1970 speech arguing against the extension of the
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Voting Right Act, Eastland charged the Act was “unfair, unconstitutional, and
discriminatory” because, as the Supreme Court had consistently determined,
“Residence requirements, age, previous criminal record are obvious examples
indicating factors which a State may take into consideration in determining the
qualifications of voters.”858
The authority to set committee agendas provided Chairman Eastland an
effective tool to impede Senate legislation anathema to his personal or political
interests. But, as the 1960s progressed, Eastland and other southerners felt greater
intra-committee pressure from northern and western Democrats to adopt the social
justice measures that party leaders prized. As a result, southern senators
increasingly resorted to the threat of filibusters to impede civil rights legislation.859
Because of Senate rules that permitted extended discussion of pending bills,
filibusters allowed a determined minority of one or a few senators to prevent
passage of a proposal by prolonging debate and monopolizing floor action. Since
filibusters ground Senate business to a halt, the threat of one often compelled bill
managers to amend controversial legislation or resist bringing it to the floor.860
Southern senators often utilized the menace of a filibuster as an effective
tactic against civil rights legislation. They generally followed a two-pronged
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strategy: talk disagreeable proposals to death or emasculate them by tacking on
cumbersome amendments. In 1943, for instance, Theodore Bilbo (D-MS) halted a
federal anti-poll tax measure via a week-long, intermittent talk-a-thon that
involved burying the bill in a flurry of amendments, including a youth suffrage
tender that became its poison pill. Political scientist Bruce I. Oppenheimer finds
that the most successful filibusters, either really conducted or tactically feigned,
occurred near the end of a legislative session (when it could threaten the completion
of other business) or when a sizeable number of senators vehemently opposed a
measure (as southern Democrats were to most civil rights bills). Oppenheimer
argues timing was crucial to filibuster strategy because delaying maneuvers had to
be precisely sprung to minimize the likelihood of gathering enough votes to invoke
cloture, or the parliamentary petition to limit or end debate in the Senate.861
Established in 1917, Senate Rule XXII required extraordinary majorities to
bring debate to an end: two-thirds of those senators present for a chamber vote
between 1917 and 1949, two-thirds of the entire membership between 1949 and
1959, and, again, two-thirds of senators in attendance between 1959 and 1975.
Because both of the two-thirds requirements were difficult to obtain, only four out of
23 cloture proposals were successful between 1917 and 1960. Calls for cloture
mostly occurred when southern Democrats engaged in filibusters of civil rights bills.
Prior to 1964, historical Gregory Koger reports, the Senate rejected cloture in every
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one of those instances, and each effort to reduce the two-thirds requirement to
three-fifths or a simple majority was defeated.862 Though the 1959 reversion to the
original two-thirds present-and-voting rule (shepherded through the Senate by
Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson) appeared modest, it frustrated the ability of
southern senators to employ unlimited debate as a stratagem to stall or dilute
unwanted legislation.863 As scholars Neil MacNeil and Richard A. Baker state,
“Tampering with Rule 22 suggested the weakening of the Southern bloc’s once
formidable power.”864 In June 1964, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-MT)
defanged southern obstructionism by engineering the cloture of a 75-day filibuster
against the Civil Rights Act.865 The following year, he steered another cloture
motion through the Senate to cut off southern scheming against the Voting Rights
Act.866 The historic cloture votes, according to Washington Post congressional
correspondent Robert C. Albright, “broke the Senate sway of King Filibuster, the
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Old South’s modern day refuge.”867 The ability of Mansfield and other liberal
Democrats to secure cloture on two major civil rights bills in two years loosened the
southern grip on the Senate’s domestic policy-making agenda.
Emboldened by their success in overcoming southern intransigence, northern
Democrats pursued additional reforms inside Congress. Junior liberal lawmakers
in the House and Senate pushed the effort to streamline institutional business and
reduce the independent powers of the committee chairmen. They reckoned that
moving toward a more equitable distribution of influence in shaping legislative
agendas would eventually undermine the conservative coalition. Key regulations
adopted between the mid-1960s and early 1970s allowed committee members other
than the chair the ability to force the consideration of an issue, capped the amount
of time committees could deliberate on legislation, stripped chairs of the exclusive
authority to set meeting dates, set limits on proxy voting, and called for majority
consent to table bills in committee.868 Subcommittees also grew in number and
autonomy, thereby growing the number of leadership positions and strengthening
the checks on rogue chairmen. The institutional reforms harnessed the unbridled
obstructionism of the past by shifting legislative controls from committee chairmen
to party leaders and rewarding party loyalty over seniority. The net effect of such
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changes wrested deal-making clout from southern Democrats and their conservative
GOP sidekicks, which, according to political scientist Eva Bertram, yielded the
transformative social justice legislation that liberals had long pursued – including
youth suffrage.869
The efforts to restructure the conduct of institutional business engendered
generational discord among congressmen. Political scientist Nelson Polsby finds
that the procedural reforms within Congress coincided with a great turnover of its
personnel roster. Polsby contends that immense demographic transformations
(particularly mass suburbanization and the Baby Boom) spurred the growth of
heterogeneous metropolitan population centers. The lawmakers elected from these
districts tended to be relatively young, independent, and disdainful of traditions
that impeded reform or innovation – just like the constituents they represented. By
the early 1970s, Polsby concludes, successive crops of such like-minded congressmen
gradually replaced older politicos (usually from the rural South or urban North)
who had accumulated institutional power within the seniority structure.870 During
the 1960s, elder lawmakers sought to sustain the establishmentarian culture that
emphasized congeniality, collegiality, and conventionality as the time-honored
mores of a professional legislator. Political scientists who studied the postwar
Congresses chronicled the internal socialization and intense coercion upholding the
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institutional folkways that governed congressional operations. Their studies
revealed that inexperienced lawmakers endured an “apprenticeship” that
emphasized homage to tradition, respect for elders, and acquiescence to superiors as
the basis for legislative accomplishment and career advancement.871 In 1964,
journalist David S. Broder observed that most every high-ranking congressman had
followed the “established route up the seniority ladder to a committee chairmanship
and increasing influence with The [leadership] Establishment.” But Congress,
Broder asserted, also provided “outlets for ‘the angry men’ who cannot conform to
these comfortable career lines.”872
In the decade after the historic 1958 elections, more and more legislators,
both Democrat and Republican, conspicuously defied Congress’s establishmentarian
ethos. In particular, junior congressmen increasingly refused to abide customs that
muted their representative voices or limited their legislative agency. They insisted
that individual capacity rather than years of service should determine institutional
ranks of influence. These younger, reform-minded lawmakers seemed to be inspired
by a zeitgeist emphasizing, as New York Times political commentator Arthur Krock
explained, “fresh approaches to public problems to which youth is supposed to be
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more responsive than maturity.”873 They also appeared to be motivated by a
perception that Congress had failed to uphold its part in the national lawmaking
process. Tom Wicker, Washington correspondent for the New York Times, remarked
in 1965 that “Congress has let itself become too small.” While the modern
presidency had evolved to become a “remarkable instrument of governing power,”
Wicker maintained, “Congress has not similarly grown and adapted itself to new
conditions.”874 Among several explanations of its deficiencies, many contemporary
political observers faulted Congress for maintaining a dogmatic internal culture
that ranked its members by experience rather than talent and valued the following
of arcane institutional procedures over achieving notable legislative results.875
The jolting assertiveness of the greenhorns was a byproduct of a moment of
significant turnover in congressional membership. Nearly 60% of the legislators
who served in Dwight Eisenhower’s last Congress (1959-1961) would leave Capitol
Hill before Richard Nixon’s election to the presidency in 1968. Though the average
age of Congress fluctuated little in that decade, the newcomers appeared “younger”
(i.e. more energetic, strong-willed, and activist) than their predecessors.876 Raymond
Moley, lead columnist for Newsweek, observed that they were “not merely an ‘angry’
Arthur Krock, “Youth Versus Age: A Trend to the Younger Candidates Is Stirring
Republican Apprehension,” New York Times, 2 October 1960, 11E.
873

874

Tom Wicker, “Congress: What Role in the Twentieth Century?” Ibid, 24 August 1965, 30.

See, for example, Charles L. Clapp, The Congressman: His Work as He Sees It
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1964).
875

The average age of the legislators at the beginning of the 86th Congress (1959-1961) was
52.7 years; for the 91st Congress (1969-1971), it was 53 years of age. See “Who Gets Elected,”
Congressional Quarterly’s Guide to Congress, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly
Press, 1991), 700.
876

305

generation bent on revenge against their elders;” rather, “these young members of
both parties” generally refused to abide the orthodoxy imposed by “their own party
leadership.”877 As Moley sensed, the youthful neophytes who came to Congress in
the 1960s were more self-assured and less conformist than past members. They
respected institutional traditions but were unwilling to defer robotically to the
orders of senior congressmen. Most of them refused to accept the apprenticeship
custom, especially within their committees. Importantly, they disregarded Sam
Rayburn’s classic dictum, “The way to get along is to go along.” Instead, they
worked to weaken the grip of the seniority system and the committee structure to
allow rank-and-file lawmakers meaningful participation in policymaking. Such
institutional changes, along with the election of more iconoclastic legislators,
eventually wrought the enactment of historic civil rights bills and major suffrage
laws, including the Twenty-sixth Amendment. David Broder described this cohort
of eager legislators as a “new breed . . . impatient with the old ways of doing
business; less willing to ‘move up the chairs,’ waiting silently for years for their turn
at a subcommittee chairmanship; less deferential to their elders; and more insistent
on grabbing a piece of the action now.”878 The claims of this “new breed” of junior
congressmen for their rightful share of congressional power mirrored the demands
of the “new generation” of young citizens for an equal voice in national decision-
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making.
By all accounts, the 1960s were years of extraordinary domestic turbulence.
As historian James Miller contends, “’The Sixties’ represented not just a span of
time but an impetuous, extreme spirit – youthful and reckless, searching and
headstrong, foolhardy, romantic, willing to try almost anything.”879 The upheavals
that define “The Sixties” as exciting and transformative took place because the
nation’s most excluded members insisted upon full and equal access to all the
privileges and opportunities afforded American citizens. Many of the decade’s
storms and stresses were set off by disgruntled adolescents. Idealistic young people
rebelled against the enduring inequalities and injustices that stained the American
Dream but adults had abided. They rejected mainstream beliefs, engaged in directaction protests, and defied government bureaucracies. In seeking to empower
disadvantaged groups, youth activists took to the streets to contest the power of
elites, reform social conventions, end the Vietnam War, fight for socioeconomic
justice, revamp university governance, and democratize political life. Young people
also sought to empower themselves by insisting that adult lawmakers enfranchise
citizens at least 18-years-old.
Two sources of inspiration roused young people to get actively involved in
public affairs. Many youths were moved by the uplifting words of John Kennedy’s
inaugural address. In his speech, Kennedy purposefully spoke as the leader of “a
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new generation of Americans,” implying that Dwight Eisenhower and Congress’s
leadership cadre had come to represent older Americans. He had promised during
the 1960 campaign to get the nation “moving again” and outlined in the inaugural
how muscular governmental activism at home and abroad would invigorate the
nation. Many young Americans who were attracted to Kennedy’s youth, will, and
dynamism took to heart his call to public service, especially those idealistic
teenagers and 20-somethings who joined the Volunteers in Service to America or
the Peace Corps.
The bold activism of the civil rights movement stirred other youths. The sitins, marches, protests, ideals, and sacrifices associated with the black offensives
against white supremacy in the South captured the imaginations of young people all
over the nation. “There was a feeling that they were us and we were them, and a
recognition that they were expressing something we we feeling as well,” recalled
Rennie Davis, an Oberlin College student who became a leader of the Students for a
Democratic Society.880 The civil rights movement gave cause to many youths,
particularly from minority groups, to rebel against all forms of injustice and
inequality. The energy, tactics, and courage of civil rights activists inspired other
social reform movements, such as those on behalf of women, Latinos, Native
Americans, homosexuals, and disabled persons, that were infused by young
advocates.
By the mid-1960s, the heightened interest in social causes and public service
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stoked by the civil rights movement and President Kennedy propelled youth
activists into political work. Academic explanations of 60s political advocacy among
young people generally divide along two theoretical tracks. While some scholars
argue youth political involvement was a predictable outgrowth of the youthful
rebellion against the older generation, others contend young people merely put into
action the political attitudes and behaviors taught to them by their parents and
teachers.881 Whether of liberal or conservative bent, young partisans challenged
what they perceived to be the unfulfilled political promises and unacceptable social
circumstances created by their elders.
Through various means of petition and protest, young people forced issues to
the forefront of national concern that had been ignored or deferred by adults.
Young liberals insisted that politicians take direct, remedial action against
discrimination, poverty, ignorance, and the military-industrial complex. During the
early and mid-1960s, they organized and staffed seminal movements on behalf of
civil rights for minorities, aid to the underprivileged, the elimination of nuclear
weapons, and peace in Vietnam. Those movements inspired liberal Democrats in
Congress to initiate bold policies, which moderate Republicans mostly supported,
that advanced equality and opportunity at home and goodwill and amity abroad.
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Lyndon Johnson unreservedly embraced the idealistic commitment of John
Kennedy, Martin Luther King, Jr., and their youthful devotees to improve
America’s quality of life. Johnson’s executive dash and legislative savvy advanced a
broad reform agenda he called the “Great Society.” The Great Society produced a
torrent of new federal programs that addressed problems regarding segregation,
prejudice, poverty, food security, housing, health care, job training, education,
immigration, and the environment. The great bulk the Great Society emerged
during the 89th Congress of 1965-66, a legislative session many people regard as one
of the most significant in U.S. history.882
Johnson’s presidency also witnessed a historic expansion of voting rights.
Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy had moved cautiously in the field of
suffrage; neither administration wanted to get too far ahead of public opinion on
broadening the franchise nor cared to challenge the tradition of state prerogative in
determining voter qualifications. By the time Johnson’s term began, many
Americans insisted that the franchise was less a privilege and more a right that
should be extended to as many qualified citizens as possible. Media exposés
chronicled suffrage problems rooted in local prejudices that consistently stymied
For example, journalist Jonathan Darman states, “Historians would in time come to view
the Eighty-Ninth Congress as perhaps the most productive legislative session in American history,
and for later generations of progressives, the Congress that produced the Voting Rights Act,
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minorities and suburban migrants who wanted to vote. Government studies
bolstered the press reports. In October 1963, the Commission on Civil Rights
detailed the pathetic stoops of bigotry employed by white voter registrars to reject
black applicants. The Commission called for uniform voter-registration standards,
enforced by federal officials if necessary, to thwart “the evil of arbitrary
disfranchisement.”883 In December 1963, the President’s Commission on
Registration and Voting Participation, a special bipartisan panel appointed by JFK
the previous March, made public its examination of the procedural restrictions that
deterred Americans from voting. Chaired by Richard M. Scammon, director of the
Census Bureau, the 11-member commission found that “unreasonable, unfair, and
outmoded” election laws denied millions of capable citizens the opportunity to
vote.884 The Commission offered three core proposals to swell the ranks of voters:
shorten residency requirements to thirty days, abolish literacy tests and poll taxes,
and lower franchise ages to eighteen. The commission reasoned that establishing
the 18-vote might fix the dismal turnout rate among voters under age thirty. It
claimed a “major reason” young electors stayed away from the polls was that “by the
time they have turned 21 . . . many young people are so far removed from the
stimulation of the educational process that their interest in public affairs has
waned. Some may be lost as voters for the rest of their lives.”885
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Like many Americans, President Johnson thought of suffrage denial as a
problem that demanded federal remedy since state statutes and local ordinances
suborned disfranchisement. “’I am told that it is easier today to buy a destructive
weapon, a gun, in a hardware store than it is to vote,” Johnson remarked upon
receiving the President’s Commission inquiry, “Why should we make it difficult for
people to vote?’”886 Taking the commission reports as a blueprint, Johnson sought to
maximize voter turnout and minimize voter discrimination – even if that meant
bending states’ rights tradition. For geographically mobile Americans, he pursued
standardizing residency requirements and registration procedures to spur electoral
participation. For black southerners, Johnson pushed hard to collapse the racial
disfranchisements whites constructed to circumvent the Fifteenth Amendment.
Civil rights leaders put suffrage high on their political agenda, and, one by one,
Johnson, Congress, and the Supreme Court labored to smash the undemocratic
barriers to African-American voting. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 barred voter
registrars from applying unequal criteria in registration procedures or rejecting
applications because of immaterial errors. The Twenty-fourth Amendment, also
promulgated in 1964, made poll taxes unconstitutional as a requirement for voting
in national elections. In 1966, the Supreme Court nixed poll tax prerequisites for
balloting in state and local elections.887 The Voting Rights Act of 1965 prohibited
any government from using voting procedures that denied a person suffrage on the
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basis of race or color. It abolished the use of literacy tests for anyone who had
completed sixth grade or its equivalent for naturalized citizens schooled outside of
the United States. The Act also allowed the U.S. attorney general to send federal
election registrars to places with long histories of voter discrimination. These same
areas had to submit all proposed changes in their suffrage laws or voting practices
to federal officials for approval.888
Advocates of youth suffrage realized that the actions of Congress and the
Supreme Court had undercut the states’ rights arguments against the 18-vote. The
provisions of the laws and rulings circumscribed the power of states to have sole
discretion over the determination and application of voter requirements. Moreover,
the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts squashed the argument that teenagers were
not smart enough to vote by defining literacy, in terms of legal qualification to cast
a ballot, as the attainment of a 6th-grade education. The institution of federal
checks on state administration of suffrage forever transformed American politics by
empowering formerly disfranchised voters and enabling their election to public
office. Federal activism did much to expand the right to vote to all citizens – except
young people. While government officials eased residency requirements and
eliminated literacy tests and poll taxes, they neglected to lower voting ages to
eighteen. During the era 1960 to 1967, legislators in twenty-seven states filed
sixty-seven 18-vote measures. Of those 67 resolutions, only two were sent to state
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voters for approval, and both were rejected. In addition, New York’s 1967
constitutional convention declined an opportunity to promulgate eighteen as the
state’s new suffrage age.889 Federal proposals to establish eighteen as the standard
franchise age proved equally fruitless. Between the 87th (1961-62) and the 90th
(1967-68) Congresses, lawmakers proposed 98 constitutional amendments to set the
national voting age at eighteen: 11 in the Senate and 87 in the House of
Representatives; none were reported out of committee in either body.890
Reasons for the legislative inaction on youth suffrage varied. In statehouses,
the issue got wrapped into drives to modernize constitutions. The passage of
federal civil rights laws and the promulgation of the “one man, one vote” standard
by the Supreme Court spurred several states to update outmoded and cumbersome
franchise statutes.891 The goal of modernizing suffrage laws was to inspire renewed
interest in voting by loosening old voter requirements. The revision of state codes,
however, stopped short of enfranchising new classes of voters; instead, lawmakers
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worked to broaden electoral access for people already enfranchised, which was an
effort encouraged by the federal government. As Attorney General Robert Kennedy
told the 1961 graduates of the University of Georgia’s law school, “we must make a
total effort to guarantee the ballot to every American of voting age – in the North,
as well as in the South.”892 The attention given to boosting the turnout of adult
voters caused state assemblymen to bypass enfranchising adolescents. In addition,
many state officials contended that extending voting rights to inexperienced and
immature teenagers might pose unintended harm to American democracy. Naïve
and impressionable juveniles, they posited, could be easily manipulated to subvert
public order by unscrupulous schemers. Maryland’s 1967 Constitutional
Convention Commission, for example, rebuffed an 18-vote proposal because it
would: 1) add “idealistic rather than practical” persons to the voting populace, 2)
enfranchise people “highly influenced by their parents, schools, television, and
special interest groups,” and 3) spur “energetic college students” to “overrun” the
local governments of small college towns.893
In the White House, the issue of adolescent enfranchisement stirred yawning
indifference. Neither Democratic president of the 1960s, John Kennedy and Lyndon
Johnson, made reducing suffrage ages a top legislative priority. Their aloof position
on the issue seemed unusual because of their avid encouragement of youth
participation in civic matters, which stemmed from an unreserved confidence in the
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capacities of adolescents. In 1962, for example, Kennedy challenged the
participants of the Girl Scout Senior Roundup to “make the most of your natural
abilities, develop your skills and character, seek wider horizons in order to become
more constructive citizens of our nation and the world even before you become of
voting age.”894 Both Kennedy and Johnson couched their political appeals in
language that implied that being young in spirit, if not in years, would offer a fresh
and vigorous approach for dealing with the aging international and domestic
problems of the postwar era. Johnson even hailed a throng of college students
gathered on the White House law in 1965 as his “fellow revolutionaries” in the
cause of change and progress.895 LBJ and JFK certainly appreciated the labors of
young Americans on behalf of their nation.
Though Kennedy and Johnson asked young people to do things for their
country, they never asked Congress to do anything for voteless youths. Both men
warmly espoused the idea of youth suffrage, but neither felt compelled to force
legislation on the issue. As senators, Kennedy and Johnson voted against Dwight
Eisenhower’s 1954 proposal to establish eighteen as the voting age in federal
elections as a violation of states’ rights prerogative.896 As a presidential candidate,
Kennedy replied to questionnaire that he supported the teen franchise but felt
“’that the voting age should remain a matter for state decision.”897 In June 1961,

894

New York Times, 21 July 1962, 9.

895

Ibid, 5 August 1965, 13.

896

Congressional Record 100 (21 May 1954): 6979.

897

Quoted in Wendell W. Cultice, Youth’s Battle for the Ballot: A History of Voting Age in

316

Assistant Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach testified before a Senate
subcommittee that the president opposed a constitutional amendment offered by
Estes Kefauver (D-TN) to lower the national voting age to eighteen as potentially
injurious to federalist tradition.898 In contrast, the Kennedy administration
vigorously pursued passage of the federal amendments that took away from states
the power to charge poll taxes and utilize literacy tests to screen possible electors.
President Johnson unabashedly employed federal authority to secure the right to
vote for African-Americans and other minority groups but exerted little effort to
enfranchise adolescents. In March 1965, Johnson said he wanted to add an 18-vote
provision to the Voting Rights Act but held back because “the lawyers felt that that
would complicate the matter and that it should be approached otherwise.”899 For
the Machiavelli of congressional machination to shrink away from a legislative
battle on behalf of teen voting within the arena of a civil rights bill appeared both
shrewd (to adults) and timid (to adolescents). Because Kennedy and Johnson did
not consider youth suffrage one of the big domestic issues of the day, they viewed it
as a low executive priority compared to more pressing matters, such as containing
communism, winning the space race, establishing welfare programs, and
eliminating racial segregation.900 Even though junior lawmakers were ascending

America (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 65. Cultice apparently sent an issues survey
including the question about reducing the voting age to both Kennedy and his opponent Richard
Nixon.
898

New York Times, 29 June 1961, 22.

899

Ibid, 21 March 1965, 70.

900

Ibid, 31 May 1968, 16.

317

and the committee oligarchies were crumbling inside Congress, there was still
enough bipartisan resistance to youth suffrage that Kennedy and Johnson reckoned
a legislative battle on its behalf was not worth putting other, more important
concerns as risk. Hence, the 18-vote languished without a strong push from the
White House.
On Capitol Hill, most congressmen did not rank reducing voting ages as an
issue of critical importance. The transformative legislation Congress passed during
Kennedy-Johnson years showed they were willing to take on the toughest
challenges of the moment. Nor did they have to be afraid of political fallout since
support and opposition for youth suffrage cut across ideological and party lines. Yet
the legislative inaction on the ninety-eight 18-vote proposals offered between 1960
and 1968 clearly signified Congress’s indifference to enfranchising adolescents. And
never in that span did either the House or Senate host a genuine floor debate about
the pros and cons of teen voting similar to what had taken place in 1954.
Congressional advocates could have used parliamentary maneuvers to ramrod 18vote bills through the lawmaking process like other social justice measures of the
period. Promulgating a national suffrage age, however, simply did not garner “the
fierce urgency of now” that drove passage of the era’s progressive initiatives and
electoral reforms.901 Legislative apathy allowed Judiciary chairs Emanuel Celler
and James Eastland to let voting-age measures expire of neglect within their
committees.
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The lack of legislative resolve in Washington and the states paralleled
contemporary disinterest for recalibrating franchise ages. George Gallup’s polling
organization, a reliable barometer of public opinion on the hot topics of the moment,
took no surveys gauging civic views on youth suffrage between March 1954 and
August 1965.902 Prior to 1965, discussion of the issue in the public domain occurred
chiefly among young people. Many youths subscribed to the “old enough to fight-old
enough to vote” aphorism. Other teens, like a male from Indianapolis who wrote
Senator Richard Russell, pointed out that since the “federal government helped the
Negroes and the women” gain the right to vote, “It is time for the federal
government to help the young adults.”903 However, most youths appeared to
disfavor the idea. In 1960 and 1961, for example, the Illinois teens who attended
the YMCA’s mock “Youth Legislature” turned down bills favoring voting rights for
18-year-olds.904 An informal poll of high-schoolers attending a regional Junior
Achievement conference in December 1962 also revealed a clear distaste (340-136)
for reducing franchise ages to eighteen.905 The prevailing sentiment against the
proposals emphasized that adolescents were too inexperienced and immature to be
enfranchised. “I happen to be almost 21 years old, and believe me,” a Chicago
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resident declared, “no 18-year-olds (or teen-agers collectively) are prepared to vote.
They don’t have enough brains or interest. They are preoccupied with cars and girls
and probably won’t even bother to vote when they are 21 or older.”906
Adults questioned whether teenagers possessed the emotional and cognitive
capacity to vote sensibly. The allies and adversaries of the 18-vote shared a
common view of teenagers as idealistic, passionate, willful, and immature, but they
disagreed which qualities mostly defined youth. Advocates of the 18-vote believed
young people had, in the words of a Long Island resident, “the ability as a group to
make contributions to wise decision making” in political venues.907 Representative
Ken Hechler (D-WA) questioned why ignorant elders could vote while
knowledgeable teenagers could not since, as statistical data plainly showed, “There
is far more illiteracy among people over sixty than there is among people between
18 and 21.”908 However, most adults agreed that young people were too callow to be
entrusted with the franchise. A 18-vote bill filed in the Wisconsin legislature in
1961 prompted the Milwaukee Journal to affirm, “Voting intelligently requires
knowledge, judgment, and maturity. . . .Many young persons lack these qualities.
Those who have them won’t mind waiting three years for the right to vote.”909 The
conservative editors of the Wall Street Journal urged state and federal legislators to
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uphold the 21-vote standard to “protect our society and its governments against the
irresponsible, and against those who understand neither our political system nor
the issues facing it nor the full meaning of the voting privilege.”910 Lawmaking
adults in Washington, D.C. and the states concurred. Executive and legislative
indifference curtailed the opportunity to build momentum on behalf of adolescent
enfranchisement. Nor did government officials feel a compelling need to act since
there was no widespread demand or vibrant grassroots support among adults or
adolescents to lower voting ages.
The Vietnam War revived public interest in youth suffrage. In 1965, Lyndon
Johnson made the fateful decision to use military means to contain communism in
South Vietnam. Sending American troops into combat to prevent the communist
dominoes from falling across the rest of Asia eventually doomed LBJ’s presidency.
Initially, support for the war was high across all demographic groups, including
youth. A Gallup survey taken in August 1965 revealed that 76% of Americans
under age 30 backed the war, compared to 64% of persons between 30 and 49 and
51% of those over age 50.911 The same month, Gallup found a “majority of America’s
adults believe that the voting age should be lowered, to permit persons 18, 19, and
20 years old to vote.”912 The numbers of adults who accepted the 18-vote in August
1965 (57%) nearly replicated the approval rating in Gallup’s last teen voting poll
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taken in March 1954 (58%). Public support for enfranchising adolescents never fell
below 57% nationally, as registered by the Gallup group, throughout the duration of
the Vietnam War.913
The war added an emotional quotient to the civic discussions about youth
suffrage not present between 1954 and 1965. “When there’s a war on,” an adult
from Nebraska admitted, “it gets harder and harder to say to a kid is old enough to
defend his country in Vietnam but not old enough to vote.”914 The vast majority of
18-vote advocates argued that young troops deserved enfranchisement because of
their service to the nation. They insisted that the draft age represented the most
important legal marker signifying adulthood, for it reflected a collective decision
that 18-year-olds should be considered of full age to defend and possess the rights
and privileges afforded adults – including suffrage. “If a person is old enough to be
drafted and be asked to fight for his country he is old enough to vote,” a Georgia
high-school succinctly proclaimed.915 Many people claimed that performing the
duties involved with warring in the tricky jungles of Vietnam against a tough
enemy proved adolescents were more than capable to handle the task of voting. “If
18-year-old boys are smart enough to die for their country,” a Michigan
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businessman asserted, “they should be smart enough to vote.”916 Some citizens
pointed out the irony of adolescents fighting for democracy against communist
forces abroad without having full voting rights at home. “How can our soldiers be
expected to sincerely defend ‘American ideals,’ nebulous at best, in an inhospitable
foreign country while they are being denied their constitutional rights at home?” a
New Jersey 18-year-old demanded.917
Between 1965 and 1968, as President Johnson steadily increased the number
of American servicemen and the death toll of young soldiers mounted, the dialogue
about teen suffrage became evermore charged. In those years, an ever-increasing
number of youths began to question the necessity of “a bewildering struggle whose
origins are unclear, whose progress is unsure, whose aims are unsettled, and whose
outcome is in doubt.”918 Like those young people who had staffed the civil rights
movement, antiwar youths claimed that adults could no longer be the sole
custodians of truth and reason. They emphasized that enfranchising the generation
shouldering the burdens of the war was a matter of simple democratic justice. A
pamphlet issued by the Fair Franchise Committee declared, “American democracy
is based upon a social contract: the right to vote in return for meeting adult citizen
responsibilities. Those over 18 are meeting their responsibilities. They have
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earned the citizen’s franchise.”919 Non-combatant teens on the homefront forcefully
insisted that they, too, were fulfilling their obligations, and, therefore, earned
voting rights. As girl from Michigan fumed to her congressman:
I’m 17 years old, and still don’t understand how they run the
government. For instance, I work, pay taxes, and naturally I
am too young to vote. . . .Now, you tell me how can I be old
enough to work, own a car, pay insurance, and go to school,
plus saving money for my college education, and still I don’t
have the right to vote, or at least determine what I’d like to do
with the taxes I pay out. If this is the way it has to be for the
government’s sake, I think it is a very unfair proposition for
all the young adults under 21. . . .If the government is going
to treat us like kids, they I think it’s cruel to send a child to
Viet Nam to get killed and take away the money he or she is
working hard for. So you tell me why I’m not considered an
adult, who can vote, either on taxes or for offices?920
The Vietnam War served as a galvanizing agent pulling together a public
consensus in support of the 18-vote. That accord prompted renewed congressional
interest. During the 90th Congress (1967-68), lawmakers offered sixty 18-vote bills,
which represented a 114% increase in filings from the 89th. The emotionalism
stoking the action on behalf of teen enfranchisement, however, did not yield
legislation. While the young people who connected soldiering and suffrage insisted
that voting was a right, congressional opponents of the 18-vote maintained that
voting was a privilege. And as a privilege, they contended, suffrage unquestionably
required specific qualifications. Mainly, detractors of youth enfranchisement
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questioned whether the mass of teenagers possessed the maturity required for
making consequential political decisions irrespective of a youth’s ability to respond
to military commands. Most congressmen, across the ideological spectrum, held
that the vast majority of 18-year-olds lacked the life experience, emotional stability,
and common sense to exercise good voting judgment. House Judiciary chairman
Emanuel Celler (D-NY) alleged that teenagers were “’easily enflamed’” and usually
saw things “’in patterns of black and white without shadings.” Because of the
tempestuousness inherent to adolescence, Celler asserted, “’There are sound
psychological reasons why the age of 21 has been considered the beginning of
maturity.’”921
The sense that adolescents were too immature to vote heightened as youth
activism against the war and for social justice causes intensified. During the 1960s,
young people led and staffed a series of widely disparate protest movements that
expressed discontent with American politics and society. Spurred on by the civil
rights movement, the Vietnam War, and a growing counterculture, youth
organizations such as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and the
Students for a Democratic Society rose to prominence by protesting long-accepted
conduct codes that grounded the subjugation experienced by powerless citizens.
They advocated populist democracy and socioeconomic justice and criticized
corporate-military interlocks and unresponsive government bureaucracies. Their
tactics included rhetorical appeals, political lobbying, peaceful protests, and mass
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demonstrations. The threat that tied many of these groups was a desire to redefine
American democracy to make it more inclusive and responsive to the members of
previously underrepresented groups – including women, ethnic and racial
minorities, students, and youth – who sought a greater role in determining the
goals, values, and policies of the U.S. government. Tom Hayden, original organizer
of the Students for a Democratic Society, famously penned in the Port Huron
Statement that young activists sought “the establishment of a democracy of
individual participation, governed by two central aims: that the individual share in
those social decisions determining the quality and direction of his life; that society
be organized to encourage independence in men and provide the media for their
common participation.”922
In its crusade to establish participatory democracy, the Students for a
Democratic Society led a loose coalition of left-wing youths deeply committed to the
ideas of liberal politics and social progress. The “New Left” of the 1960s was born
from the experiences of civil rights activists, opposition to the Vietnam War, and
disillusionment with Lyndon Johnson’s version of liberalism. Initially, the New
Left focused on the issues facing the students at the growing “multiversities,” such
as limitations on free speech and the persistence of in loco parentis as the
philosophical basis for administering campus life. By the end of the decade, New
Left activists had moved on to deal with troubles in the jungles of Vietnam, the
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inner cities of America, and the legislative halls of Washington, D.C. They blamed
Johnson for trading away the populist inclusiveness intrinsic to modern liberalism
in exchange for an impersonal, corporatized politics that valued exercising power
more than advancing social justice. And they railed against the sluggish progress
toward solving the problems that had beset generations of Americans, especially
ageism, racism, sexism, homophobia, xenophobia, and imperialism.923 Even
President Johnson admitted in the final months of his presidency that in spite of all
the progress his administration had made “’we are still unable to set a precise date
for the arrival of equality, the advent of peace, the curing of old ills, and the healing
of old wounds.’”924
British journalist Henry Fairlie identified the “politics of expectation” as a
key source of 60s sociopolitical turmoil. He argued that the decade’s political
bigwigs, following the example of John and Bobby Kennedy, carefully crafted
images of themselves as leaders who could spectacularly deliver on quixotic
promises. Fairlie concluded that the Kennedy brothers taught their contemporaries
to think more about image than achievement.925 Young people, however, had been
socialized to believe that results mattered more than style in politics, especially in
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the substance-laden realm of the White House. As the Johnson presidency
unfolded, many politicized youths reckoned his administration would not fulfill the
idealistic pledges of John Kennedy or complete the reform agenda of the Great
Society. That realization either disillusioned or angered thousands of young
liberals. Because they sensed that “’no one is listening,’” Bobby Kennedy averred,
“’we can understand why so many of our young people have turned from
engagement to disengagement, from politics to passivity, from hope to nihilism,
from S.D.S. to LSD.’”926 Young leftists acknowledged that many Johnson initiatives
suffered from unrealistic hopes and poor execution. But they blamed America’s
expanding military involvement in Vietnam for impeding a full political
commitment to social transformation. And they charged “the Establishment” – that
mysterious cabal of Wall Street tycoons, Pentagon brass, and Ivy League-trained
bureaucrats – with monopolizing governmental power to benefit their elite selfinterests at the expense of the needs of the people.
As criticism of LBJ, Vietnam, and the Establishment mounted, young people
disillusioned with the federal government and authority of all kinds became
evermore radicalized. In a 1969 special broadcast trying to explain why youths were
rebellious, CBS news anchor Walter Cronkite concluded young people most wanted
to “’make things happen now’” because of a shared “’frustration, restiveness, and
dissatisfaction’” with the persistence of bigotry, intolerance, and militarism.927 A
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1968 Gallup poll indicated that the youth revolt “appears directed against
traditionalism and complacency, or ‘the Establishment.’ Sometimes this takes the
form of attacks on the [Johnson] Administration’s Vietnam policies, other times
against the slowness of efforts to help the Negro race.”928 A man from West
Chatham, Massachusetts, justified his support for the 18-vote by highlighting that
youth “are almost the only ones among us who in recent years have had the
audacity to point to the emperor’s nakedness. And naked he has been on many of
the matters these committed young people have decried.”929 Whether Johnson
under-delivered or youths demanded too much, the disappointments of unrealized
expectations fueled the generational crises that convulsed American society
between the mid-1960s and early 1970s.
That brief era marked the singular time in U.S. history when sociopolitical
conflict manifestly divided along age-group lines. Many of the same forces that had
fostered the complacent prosperity of the 1950s – the Baby Boom, Cold War, and
burgeoning consumer culture – helped set off the volatile clashes between young
and old during the 1960s and 1970s. The chasm between the traditionalism of
adults and the iconoclasm of adolescents, contemporaneously referred to as the
“generation gap,” appeared unbridgeable. A 1969 Gallup survey found that 70% of
college students and adults believed a “generation gap” existed and that it would
most likely persist because adults were “’too set in their ways’” and adolescents
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fancied “’undisciplined behavior.’”930 Whereas adults expected young people to
conform to the norms of mainstream culture, adolescents insisted that all
individuals had a right to self-determination – even if its expressions were
disobedient or disruptive. Age-based social differences have existed since the
beginnings of recorded history. Only in the post-World War II era, however, did
“teenagers” become recognized as distinct cultural personae with their own
lifestyles separate from adults. The adult-adolescent cultural strife of the 1950s
begot the young-old generational hostilities of the 1960s. When the decade began,
most youths were either apolitical or dedicated to working peacefully for change
within the existing systems of governance. By the end of the decade, large numbers
of young people had become politicized, and many disbelieved peaceful change was
possible.
As the sixties unfolded, more and more young people assailed time-honored
notions of authority. Civil rights marches, counterculture be-ins, student strikes,
antiwar rallies, and protests against the Johnson administration each contested the
values and rules that elders claimed made America exceptional among world
nations. Young people of all ideological stripes criticized the special privileges
attached to age and seniority within America’s sociopolitical system. Hardly any
civic institution dominated by adults escaped scrutiny or challenge from some youth
group. The most revolutionary of youths saw themselves as the vanguard of “the
Movement,” a supernatural force of history that would overthrow a corrupt and
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outdated way of life perpetuated by adults. By the late 1960s, it had evolved from a
generally passive civil disobedience to aggressive resistance. An angry
rebelliousness stoked the most aggrieved and disaffected youth. They harbored a
bitter resentment that the majority of adults and government officials patronized,
neglected, or ignored the issues they found morally compelling. Abandoning the
idealistic rhetoric of John F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr., young activists
openly questioned the efficacy of sociopolitical change through existing institutions.
They concluded that the American political system was utterly impotent and had to
be fundamentally reformed. Believing they had been duped by the politics of
expectation, young nihilists launched a multidimensional assault upon virtually
every aspect of the mainstream life. More militant youths prepared for a war with
adult authorities.931 As more and more youths insisted upon a greater voice in
campus affairs, demanded justice for oppressed people, burned their draft cards,
and, occasionally, bombed university buildings, their increased belligerence
enflamed national tensions. Across the United States, multiple places, particularly
university campuses, witnessed disruption, violence, and, on occasion, fatalities.
The young radicals who pursued “liberation” from social and political constraints
became the focus of the public’s scorn. Parents and politicians alike worried that
Bob Dylan was right when he sang in his hit “The Times They Are A-Changin’” that
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“your sons and your daughters are beyond your command.”932
The rising tide of youth outrage crested in 1968. “There was a sense
everywhere in 1968 that things were giving way,” journalist Garry Wills observed,
“That man had not merely lost control of his history, but might never regain it
again.”933 In a year of chaos punctuated by violence and enveloped by tragedy, the
spring of 1968 proved to be the most traumatic season: LBJ announced he would
not run for reelection after a narrow victory over an antiwar candidate, Senator
Eugene McCarthy, in New Hampshire’s Democratic primary; assassins murdered
Martin Luther King, Jr. and Robert Kennedy; and campus unrest boiled over across
the nation. In a semester that began the month of the Tet Offensive, major protests
(i.e. those involving at least 1,000 people) erupted at more than 200 colleges. At
fifty-nine universities, students occupied campus buildings, mainly administrative
centers. Students on at least another thousand campuses held smaller
demonstrations, usually against the Vietnam War.934 The spring campus unrest
reached its acme at Columbia University. Beginning on 23 April 1968, SDS radicals
and black militants occupied the president’s office and classroom buildings for eight
days in protest of a defense research center on campus and the construction of a
gymnasium bordering Harlem that would be closed to community members. The
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strike paralyzed the campus, forcing administration officials to summon New York
City police to arrest the students – a process that turned bloody as many officers,
resentful of what they saw as privileged students who lacked respect for authority,
beat the protestors and their faculty advocates indiscriminately.935 Similar clashes
among students, administrators, and police at Harvard, Cornell, San Francisco
State, and other universities further widened generational rifts.
The incessant on-campus havoc convinced many adults that a full-fledged
youth revolt had erupted. When the 1960s began, most Americans lauded the
idealism, courage, and restraint of young demonstrators, particularly the students
involved in the civil rights movement. As the decade ended, public opinion
registered confusion, fear, and anger over the escalation and extremism of youth
protest. The vehement challenges of the “Me Generation” to the existing social
order and dominant value system added to the anxiety. By the end of the 60s,
historian Carl Boggs writes, most adult authorities agreed that the hopeful visions
of change outlined by young activists had turned into “a nightmare of adventurous
violence, dogmatic posturing, and a decaying drug culture.”936 Millions of vexed
adults thought that young people, whether Black Panthers, student militants, or
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hippie chicks, threatened to shred the sociopolitical fabric of America. As New York
City Mayor John Lindsay observed, “The country is virtually on the edge of a
spiritual – and perhaps physical – breakdown. For the first time in a century, we
are not sure there is a future for America.”937
Adults pondered how to rescue America from the young insurgents and how
to save fanatical youths from self-ruination. Some adults championed suppression
of youth activism. In 1968, J. Edgar Hoover, director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, established a nationwide program to disrupt the lives of key New Left
leaders. He deployed hundreds of undercover agents in a massive surveillance
program to neutralize civil disorders.938 Other people sought a salve for the social
wounds inflicted by intergenerational conflict by resurrecting the issue of lowering
the voting age. For many adults, the specter of youth-inspired domestic calamity,
especially the mayhem instigated by college-age activists, convinced them of the
sociopolitical need to enfranchise young people. As a mother from East Detroit
averred, “I believe that in lowering the voting age to 18, student protest and
violence would diminish. Through the elections of candidates who represent the
views of the youth today, their ideas could be put across in a non violent manner.”939
Most adults who supported adolescent suffrage did not necessarily hanker after the
political insights of youth; rather, they believed including young voices in national
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dialogues might yield social tranquility. Pro-18-vote adults reckoned that young
people, upon enfranchisement, could no longer protest that they lacked a say in
shaping the laws and policies that directly affected their lives. Of course, the youth
activists who turned university campuses and political conventions into
battlegrounds turned some adults against adolescent suffrage. An eighty-year-old
woman from Minnesota told the Minneapolis Tribune, “When I think of the way
kids are acting on campuses these days, I certainly don’t think they should have the
vote.”940 Although Representative James Harvey (R-MI) stated that continued
campus protests would create “a most unfavorable atmosphere for this deserved
legislation,” his colleague Howard Robison (R-NY) speculated that Congress might
reconsidered the 18-vote issue “if there is a groundswell of public interest in and
support for the proposal.”941
During 1968-69, the effort to lower the voting age steadily gathered
momentum. High school students flooded state and federal representatives with
petitions asking for a legislative redress of the youth suffrage grievance. “I stand
with the thousands of responsible, respectable, educated teenagers, members of my
generation who want to take an important part in their country’s welfare and help
in the election of their representatives and those who will represent their children,”
a 14-year-old Michigan resident wrote to House Minority Leader Gerald Ford, “Sir,
I hope that you will have faith in my generation and promote any bill that will
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enable us the right to vote.”942 Eugene McCarthy’s “Children’s Crusade” spurred the
formation of youth groups to promote the 18-vote, such as the Youth Franchise
Coalition and Let Us Vote. Both the YFC and LUV constructed national coalitions
on behalf of adolescent enfranchisement with such organizations as the AFL-CIO,
NAACP, Young Republican and Young Democrat clubs, National Educational
Association, and United States Youth Council. Let Us Vote formed 327 college and
3,000 high school chapters.943 A Gallup survey taken in December 1969 indicated
that 76% of college students favored allowing 18-, 19-, and 20-year-olds to vote.944
Other polls indicated broad-based support for teen suffrage among adults.945 While
some adults feared the granting “hippies, yippies, and other beatnik types” voting
power, an ever-increasing number of parents and politicians came to believe that
enfranchising “the handful of [youth] trouble makers” might calm their
antinomianism.946
Influential government officials also agreed a lower franchise age could
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become part of the cure for the youth-fired social distempers unsettling the nation.
Early in the first session of the 91st Congress, lawmakers in support of the 18-vote
intently lobbied their ambivalent colleagues. Jennings Randolph (D-WV) and Jacob
Javits (R-NY), for example, tried to impress upon fellow senators that the valor of
youths abroad, “their political involvement at home, and their deep concern for the
complex social problems of our times, clearly indicate new compelling reasons for
the vote.” They acknowledged that “contemporary frustrations” had driven “some of
our most capable and inquisitive youth to seek less acceptable means of making
known their views on public affairs.” But, Randolph and Javits concluded, “We feel
our Nation also should benefit from the creative energy of these individuals.”947
Beginning in the summer of 1969, a task force within Richard Nixon’s
administration began work on a national youth policy to remedy the “crisis of
authority” stoked by the pervasive sense of alienation among youth. Part of the
strategy to integrate young people into mainstream politics included establishing
eighteen as the national suffrage age – a suggestion that President Nixon
endorsed.948
In November 1969, the National Violence Study Commission, impaneled by
Nixon in June 1968 to study the causes of social unrest, issued a report that
advocated easing marijuana laws, enacting draft reforms, expanding public service
activities, and lowering the voting age to eighteen as steps to dampening the “youth
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rebellion.” The Commission asserted that enfranchising 18-year-olds would be an
important part of the process to woo alienated youths back into the mainstream of
American society: “The anachronistic voting age limitations tend to alienate them
from systematic political processes and to drive them into a search for alternative,
sometimes violent, means to express their frustrations over the gap between the
nation’s ideals and actions. Lowering the voting age will provide them with a
direct, constructive and democratic channel for making their views felt and for
giving them a responsible stake in the future of the nation.”949 The torrent of
positive support, both public and political, encouraged Representative James
Howard to report to his House colleagues “that the majority of the population of the
country supports the need for lowering the minimum voting age.”950
The civic demand that social order be restored became the motivating force
propelling Congress to lower the voting age to eighteen. In May 1968, the Senate
Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments conducted hearings on a handful of
18-vote resolutions. In his opening statement, Subcommittee Chair Birch Bayh (DIN) noted that American youth were “deeply involved” in political campaigns, civil
rights, the Peace Corps, Volunteers in Service to America, and the “issues of war
and peace.”951 Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-MT) maintained that “the
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age of 21 is not simply the automatic chronological door to the sound judgment and
wisdom that is needed to exercise the franchise of the ballot, or, for that matter, to
assume any other responsibility.” He also claimed that the great majority of
unradicalized youth should be granted the franchise because “their probing
intelligence, deep interest, and eagerness to participate in the elective process
exemplify the best qualities of responsible citizenship.”952 Other supporters argued
that the denial of a formal voice in political processes, particularly suffrage, fueled
the palpable distrust of “the Establishment” among young people. As John Owen,
president of the Philodemic Debating Society at Georgetown University, charged:
The big student complaints are that students are not consulted
in decision making. . . .This sort of thing has just snowballed to
the point where the mind of the young people age 18 to 21, many
people who feel themselves excluded from the political process or
just any decision making process, they feel the exclusion and
their idealism turns to some form of cynicism. Their cynicism
then turns into some sort of violence, which they feel is the last
way they have of communicating with the older generation.953
The justification most often cited in support of the 18-vote emphasized its
potential to diminish, if not stop, the violent machinations of those angry and
dispossessed young people. Proclaiming that youth needed “both a stake and a role”
in American government, Senator Howard Cannon (D-NV) declared that “it is
important, indeed crucial, that young adults – especially the concerned and active
young person – be convinced that improvement can still occur through the

952

Ibid, 5.

953

Ibid, 16 May 1968: 97.

339

established processes.”954 Mansfield underscored that dissatisfied youth “need to
know that their participation and counsel is sought and valued.”955 Jack McDonald,
chairman of the Young Republican National Federation, asserted that reducing the
franchise age “would do a lot to make young people realize that they are involved
rather than alienated from today’s society in America.”956 Senator Javits said he
was “convinced that self-styled student leaders who urge acts of civil disobedience
would find themselves with no support if students were given a more meaningful
role in the electoral process.”957 On the final day of the hearings, Representative
Ken Hechler (D-WV) provided insightful testimony linking the continuation of
youth disfranchisement and the prolongation of youth radicalism. He warned:
Today, the 18-year-old vote is needed to harness the energy of
young people and direct it into useful and constructive channels,
not simply for their benefit, but for the benefit of the entire
Nation. . . .[I]f we deny the right to vote to those young people
between the ages of 18 and 20, it is entirely possible that they
will join the more militant minority of their fellow students and
engage in destructive activities of a dangerous nature.958
The 18-vote resolutions received overwhelming bipartisan support within the
subcommittee, but it did not forward the bills to the full Senate Judiciary
Committee for consideration. Though the successes of the Civil Rights Act and
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Voting Rights Act had weakened Chairman Eastland, he still held considerable
sway within the Judiciary Committee to thwart legislation he considered a threat to
states’ rights. Bayh and other youth suffrage supporters on the committee reckoned
that the time was not advantageous for an aggressive push. The hearings took
place less than a month after President Johnson’s decision not to seek reelection.
Democratic leaders sought to hold onto as much southern support within the party
as they muster could for the upcoming elections since Republicans captured a large
number of congressional seats in the 1966 mid-term elections. Republicans found
ready allies in southern Democrats and a few of them, like Strom Thurmond, had
switched their party affiliation to the GOP. Intraparty politics halted the Senate’s
progress on youth suffrage, but the issue had garnered serious congressional
attention. The May 1968 hearings showed that the majority of congressmen
approved youth suffrage regardless of the conservative resurgence. Hence, the
debate over the 18-vote had shifted from a question of should Congress grant youth
the right of suffrage to how Congress could most suitably establish a national voting
age.
The 1970 renewal of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 provided pro-18-vote
congressmen a ripe legislative circumstance to enfranchise adolescents. The Voting
Rights Act intended to facilitate black voter registration in the South by outlawing
the legal barriers at the state and local level that prevented African-Americans
from exercising their right to vote under the Fifteenth Amendment. Congress
mandated that the Act be reexamined every five years to gauge compliance. The
341

initial debate on the extension of the Act focused on whether its “triggering
formula” within Section 4 or the “preclearance” measures of Section 5 would remain
unchanged as a common national standard. Section 4 banned literacy tests for five
years in Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, and
several counties in North Carolina; it also allowed federal officials to enfranchise
African-Americans and monitor elections within the aforementioned states. Section
5 dictated that federal courts and agencies could hold up the passage of suffrage
laws in the seven affected states until approved by a three-judge federal court in the
District of Columbia. In January 1969, Representative Emanuel Celler introduced
H.R. 4249 to extend, with no modifications, the 1965 Act. In July 1969, House
Minority Leader Gerald Ford, prompted by the Nixon administration, offered
several amendments to Celler’s bill. Ford’s proposal sought to change Section 4 of
the Voting Rights Act by authorizing a nationwide ban on literacy tests and
prohibiting extended residential requirements for voting in presidential elections; it
also altered Section 5 by placing jurisdiction over voting rights cases in local federal
district courts.959 On 11 December 1969, the House agreed to Ford’s modifications to
H.R. 4249 and sent the amended resolution to the Senate.960
Five days later, the Senate unanimously referred the bill to its Judiciary
Committee. The referral specified that the committee should report back to the full
Senate by 1 March 1970 and mandated that the bill, whether marked up or
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accepted in toto, become the pending order of business upon its return to the
Senate. Liberal Democrats secured the special instructions because they worried
that Judiciary Chairman James Eastland would kill the measure by purposely
refusing to schedule committee discussion about it. The Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights discussed the House amendments to the Voting Rights Act
extension over five nonconsecutive days during the latter part of February 1970.
The day before the Subcommittee on Constitution Rights initially met to talk
about H.R. 4249, the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments concluded its
two-day hearings regarding a Senate-derived youth suffrage bill. In August 1969,
Jennings Randolph and 67 co-sponsors offered S.J. Res. 147 to declare eighteen as
the national voting age.961 The first day of the hearings, 16 February 1970,
repeated the positive support for the 18-vote heard during the 1968 inquiry.
Subcommittee Chairman Birch Bayh opened the proceedings by emphasizing, “I
know of no other step that government can take that will lessen discontent and
provide a viable alternative to activities outside of the system than giving young
people a voice, an act, a responsible position within the system.”962 Dr. S.I.
Hayakawa, who as president of San Francisco State had become renowned for his
calm defusing of on-campus tensions, seconded Bayh’s thesis by asserting suffrage
held “symbolic meaning” for adolescents because it represented an acknowledgment
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of adulthood.963 Theodore Sorenson, a well-respected former advisor to John and
Robert Kennedy, said Congress should view the 18-vote as a “moral issue” that, if
not adopted, threatened to tear asunder the common democratic standards that had
traditionally rooted political socialization in America.964 Senator Randolph, a
staunch supporter of youth suffrage since World War II, focused his testimony on
the national political benefits of adding 11 million new electors to the voting rolls.965
The following day of hearings proved more contentious, as the participants
debated whether Congress held the power to lower voting ages in federal, state,
and/or local elections. Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst stated that
President Nixon and the Justice Department both disagreed with S.J. Res. 147
because it established eighteen as the national age of enfranchisement for all
elections. Kleindienst affirmed that the Nixon administration would only support a
constitutional amendment that restricted 18-year-olds to vote in federal elections.
He claimed that the qualification of age, unlike the categories of race and sex,
remained a “compelling interest” of the states; therefore, Kleindienst argued,
Congress possessed no power to require the states to reduce their minimum age
qualifications for enfranchisement.966 The other witnesses disagreed with
Kleindienst’s stance. Charles Gonzalez, president of the Student National
Education Association, labeled Kleindienst’s position “tokenism” and urged the
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subcommittee to accept S.J. Res. 147 as proposed.967 Former Attorney General
Ramsey Clark also backed an unadulterated S.J. Res. 147 and criticized the
limiting of the 18-vote to federal elections because “halfway steps are one of the
causes of [young people’s] doubt that we understand the times.”968 The hearings
again revealed widespread support for the idea of reducing suffrage ages. However,
the dispute over congressional authority to alter voting-age qualifications in state
and local elections stymied approval of S.J. Res. 147 in the subcommittee.
The spurning of S.J. Res. 147 did not derail the 18-vote effort, however, as its
senatorial proponents found a different path to promulgate youth suffrage. As
specified by the Senate’s special instructions, Emanuel Celler’s H.R. 4249 to extend
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 became the pending order of business on 1 March
1970. On 2 March, Senators Hugh Scott (R-PA) and Philip Hart (R-MI) offered an
amendment, in the nature of a substitute bill, to Cellar’s measure. The Scott-Hart
proposal narrowed Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act from nationwide application to
only those affected southern states as originally provided in 1965.969 Two days later,
Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, on behalf of Warren Magnuson (D-WA)
and Edward Kennedy (D-MA), introduced an amendment to the Scott-Hart
substitute bill. Quickly named the Mansfield Amendment, the tender sought to
lower the voting age to eighteen in all local, state, and federal elections. Senators
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quickly realized that Mansfield’s amendment, as a rider to preexisting law, schemed
to establish a national 18-vote via legislative statute. Mansfield claimed that he
proposed the statutory route because the “states simply have not taken the
initiative.”970
Several senators criticized Mansfield’s action. Hugh Scott charged it would
jeopardize the extension of the Voting Rights Act. Jennings Randolph stated that
he preferred a constitutional amendment rather than a congressional statute to
establish youth suffrage. He suggested that Mansfield’s ploy to make an end run
around the traditional amendment process might not even be necessary. Randolph
announced to his senate colleagues that James Eastland had assured him the
Judiciary Committee would not impede passage of S.J. Res. 147 (which Eastland
later confirmed on the Senate floor).971 But Randolph asked to co-sponsor
Mansfield’s measure “to join others who feel that the statutory approach is
possible.”972 Southern Democrats, led by Sam Ervin, opposed the rider as a threat to
a state’s right to determine suffrage qualifications. Ervin objected to the statute as
a violation of four sections of the Constitution (Section 1 of Article 2, Section 2 of
Article 1, the Tenth Amendment, and the Seventeenth Amendment) that he claimed
prohibited Congress from interfering with state determination of voting
requirements, including age specifications. In summarizing southern objections to
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the Mansfield amendment and the Voting Rights Act, Ervin forcefully inquired:
“Are we going to strive to have an indestructible Union composed of indestructible
States, or are we going to attempt to destroy, in an unauthorized manner, in an
unconstitutional manner, that Union by usurping for the Congress the powers
reserved to the States to prescribe the qualification for voting?”973
The central controversy that consumed the Senate involved an argument over
the means to begat the 18-vote. While some senators backed the slow but legally
certain path of a constitutional amendment, others preferred the expedient but
legally dubious course of a legislative statute. Supporters of Mansfield’s
amendment argued that the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Katzenbach v.

Morgan offered a solid constitutional basis for declaring a national suffrage age via
statute. In Katzenbach, the Court declared that the enforcement powers written
into Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment allowed Congress to enact laws that
increased the rights of citizens beyond what the judiciary had previously recognized.
The case originated from a suit brought by New York voters who contested Section
4(e) of the Voting Rights Act, which provided that no person who had successfully
completed sixth grade in a school accredited by the commonwealth of Puerto Rico
could be denied the right to vote because of an inability to read or write English.
The plaintiffs argued that Section 4(e) violated New York elections laws that
specifically required reading and writing literacy in English as a condition to vote.
A three-judge federal district court concurred with the plaintiffs. It held that
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Congress had infringed on rights reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment
and exceeded its powers of enforcement under the Fourteenth Amendment in
enacting Section 4(e). In a 7-2 decision written by Justice William J. Brennan, the
Supreme Court ruled that Section 4(e) was constitutional because Congress had
exercised its powers consistent with those afforded it by Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Brennan held that the supremacy clause embedded into Article VI,
Paragraph 2 of the U.S. Constitution prevented the enforcement of New York’s
English literacy requirement since Congress specifically wrote Section 4(e) of the
Voting Rights Act to enfranchise educated but non-English literate Puerto Ricans.
Brennan theorized that Congress could ratchet up civil rights beyond what the
Supreme Court had recognized via legislation enacted under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment that expressly sought to uphold or expand its equal
protection clause. He concluded that Section 5 offers “a positive grant of legislative
power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining the need for
and nature of legislation to secure Fourteenth Amendment guarantees.”974
Proponents of Mansfield’s amendment seized onto Justice Brennan’s “ratchet
theory” as justification for the statutory route to promulgate the 18-vote into federal
law. In testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments,
former Solicitor General Archibald Cox and Harvard constitutional law professor
Paul Freund backed the statutory approach to the 18-vote. Both men asserted that
Justice Brennan’s “ratchet theory” allowed Congress full authority to expand those
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rights recognized by the judiciary as essential to the types of civil equality intended
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Since Brennan’s theory proposed that Congress
could not ratchet down judicially recognized rights, Cox and Freund maintained
that Mansfield’s rider had constitutional validity because the Supreme Court had
frequently protected infringements of suffrage as potential violations of the equal
protection clause. Cox and Freund agreed that Brennan’s “ratchet theory” allowed
for multiple interpreters of the Fourteenth Amendment. They concluded that the
statutory route to youth suffrage would most likely pass constitutional muster if a
court clearly saw that Congress deliberately intended through legislation to deem
persons at least 18-years-of-age to be a class of citizens worthy of voting rights
equal to those of enfranchised adults.975
Opponents of Mansfield’s rider solicited the counsel of six Yale law
professors, including Alexander Bickel and Robert Bork, who rejected Brennan’s
“ratchet theory.” Bickel and Bork defended Justice John Marshall Harlan’s
minority opinion in Katzenbach that allowing Congress to interpret the Fourteenth
Amendment undercut the power of the judiciary. In particular, Bickel and Bork
concurred with Harlan’s objection to Congress having the power to interpret the
Fourteenth Amendment substantively, which, in their view, would permit Congress
great latitude under the 14th’s Section 5 enforcement provision to create new rights
with scant limitation and little judicial oversight. They insisted that Brennan’s
“ratchet theory” would harm the Constitution’s separation of powers by sanctioning
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judicial deference to Congress’s authority to interpret the equal protection clause as
it saw fit. Bickel and Bork argued that limiting congressional use of Section 5
power to the enforcement of judicially-recognized Fourteenth Amendment rights
was the proper constitutional safeguard. Bickel and Bork rebuffed Brennan’s
opinion as a foundation for justifying a statute overturning a state’s right to
determine age qualifications for voting, and they questioned the applicability of the

Katzenbach case to support any federal expansion of voting rights.976
The position of the Nixon administration further confused the situation.
President Nixon supported the use of the Katzenbach ruling by the Justice
Department and in Gerald Ford’s amendments to H.R. 4249 to validate the
abolition of state literacy tests and the reduction of state residency requirements for
voting. But in the case of youth suffrage, Nixon accepted the view of Bickel and
Bork that an overzealous interpretation of the “ratchet theory” posed potential
harm to federalist traditions regarding the locus of suffrage laws. William
Rehnquist, who served as the Assistant Attorney General of the Office of Legal
Counsel under Nixon, testified before the Subcommittee on Constitutional
Amendments that the statutory route to adolescent enfranchisement would confuse
the legality of the upcoming 1972 presidential election. He claimed Nixon
supported voting rights for young people, but the president preferred the more
certain and less polarizing amendment process to Mansfield’s rider.977 Edward
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Kennedy highlighted the seeming incongruity of Nixon’s employ of Katzenbach to
argue the case offered blanket constitutional protection for changing state suffrage
qualifications via federal decree. “If it is constitutional to change literacy and
residence requirements by statute,” Kennedy declared, “then it is also constitutional
to change age requirements for voting.”978
The floor debate on the Mansfield amendment to H.R. 4249 repeated,
virtually verbatim, the arguments for and against the statutory approach to
establishing a national voting age. Senator Vance Hartke (D-IN) believed passage
of the rider “both morally right and politically expedient.”979 Eugene Talmadge (DGA) insisted, “The worthiness of a cause and the popularity of an issue should not
and cannot be used to circumvent the process by which the Constitution can be
amended.”980 Birch Bayh reminded his colleagues of their legislative duty despite
their personal or political beliefs:
Whether it is by statute or by constitutional amendment, we
must proceed until we succeed. We must not raise the expectations of young people that we are going to give them a place
in the system and then fail them once more. We must continue
until they are full participatory partners in this great system
of ours.981
On 12 March 1970, the Senate accepted Mansfield’s amendment 64-17.982 The
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following day, the Senate agreed to the Scott-Hart substitute bill (51-22) and passed
H.R. 4249 as amended back to the House by a vote of 64 to 12.983 The success of the
Mansfield rider, in part, stemmed from the potent leadership of the Democratic
majority leader, plus bipartisan support from moderate and liberal senators who
overcame the objections of a small group of Republican and southern conservatives
backed by the Nixon administration.
In returning the substitute bill to the House, the Senate placed great cross
pressure on Emanuel Celler. Since World War II, he had staunchly opposed any
measure intending to establish a national voting age. But he had just as resolutely
supported any legislation proposing to uphold the civil rights of oppressed
minorities, especially African-Americans. Celler eventually relented from his
warning that he would “fight like hell” against the inclusion of the 18-vote rider to
the Scott-Hart bill. Celler reasoned that the Supreme Court would swiftly
determine the constitutionality of the Mansfield amendment prior to the effective
date (1 January 1971) of the Voting Rights Act renewal.984 He did, however, garner
a rule (H. Res. 914) from the Rules Committee that instructed the House to vote on
the Mansfield provision first, and then, if accepted, to next vote on the Scott-Hart
substitute bill. The rule also designated a one-hour time limit for debate on the
House floor.
House Minority Leader Gerald Ford attempted to send Scott-Hart to a
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conference with the Senate to delete the Mansfield rider. He charged that the
extraordinary legislative step to bypass committee and take up the Mansfield
amendment on the House floor was “the most indefensible procedure I have ever
seen.”985 Celler, however, realized the potential for southern obstructionism against
the renewal of the entire Voting Rights Act if Scott-Hart was tabled to conference.
When Celler pointed out that James Eastland would take part in the conference as
chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, congressmen anxious about the potential
derailing of the Voting Rights Act extension rallied to reject Ford’s conference call.
After Celler openly approved Scott-Hart on the House floor, passage of the measure
was virtually guaranteed, and the majority of representatives who commented
during the bill’s discussion castigated the Senate for the House’s predicament.986 On
17 June 1970, the House passed the Mansfield rider by a margin of 224-183, and
then quickly agreed 272-132 to the Scott-Hart substitute extending the Voting
Rights Act until 1975.987 President Nixon signed the amended H.R. 4249 into law on
22 June 1970. Nixon said he accepted the resolution despite disagreeing with its
18-vote statute. Nixon explained, “If I were to veto, I would have to veto the entire
bill – voting rights and all. . . .Because the basic provisions of this Act are of great
importance, therefore, I am giving it my approval.”988
At the request of President Nixon, the constitutionality of the Mansfield
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provision to Public Law 91-285 was immediately tested before the Supreme Court.
Many of the most fundamentally important and politically controversial decisions of
the Supreme Court since the 1930s had pondered the federal-state balance. The

Brown v. Board of Education decision, for example, placed the most traditionally
local of all governmental institutions, the public school, under the scrutiny of the
federal judiciary. In other rulings, the Court reconsidered the proper reach of the
Fourteenth Amendment while debating the limits of how far state regulation of
behavior might properly extend. The case concerning Mansfield’s amendment,

Oregon v. Mitchell, exemplified the Court’s post-New Deal forays into federal-state
relations. The ruling, however, represented one of the few Court decisions that
sided with the states at the expense of individual or group rights.
The Court actually reached three verdicts in deciding Oregon v. Mitchell.
The justices decided by a 5-4 vote that Congress held the power to lower the voting
age in federal but not in state or local elections. They also ruled 8-1 to restrict state
residency requirements for voters in presidential elections. And in another 8-1 vote,
they banned literacy tests as a voter qualification device in any election.989 The
Court’s ruling violated the intended spirit of the Voting Rights Act to facilitate voter
participation among historically vote-deprived social groups. But it also upheld a
core federalist tenet fixing within the states the primary responsibility for
determining the age qualifications of potential voters. To youth, the ruling
evidenced the vast gulf between democratic promise and adult action.
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Senator Birch Bayh said the Court’s verdict produced “some significant
problems” for the states.990 In ruling that Congress’s statue was only good in federal
elections, the Supreme Court created a gaping discrepancy in election laws that
threatened to muddle the upcoming 1972 plebiscite. The Court’s decision placed
profound administrative and financial burdens upon the 47 states that did not allow
18-year-olds to vote. To oblige the judgment, those states would be required to keep
two voter registration lists: one for federal offices and one for all other offices.
State administrators told federal officials that the added expense of holding
simultaneous federal elections that included 18-, 19-, and 20-year-olds while
conducting state elections that disfranchised persons under age 21 would exhaust
state electoral budgets. They also claimed the task of producing dual registration
books, ballots, and voting machines to comply with Oregon v. Mitchell could not be
completed in time for the 1972 election. Costs of conducting dual-age voting were
estimated at $5 million for New York City, $2.5 million for St. Louis, and between
$10 and $20 million for the nation as a whole. Further, because of state
requirements for amending state constitutions, twenty-two legislatures could not
act to lower state voting age laws before November 1972.991
The 91st Congress had determined how a national voting age could be
established. The Supreme Court’s half-hearted acceptance of the 18-vote statute,
however, engendered a dilemma for the 92nd Congress: how quickly could it pass a
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constitutional amendment to simplify for the states the “’dangerously complicated’”
construction of dual-age voting systems?992 A New York Times editorial aptly
described the problem as “no longer of philosophical preference, but only of smooth
mechanics . . . to bring uniformity out of confusion – ideally in time for the 1972
elections.”993 Early in the 92nd session, lawmakers in both the House and Senate
filed numerous 18-vote measures. Two identical bills, S.J. Res. 7 and H.J. Res. 223,
that set eighteen as the national age of enfranchisement age became the focus of
legislative action.

The House resolution garnered attention because Emanuel

Celler proposed it and House Speaker Carl Albert (D-OK) endorsed it; the Senate
measure, put forth by Jennings Randolph, had 85 co-sponsors.994 In late January,
Judiciary chairmen Celler and James Eastland announced they had pledged
cooperation to expedite passage of a youth suffrage amendment. Their timeline
appeared unusually aggressive. Celler and Eastland aimed for congressional
approval by the first week of March, so as to give state legislators enough time to
act before the end of 1971.995
The rush to get a youth suffrage amendment passed truncated debate on the
youth suffrage resolutions. A few conservative lawmakers repeated the dictum
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against federal infringements upon traditional state prerogatives. Opposing
legislators, mostly Republicans, also questioned whether the American people
wanted Congress to enfranchise adolescents by highlighting the 1970 state
referendums in Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, and Michigan that rejected
youth suffrage proposals. Representative John G. Schmitz (R-CA) revealed that he
planned to introduce a bill to repeal the federal statute that had promulgated the
18-vote to thwart congressional action on a national voting age resolution. In
announcing his plan to his House colleagues, Schmitz declared, “There is no reason
whatever to assume that we must resolve the present chaos by a constitutional
amendment compelling the states to reject the will of their own people and lower
the voting age for state as well as federal legislatures.”996
Republican resistance to the 18-vote measures got undercut by the Nixon
administration. In early February, Vice President Spiro Agnew proclaimed at the
annual Hearst Senate Youth Conference that he backed the efforts to lower the
voting age via constitutional amendment. Though Richard Nixon never publically
weighed in on the issue during the 92nd Congress, the implication of Agnew’s
message was that the president concurred.997 Some citizens claimed Nixon’s use of
Agnew as a proxy exposed the depth of the president’s scheming political
opportunism. Dr. E. James Lieberman, former director of the Center for Studies of
Child and Family Mental Health at the National Institute of Mental Health,

996

Congressional Record 117 (22 January 1971): 241.

997

Ibid, (9 February 1971): 2255.

357

charged: “With the lowering of the voting age and the erosion of his leadership
among the living, perhaps Mr. Nixon is pursuing the silent majority all the way
back to the womb.”998 After Agnew’s speech, however, Republican challenges to
youth suffrage faded, and congressional support swelled.
During the last week of February 1971, work on the 18-vote resolutions
began in the Judiciary Committees. On 23 February, a House Judiciary
subcommittee unanimously accepted H.J. Res. 223.999 On 2 March, the full
Judiciary Committee approved the bill “with little argument and practically no
opposition” 32-2 after a closed meeting lasting less than an hour; only Wiley Mayne
(R-IA) and Charles Wiggins (R-CA) dissented.1000 Later that afternoon, the Senate
Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments unanimously endorsed S.J. Res. 7 by
a vote of 5-0. Afterwards, Subcommittee chair Birch Bayh insisted, “’It’s
imperative that we [the Senate Judiciary Committee] take action quickly on this.’”
He worried that acceptance of the resolution might be impaired by the addition of
other popular proposals, such as congressional representation for the District of
Columbia or equal rights for women.1001 Emanuel Celler also urged his House
colleagues to act posthaste. He noted that several states had begun to amend their
998
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own constitutions to reduce voting ages, but he cited an informal survey that found
insufficient time for the states to accomplish a uniform 18-year-old standard by
1972. Celler claimed there existed a “’realistic possibility’” that enough state
legislatures could ratify a federal constitutional amendment ahead of the 1972
elections if Congress worked rapidly.1002
On Thursday, 4 March 1971, the Senate Judiciary Committee, “moving with
uncommon speed,” unanimously endorsed S.J. Res. 7.1003 “In an unusual display of
agreement on a constitutional question,” United Press International commented,
“conservatives and liberals, Republicans and Democrats got behind a bill to
straighten out what they felt was certain to become an electoral mess next year
without the amendment.”1004 Eastland kept his word not to muck up the 18-vote
amendment in committee by getting it reported out by the first week of March. In
its official report to the Senate explaining why the body should approve the
resolution, the committee averred “that the time has come to lower the voting age to
18 in every election across the land – because it is right. Lowering the voting age is
sound principle, sound policy, and sound practice.”1005 The unanimous consent of
the committee virtually assured Senate passage of S.J. Res. 7.
On Monday, 8 March, the Senate agreed to consider the resolution. Majority
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Leader Mike Mansfield indicated there would be no filibuster holdups because of
the Judiciary Committee’s categorical support. He tapped Birch Bayh to be the
floor manager for the bill. While delivering the keynote affirmation of the measure,
Bayh emphasized it would help restore domestic order by cooling the allure of
radical sets. He argued, “How devastating it would be to the main rallying cry of
these groups if the very system they say is sterile and unresponsive to change
proves that it can change, and purges itself of inequities. No other one piece of
legislation can do as much to convince the younger people that there is a place for
them within the system.”1006 As Bayh had previously predicted, however, the
addition of tangential amendments threatened to delay enactment of the 18-vote.
On Wednesday, 10 March, Ted Kennedy and Tom Eagleton (D-MO) attempted to
add, in essence, another constitutional amendment onto S.J. Res. 7 by proposing full
voting representation for the District of Columbia within Congress.1007 To
accomplish their aim, which Eagleton claimed was an essential “attribute of
citizenship” that Washington’s residents deserved, they sought to replicate
Kennedy’s 1970 scheme to enfranchise youth.1008 Kennedy and Eagleton argued
that their attachment to S.J. Res. 7 was the only way to bypass the hostility within
the Senate Judiciary and House Rules committees towards congressional
representation for D.C. “I doubt,” Kennedy affirmed, “that there has ever been a
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more meritorious case in Congress that called out for the unusual procedure of
legislation by rider.”1009
Mansfield spiked the proviso by asking for it to be tabled, to which the Senate
agreed 68-23.1010 “Unquestionably,” Mansfield assented, “the people of the District
deserve full and fair representation.” But he contended that the D.C. issue lacked
the same “unanimity” of congressional accord that the cause to enfranchise youth
fully had garnered.1011 Mansfield stressed, “It is imperative that no action be taken
to jeopardize the effort to extend to 18, 19, and 20-year-olds the full franchise of the
ballot in all elections.”1012 Mansfield’s parliamentary move to kill the KennedyEagleton amendment before it could be brought to a vote seemed unusual because of
its intra-party, fratricidal quality. To those people who knew the inside baseball of
the Senate, however, the tabling motion appeared to widen the rift that had
developed between Mansfield and Kennedy the previous year over the 18-vote rider
during the Voting Rights Act renewal.1013
After tabling the Kennedy-Eagleton tender, Senate discourse regarding S.J.
Res. 7 resembled more a pep rally than a debate. Before announcing his support for
the resolution, Senator James Allen (D-AL) noted, “Usually it is said that there are
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two sides to every question; but, apparently, there is only one side to the issue now
before the Senate, and that is the matter of granting the vote to young people of the
age of 18 years and older.”1014 All the senators who spoke in favor of the resolution
praised its judicious mending of the electoral fissure left by the Supreme Court. As
Strom Thurmond (R-SC) summarized, “It just does not make sense to permit young
people to have a voice in choosing national leaders while denying them the
opportunity to participate in local government.”1015 Many senators took the
opportunity to lionize Jennings Randolph for his long efforts to enfranchise
American youth; Marlin Cook (R-KY) even suggested naming the measure the
“Randolph Amendment.”1016 Birch Bayh was the last senator to speak on behalf of
the resolution. He admitted that “lowering the voting age is not a panacea for the
problems confronting us.” He asserted the 18-vote would “give the 11½ million
young people who are outside of much of the legislative process, young people who
are subject to all laws passed in this body and in all other legislative bodies, the
right to participate in the election process and shape and mold their own futures.”
Bayh concluded with a confident forecast: “I predict that young people will vote, in
large numbers. I believe that once these younger citizens have the right they have
sought, they will use it.”1017 The Senate unanimously approved S.J. Res. 7 by a vote
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of 94-0.1018
The youth suffrage bill in the House received a little more pushback. A few
representatives envisioned doom if H.J. Res. 223 passed: adult residents in college
towns held hostage to the whimsies of transitory young voters and local
governments occupied by charming radical carpetbaggers skilled in wooing gullible
teenagers. A handful of other congressmen pointed to recent failures of 18-vote
legislation in the states as indication of popular disdain for adolescent
enfranchisement. Charles Wiggins spoke for a few lawmakers when he lamented
that the resolution would pass “for no other reason than that the young people are
asking for it and we don’t want to say ‘no’ to them. In this, we sadly mirror the
permissiveness of society in general.”1019 A small contingent of conservatives, both
Republican and Democrat, objected on the grounds that voting requirements for
electors should be decided by the citizens of the localities involved.1020 John Schmitz
revived his suggestion that Congress should repeal youth suffrage in federal
elections instead of seeking to broaden voting rights to 18-year-olds. The newlyformed Committee for Constitutional Integrity headed by Francis G. Wilson,
emeritus professor of political science at the University of Illinois, encouraged
House resistance. Wilson mailed circulars to all fifty governors and each of the

Ibid, 5830. The six senators not in attendance, Mike Gravel (D-AK), Fred Harris (D-OK),
Mark Hatfield (R-OR), Benjamin Jordan (D-NC), Karl Mundt (R-SD), and Edmund Muskie (D-ME),
had their intentions recorded before their colleagues voted, and each would have said “yea” if
present.
1018

1019

Chicago Tribune, 24 March 1971, 2.

1020

Congressional Record 117, (23 March 1971): 7532-7569. See also Washington Post, 24

March 1971, A1 and A8.

363

7,500 state legislators urging them to refrain from taking up any 18-vote measure
passed by Congress. He highlighted that Virginia had filed a petition to repeal the
statute, arguing it was an “act of usurpation” by granting suffrage powers to
Congress outside of its prescribed authority established in the Constitution.1021
This time, however, the adherents of states’ rights could not derail a federal
youth suffrage amendment. For most congressmen, including those who had voted
against the 18-vote in 1970, the practical need to avoid the confusion and expense of
dual-age voting systems outweighed the philosophical want to maintain states’
rights. As Representative William L. Scott (R-VA) expounded,
I have considerable reservations about permitting 18-yearolds to vote and, as the record will show, did vote against
the provision in the Voting Rights Act last year to permit
those between 18 and 21 to vote in Federal, State, and local
elections. One basis for the vote at that time is a belief that
voting age is a matter to be determined by the State rather
than the Federal Government. In my opinion, the Constitution so provides. However, the Supreme Court has now
decided that Congress by general legislation can regulate
the voting age in Federal elections but not in State and
local elections. The result of the recent decision of our
highest Federal court is that there are two classes of voters
and, apparently, those States which have not reduced the
voting age to 18 must keep separate voting lists. Moreover,
the counting of ballots would be complicated if the present
condition of the law continues to exist. Therefore, I intend
to support the present resolution which, when ratified by
38 States of the Union, will make uniform the voting age
for citizens within our States as well as throughout the
country. The action of the Supreme Court, in my opinion,
has deprived us, as well as the individual States, of the
opportunity to decide the question of whether 18-year-olds
should vote on its merits. We have to approve the resolution
Willard Edwards, “Capitol Views: Congress Shuffles 18 Vote to States,” column, Chicago
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to obtain orderly electoral procedure.1022
For the other legislators, the time had come to enfranchise adolescents irrespective
of the measure’s utility. As Representative James Kee (D-WV) asserted on the
House floor, “I am going to support this constitutional amendment not because it
will save the taxpayers money, not because the two-track system would be difficult
to administer, but because I believe it is right.”1023
Democratic leaders allowed Emanuel Celler, the oldest member of the House,
to floor manage H.J. Res. 223. Their choice illustrated just how far many adults
had come in their view of the 18-vote since the 1940s. Celler commenced the House
discussion of the resolution by acknowledging his longtime criticism of youth
suffrage. He reminded his colleagues of his constant advocacy for civil rights,
including co-sponsorship of the Twenty-third and Twenty-fourth Amendments, to
argue that his support for the Twenty-sixth Amendment was “part of a
constitutional tradition of enlarging participation in our political process.” Celler
wrapped up his speech by championing the capacities of young people. “Some of our
youth have disappointed us, but the preponderant majority are as sound of mind as
they are strong in body,” he averred. “Youth will be served,” Celler rousingly
concluded, “by giving them the ballot.”1024
As the proceedings on 23 March neared the time to vote on H.J. Res. 223,
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Representative James J. Howard (D-NJ) proposed a last-second amendment.
Howard sought to enlarge the resolution to establish eighteen as America’s legal
age majority. He argued that if 18-year-olds were old enough to vote, they should
be allowed to assume the full responsibilities of adulthood, including the rights to
enter contracts, be sued in court, have an abortion, carry a firearm, and run for
Congress. On a point of order raised by Celler, the chairman presiding over the
House, Richard Bolling (D-MO), ruled Howard’s amendment non-germane to the
resolution at hand, thus killing it.1025 Celler then asked for an immediate vote on
H.J. Res. 223, which the House overwhelmingly adopted in a roll-call vote by a
margin of 400 to 19.1026
Acceptance of resolution kicked in a directive of the Rules Committee. After
the Senate had passed its 18-vote measure, Rules members understood the time
pressures to fix the dual-age voting fiasco created by the Oregon v. Mitchell verdict.
On 17 March, exactly one week after the Senate had approved S.J. Res. 7, the
House confirmed by unanimous consent the bounds of debate for H.J. Res. 223 set
by the Rules Committee. One of the terms allowed the House to consider S.J. Res. 7
immediately following the approval of H.J. Res. 223. Rules member Thomas “Tip”
O’Neill (D-MA) explained the simple goal was to expedite the legislative approval
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process. O’Neill said the committee wished to assure that a youth suffrage
amendment would be “ratified prior to the 1972 presidential election.”1027 Since
both the Senate and House 18-vote resolutions were identical, Rules members saw
no need to ship them to a joint conference for mark up or language resolution. Once
the House consented to H.J. Res. 223, Emanuel Celler requested immediate
consideration of S.J. Res. 7. Speaker pro tempore Hale Boggs (D-LA) ordered the
House clerk to give it a third reading, a basic parliamentary rule for the enactment
of congressional legislation. Upon the reading, Boggs declared the passage of S.J.
Res. 7 the question before the House. The terms of debate accepted on 17 March
allowed the final vote total on H.J. Res. 223 to stand as the House’s tally for S.J.
Res. 7. Boggs declared the Senate resolution approved under the declared rules and
ordered the House measure to be tabled.1028 The House action meant that the
Twenty-sixth Amendment had passed Congress; whether the necessary number of
states would accept it became the new political cause célèbre.
Article V of the U.S. Constitution requires that a minimum of three-fourths
of the states (38 out of 50) must ratify an amendment proposal before it can become
law. S.J. Res. 7 allowed state legislatures seven years to approve the Twenty-sixth
Amendment. Support for quick ratification appeared strong. The Wall Street

Journal claimed there was “an excellent chance” that enough states would consent
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to the 18-vote by the November 1972 elections.1029 A New York Times survey taken
in the days after the House’s consent vote indicated “that at least 38 states will
approve it within a short period.”1030 State sanction of the amendment appeared to
be driven more by a desire to avoid the procedural headaches and financial drains of
dual registration than an eagerness to enfranchise 18-year-olds.

For reasons

related to internal politics and distrust of adolescents, ten states had rejected youth
suffrage bills in the past two years. Faced with the heavy costs of possibly having to
hold separate federal and state elections to accommodate Oregon v. Mitchell,
however, most states, including those that had previously rejected the 18-vote,
seemed ready to ratify the Twenty-sixth Amendment.1031 Three states, North
Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming, could not act because their legislatures had
recently adjourned and would not reconvene until 1973.
Among those state legislatures currently in-session, several hurriedly
maneuvered to become the first to approve the amendment. Within thirty minutes
after the House approval of S.J. Res. 7 – and without even waiting for an official
copy of the amendment certified by Congress – Minnesota and Delaware ratified it;
later in the afternoon of 23 March, Connecticut, Tennessee, and Washington also
gave consent.1032 “The bandwagon’s already rolling,” whooped Emanuel Celler upon
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hearing news about the 26th’s acceptance by the first five states.1033 Conservative
opponents of the 18-vote futility scrambled to stifle ratification. They warned that
enactment of the amendment would lead to student takeovers of governments in
college towns. A Republican state senator from Illinois bemoaned enfranchising
“’the same people who have caused us so much trouble at S.I.U. [Southern Illinois
University] and Kent State.’”1034 Most state legislators, however, rushed to relieve
themselves of the logistical and financial burdens of creating separate voting-age
systems to accommodate the Supreme Court’s decision, thereby steamrolling
resistance to the Twenty-sixth Amendment. Within thirty days of the House of
Representatives’ passage, 60% of the necessary 38 states had approved it; within
two months, 75% had consented.1035
As the 18-vote amendment neared final approval, a handful of states
maneuvered to become the historic 38th state to ratify. As Ian McGowlan of
Common Cause said, “’Nobody wants to be 39th.’”1036 A mini-tempest arose
regarding which state actually became the 38th. On the morning of 30 June 1971,
Alabama became the 36th state to accept the amendment. Three other states,
Oklahoma, Ohio, and North Carolina, only needed one house of their legislatures to
complete ratification. Around 4:00 p.m. EST, North Carolina’s Senate gave final
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approval. As news of the Tar Heel State’s feat spread, it spurred Oklahoma
lawmakers to call a special session just to endorse the 18-vote. R.W. Apple, Jr., of
the New York Times reported that Oklahoma’s action caused an “atmosphere of
near-panic” in the Ohio general assembly.1037 Charles F. Kurfess, the Ohio House
Speaker, furiously gaveled through a motion to cut off debate and ordered an
immediate roll-call vote, which ended a little after 8:00 p.m. EST. The Times and
other news outlets crowned Ohio as the 38th and necessary state to make youth
suffrage part of the Constitution.1038 However, the General Services Administration
(the federal agency responsible for preserving and safekeeping the nation’s
historical documents) considers North Carolina to be the 38th state because its
governor delayed signing the official copy of the assembly’s bill until just after
midnight on 1 July.1039 A total of 42 states eventually endorsed the 18-vote. In
October 1971, Georgia, the first state to permit 18-year-olds to vote, became the last
state to ratify the Twenty-sixth Amendment.
The 100 days to ratification established a record for swiftest approval of a
constitutional amendment.1040 President Nixon declared that unprecedented speed
of the 18-vote’s ratification “’affirms our nation’s confidence in its youth and its
trust in their responsibility.’”1041 Most state lawmakers, however, were driven by a
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practical want to have the process completed in plenty of time to accommodate the
registration of new young voters before the presidential election in November 1972.
According to David C. Huckabee of the Congressional Research Service, the average
ratification time, excluding the Twenty-seventh Amendment (which took more than
202 years), was one year, eight months, and seven days.1042 Had that historical
standard been maintained, the 11 million newly enfranchised 18-to-20-years would
have had to wait until 1974 to vote in a federal election and until 1976 to cast their
first ballot for president.
On 5 July 1971 – the day America officially observed its 195th birthday –
Robert L. Kunzig, head of the General Services Administration, certified the 26th
Amendment as part of the Constitution. At a ceremony held in the East Room of
the White House attended by federal officials and nearly 500 members of the
singing group, Young Americans in Concert, Kunzig presented President Nixon an
official copy of the amendment.1043 Nixon and a trio of 18-year-olds (Julianne Jones
of Memphis, Joseph Loyd, Jr. of Detroit, and Paul Larimer of Concord, California)
chosen by lot from the choir signed as witnesses to Kunzig’s certification, thereby
making the 18-vote national law.1044 In his prepared remarks, Nixon never
specifically endorsed the amendment. Rather, he lauded the potential contributions

David C. Huckabee, Ratification of Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, Congressional
Research Service Report for Congress, 97-222 GOV (30 September 1997): 1.
1042

Twenty-Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 85, (5 July
1971): 829-830. On 7 July 1971, Kunzig’s certifying statement that the amendment had become
valid was published. See F.R. Doc. 71 09999691, 36 F.R. 12725.
1043

1044

New York Times, 6 July 1971, 1 and 21.

371

enfranchised young Americans could make to the nation. “We can have confidence
that these young Americans will provide America with what it needs now,” Nixon
declared, “[They] will infuse into this country some idealism, some courage, some
stamina, some high moral purpose.”1045 The Census Bureau determined that the
Twenty-sixth Amendment enfranchised a little over eleven million persons aged 18
to 21. Despite optimistic predictions that young people would vote in large
numbers, however, only 5.3 million of the new electors actually voted in the 1972
presidential election.1046

The Twenty-sixth Amendment overcame many obstacles before achieving
passage and ratification. The youth suffrage issue had been a “perennial political
lemon” since its introduction during World War II.1047 Going into the 1960s,
American lawmakers and their constituents appeared patently disinterested in
reducing franchise ages. During the postwar era, nearly all the states (except for
Georgia, Kentucky, Alaska, and Hawaii) had refused to lower voting-age
requirements, and only once, in 1954, had either house of the U.S. Congress voted
on a youth suffrage bill. But during the postwar era, adult advocates for the 18vote successfully nudged adolescent enfranchisement from an issue on the outer
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edges to the margins of political discourse. Youth suffragists in the 1960s would
push enfranchisement into the political mainstream, and in doing so, public and
political support for teen enfranchisement gradually built. Like Max Frost and his
troopers, a handful of youth activists reckoned young people could not hope to
topple “the Establishment” or remake “the System” without voting rights. A spike
of intense sociopolitical shocks between summer 1968 and spring 1969 triggered by
young demonstrators made youth suffrage a legislative priority. The violent riots of
the Democratic national convention in Chicago, bellicose antiwar rallies, and
combative confrontations on university campuses convinced most lawmakers that
enfranchising adolescents might keep young militants from running wild in the
streets.
Paradoxically, the Establishment politicians that young people often rebelled
against acted responsibly on their behalf. Influential federal officials championed
youth suffrage as a political therapeutic to relieve generational tension. The
legislative toil of pushing the 18-vote through Congress proved arduous. The task
was indirectly aided by liberal Democrats who, throughout the 1950s and 1960s,
pushed Congress to streamline its institutional operations. In a political era that
demanded forceful legislative responses to severe domestic and international crises,
an energetic, motivated group of junior lawmakers were inspired by the zeitgeist to
reform congressional practices. Their actions overcame the procedural
obstructionism orchestrated by conservative Republicans and southern Democrats
against civil rights and social welfare legislation. The cause of youth suffrage most
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benefitted from a small cast of committed Senators who cleverly steered the 18-vote
through Congress’s byzantine lawmaking System. Their labors, prodded by youth
dissidents and abetted by young lobbyists, produced an enduring electoral reform
that remains an important political achievement of the long 1960s.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
Nature herself has provided the distinction [between rulers and subjects] when she
made a difference between old and young within the same species, of whom she
fitted the one to govern and other to be governed. No one takes offense at being
governed when he is young, nor does he think himself better than his governors,
especially if he will enjoy the same privilege when he reaches the required age.
Aristotle1048
Aristotle argued in his seminal treatise The Politics that the political history
of human beings is the story of an evolution from the rule of a few to the
government by the many. Common people gained power, he asserted, because “man
is by nature a political animal” who positively values, and even enjoys, participation
in decision-making associations.1049 Aristotle uncovered what he believed to be an
incontrovertible correlation: the more democratic the government, the more the
people possessed decision-making power. But Aristotle acknowledged that
democracies could not give every person an equal share in governing the state. He
reckoned that “nature herself” conceived age as the most fundamental chain of
command: between the old, “whom she fitted. . .to govern,” and the young, “whom
she fitted. . .to be governed.” Age was not as onerous in its dimensions of
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inequality as other restrictions, like race or gender, for all humans, save untimely
death, will eventually reach majority age. Nonetheless, age-based prejudices
constrained the sociopolitical autonomy and agency of all non-adults.
Control over governmental decision-making processes became the foundation
for adultocracy, or the rule of adults. Because adults were presumed to have the
knowledge and experience seemingly required for self-rule to endure, all western
democracies vested them with the power to make decisions applicable to all the
people. Arguments about which adults comprised “the people” roiled democracies,
ancient and modern. Long before the creation of republicanism, adultocracy
narrowed the connotation of “the people” to mean political people, or those adults
empowered to act politically through voting, lawmaking, and administrating on
behalf of the demos. Certain adults were expected to lead community discussions,
define civic goals, formulate public policy, and persuade (or coerce) the populace to
follow along. The methods for making choices and reaching conclusions varied, but
democratic states always granted those persons considered adults the privileges of
voting and office-holding. Limiting decision-making authority to adults meant that
the franchise served as a vital reinforcement of their sociopolitical omnipotence.
Adultocracy framed suffrage battles. The ancient progenitors of democracy in
Greece and Rome devised the two major types of restrictions on suffrage: those
based on citizenship and those based on competence. Greco-Roman legalists
scripted community-based voter qualifications to assure that only those adults who
had a vested socioeconomic stake in the outcomes of electoral affairs should be
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allowed to participate in them. Citizenship requirements also meant that every
citizen was either a potentially-eligible or legally-enfranchised voter. Competencebased restrictions emerged from a common-sense notion that only those people
deemed mentally proficient should be allowed to serve as electors, jurors, or
lawmakers.1050 Setting the criteria for determining competency was rooted more in
stereotype than objective standard. Among adults in early America, for example, all
persons not male, property-owning, white, and of European descent were denied
suffrage for supposedly lacking the cognitive capacities deemed necessary for
reasoned decision-making. In the 19th and 20th centuries, political agitation by
groups of voteless adults eliminated competence-based disfranchisements based on
sex, class, race, and ethnicity by framing suffrage as an inherent birthright of
citizenship. As a result, American conceptions of “the people” expanded to include
new factions of adult constituents.
Widening the circle of who could vote proved less complicated than
determining when a person should be enfranchised. Across polities that granted
suffrage, age has been the most universal of all voting qualifications. The “natural”
hierarchy of age that Aristotle alluded to informed normative expectations
associated with a particular chronological age. Age norms structured social
perceptions of what children, adolescents, adults, and elders should or should not be
allowed to do – notions often summarized by the dictums “You’re not old enough

See E.S. Staveley, Greek and Roman Voting and Elections (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
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yet” or “Act your age.” The cultural construction of age abilities shaped defining the
temporal thresholds used by parents and the law for bestowing individual
autonomy, social empowerment, and political enfranchisement to individuals and
groups. Age of majority laws codified links between status and entitlements to
man-made dating schemes founded on chronology. Not only was age a correlate of
lawful privileges, legally-defined majority ages served as the prerequisite to acquire
individual rights. Simply, a person had to meet certain chronological benchmarks
as determined by law to officially perform “adult” actions, such as to marry, enter
contracts, or vote. The word “majority” held dual political limitations for young
people. They were not of sufficient demographic numbers to wrest power from
adults, and they had not attained the status of having reached full legal age to
effect change. Hence, American youth endured an exclusive tyranny of the
“majority” never suffered by other disfranchised social groups.
Age-based allocations of suffrage anchored adultocracy. Regardless of other
cultural, socioeconomic, or educational disfranchisements, every citizen first had to
first reach a prescribed age before being considered eligible to cast a ballot officially.
When to offer those persons considered “adults” the authority to make binding
decisions for whole societies became a political conundrum. Bands and tribes never
set a majority age for voting because they did not tender suffrage; whereas,
democratic states had to promulgate precise ages because they formally
enfranchised citizens. At their genesis, suffrage edicts reflected the band-tribal
custom of deputizing able constituents to decide upon communal matters. The size
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of states, however, made ready assessments of individual competency exceedingly
complicated. In promulgating suffrage ages, lawmakers drew upon customs that
gradually meted the responsibilities of adulthood across adolescent years. That
tradition was based upon a presumption that as people aged they became “mature,”
or more stable, sensible, rational, and wise. To identify potential voters, states
utilized subjective perceptions of maturity rather than objective measures of ability
as the sorting mechanism. Western democracies, sociologist Frank Henderson
Stewart observes, believe that
a person should not be given the right to vote until he has
reached a certain degree of maturity. We do not believe,
however, that he suddenly achieves this degree of maturity
on his eighteenth birthday. We recognize that age is not
an exact measure of maturity, but we use it because, in this
case, it has many practical advantages: above all, it is a
measure of maturity that is generally accepted and that is
cheap and simple to apply. In both these respects it has the
advantage over some psychological test.1051
The ancient framers of western suffrage struggled to pinpoint the exact
temporal moment when persons had chronologically matured enough to impanel
them as voters. The necessity of establishing a standard for enfranchisement led
them to set arbitrary age floors, such as 21 or 18, as the determinants for exercising
electoral power. Choosing the precise chronological ages to grant electorship
reflected, as Aristotle referenced, the supposed “natural” distinctions between
adults and youth. To legislators and jurists, the central age difference seemed to be
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that adolescents were more naïve, impulsive, and unruly than adults. A common
understanding of adolescence as a turbulent time of the lifecycle defined by anxiety
and rebelliousness framed the western system for parceling majority ages over the
course of the teenage years. Adult evaluations of electoral competency usually
relied on some fuzzy combination of personal anecdote and private intuition lashed
to public perceptions of a riotous adolescence. This fickle rubric yielded a pastiche
of voting-age laws that reflected a general adult indifference towards the true or
known capabilities of young people. Adolescents might have thought of themselves
equal in capacity and knowledge to adults, but the law viewed youth as inherently
inferior in temperament and judgment – the core aptitudes demanded of democratic
electors. No empirical evidence could prove conclusively that majority-age persons
were any more able to cast an unadulterated ballot than teenagers or that
adolescents were any less cognitively or emotionally fit to vote than enfranchised
adults. Yet the determination of a particular franchise age squared with a cultural
construct that emphasized the perception of maturity over proof of capacity when
dispensing legal freedoms. Hence, the promulgation of voting-age statutes framed
suffrage more as a privilege of adulthood than as a birthright guaranteed by
government.
The Twenty-sixth Amendment broadened the scope of electoral adulthood. It
confirmed that what passes in the modern American polity as “the people” means
males and females over the age of eighteen who have also qualified by birth (or
naturalization) and residence to be participatory political citizens. In stretching the
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bounds of who are considered “the people,” the 26th Amendment closed the gap
between the promise and the actuality of full democratic citizenship for adolescents.
American youth, like other social groups, overcame daunting political barriers and
pervasive social obstacles to achieve suffrage. Though teenagers had made
distinctive contributions to the development of American institutions and culture, a
combination of circumstances, customs, and laws hindered their enfranchisement.
Extending suffrage to young people once seemed dangerously harebrained; by 1970,
it seemed assuredly democratic and profoundly just.
The Twenty-sixth Amendment overturned several centuries of AngloAmerican jurisprudence. Twenty-one was the age fixed by medieval English jurists
for full majority within the common law, and 21 had been observed informally as
the chronological benchmark for suffrage. In 1696, Parliament codified the custom
by establishing twenty-one as the official age of enfranchisement. American
colonies and states maintained the 21-vote until 1943, when Georgia electors,
spurred by a progressive governor, Ellis Arnall, voted to lower the suffrage age to
eighteen. Georgia’s action inspired the federal government to consider fixing
eighteen as the uniform national voting age. Proposals to establish an 18-vote
amendment to the U.S. Constitution became a source of sociopolitical consternation
for the next three decades. In 1971, the United States declared that all citizens at
least 18-years-old could not be denied suffrage. Today, the overwhelming majority
of world democracies set eighteen as the minimum voting age.
The long, strange trip of the Twenty-sixth Amendment exemplifies the
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stresses and strains of the political-social dynamic that informs American
lawmaking. Only the Twenty-Seventh Amendment has had a longer period of
gestation from initial introduction in Congress to eventual addition to the
Constitution.1052 One of the driving forces within modern political historiography is
an interest in tracing the modifications made to New Deal-style liberal statism
during the post-World War II period. The varied scholarship of political scientists
and historians shows that American democracy cannot be explained by recourse to a
simple narrative of political events. Political history is more than what lawmakers
did and the people endured; it has deep connection to cultural practices.
Constitutional historians, for example, dispute whether amendments are primarily
an exercise of legislative or constituent power. Bruce Ackerman maintains that any
alteration to the Constitution, particularly amendments, can only be achieved when
popular will supports the change.1053 Richard B. Bernstein and Jerome Agel hold
that amending the Constitution also requires a mobilization of political will to
undertake the arduous Article V process.1054 As Ackerman, Bernstein, and Agel
allude, scholars must explain both the constitutional arrangements and the cultural
mores that made political transformation possible (or in some cases impossible) to
provide a fuller account of postwar political history.
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The tumult over youth suffrage illuminates the theory of historian Michael
Zuckerman that there exists a “social context” to American democracy that shapes
political behavior.1055 The polling on the 18-vote issue followed a postwar political
trend: public opinion often tracked ahead of the legislative willingness to act.
Millions of Americans wanted Congress to do more to broaden the electoral base of
democracy, but many lawmakers, particularly southern Democrats and
conservative Republicans, resisted new political initiatives. Historian John Patrick
Diggins contends that the conservative coalition foisted upon the postwar era a
“politics of inertia” defined by “a retrenchment of federal power” and “a rise in local
state jurisdiction.”1056 Their state-centered view of federalism proscribed any and
all congressional actions that sought to widen the franchise, including the
thwarting of an 18-vote constitutional amendment in May 1954.
The social understanding of adolescence as a time of “storm and stress”
buttressed the obstructionism of conservative congressmen and other like-minded
adults. G. Stanley Hall’s theory of a biologically-deterministic, tumultuous
adolescence indelibly burned an image of the adolescent as hormonal, emotional,
and irrational into the American mentalitê. Postwar social scientists showed
conclusively that there was no reason to deprive adolescents of consent powers on
the basis of inferior competence; their research suggested that adolescent reasoning
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capabilities were not significantly different from that of adults. Yet, according to a
1968 Newsweek piece, the 21-vote endured “more because of legal convenience and
medieval custom than through biological necessity.”1057 The majority of adults
could not identify G. Stanley Hall or describe his seminal thesis in much detail, but
they certainly believed “storm-stress” valid. Their proof was more personal and
anecdotal: the moody and mistake-prone teenagers who seemed to laze too much,
listen too little, and dissent too often within their homes. Adults also worried that
“juvenile delinquents,” “beatniks,” and “hippies” were encouraging the “good kids” to
defy traditional notions of propriety and authority. Until adolescents could show
themselves capable of providing a thoughtful and responsible vote, adults would not
invite youth to join the American electorate.
In the years between the initial raising and final ratification of the 18-vote
amendment, the basic arguments for and against youth suffrage stayed remarkably
consistent. Adults never seriously considered whether adolescents, as citizens,
possessed an inherent right to vote; instead, they debated whether teenagers
possessed the requisite competency to justify enfranchisement. Advocates of the 18vote argued that adolescents deserved suffrage because they had, just like adults,
ably served the nation as soldiers, taxpayers, and workers. Opponents of lowering
the voting age countered that adolescents under age 21 lacked the intellectual or
emotional maturity to proffer electoral consent sensibly. Though popular opinion
polls indicated that Americans accepted the notion of teen voting, most adults,
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especially federal and state legislators, appeared thoroughly disinterested in
reducing franchise ages until youth activism shook American society during the
1960s. Some adults pointed to the leftist ideology and aggressive tactics of the
young militants as evidence of a congenital nihilism that made adolescents unfit for
enfranchisement. Other adults contended that the radical fringe should not deprive
the majority of America’s responsible young people from voting. They argued that
expressing discontent with continued adult tolerance for bigotry, conformity, and
the military-industrial complex evidenced an analytical maturity among youth;
hence, exercising the rights to petition and assemble for a redress of grievances
showed adolescents were savvy enough to proffer electoral consent. By 1970, the
18-vote became a national legislative priority. Most congressmen eventually
reckoned that suffrage could restore social order by giving talented and energetic
young people what they demanded: a real, consequential stake in the political fate
of the nation. As Senator Richard Schweiker (R-PA) asserted: “the primary reason
for endorsing the 18-year-old vote is on the merits. Our young people have
continually demonstrated the political awareness, the public concern, the desire to
participate in our process, and the capability of exercising responsible judgment,
sufficiently to have earned the right to vote.”1058
Several immediate outcomes of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment can be readily
observed. Constitutionally, it settled the question of whether or not Congress could
determine voter qualifications in federal, state, and local elections. A key reason
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some congressmen ratified the amendment was to satisfy a legal problem: the dualage voting system created by the Oregon v. Mitchell ruling. Legally, the
amendment spurred many states to lower the basic age of majority from age
twenty-one to eighteen. States rationalized that if Congress accorded 18-year-olds
greater authority to give consent, then state laws should be changed to allow them
greater authority to make binding decisions on matters involving their personal
welfare and legal condition. Additionally, state lawmakers worried that
maintaining variant ages of majority (for example, those statutes allowing different
marriage ages based on sex) would lead to a myriad of constitutional challenges.
Some states lowered the general age of majority but retained higher minimum age
requirements for particular acts, especially the purchase of alcohol.
Politically, the establishment of the 18-vote achieved both the inclusion and
the quieting of American youth. Lowering the voting age satisfied youth demands
for full democratic participation. Enfranchisement also granted young activists an
opportunity to change the political status quo through electoral pressure. Young
politicos, however, could not take advantage because they lacked the consistency of
organization and leadership common to other minority groups because of aging. As
the former firebrands grew older, the protests, movements, and identity politics
that defined ‘60s social activism were not sustained by the ensuing cohort of youth:
Generation X. It lacked the rich, highly-charged formative experiences of Vietnam,
Selma, or Chicago. The tangible risks of military conscription, the denial of
freedom, or violent physical harm never deeply threatened Gen Xers. Nor did they
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show any interest in ideological engagement; they preferred embarking on quests of
personal fulfillment to contemplating the deep existentialism of liberal
humanism.1059 Those young people who tried to retain the activist spirit of the ‘60s
discovered that a ballot afforded youth no special political standing. Competing
against other groups for influence and working the process for results did not
appear as politically gainful, or as culturally sexy, as the renegade agitation of
oppositional activism. Adult anxiety about what adolescents would do with their
votes was proven misplaced; youth predictions of transforming the system from
within proved false. Having reckoned the suffrage mission accomplished,
Generation X felt secure in its civil rights and political equality. Hence, the
sociopolitical activism that had defined the protests of the 1960s culminated with
the ratification of the Twenty-sixth Amendment.
Enfranchisement entailed a responsibility to exercise the privilege, and, in
that regard, youth voter turnout rates have generally disappointed. Prior to the
1972 election, the Census Bureau estimated that the vast majority of 18-to-21-yearold voters would cast their first ballot, but less than 50% of newly-enfranchised
youths actually voted.1060 Since 1972, young Americans have never been the crucial
constituency in any election. In marketing, media, fashion, and technology,
adolescents have been an earth-shattering demographic. But youth have not been
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all that consequential as voters; in all elections since ratification of the 26th
Amendment, young people consistently vote at lower rates of participation than
older voters. The general lack of electoral interest among American youth has
puzzled pundits and politicians. Well-publicized civic programs to register new
young voters, especially the continuing efforts of MTV’s “Rock the Vote,” seemed to
awaken youth to the importance to voting every presidential election cycle. As the
United States entered the 2000s, those endeavors did not spur widespread or
continuous execution of the franchise among adolescent voters.
The first three presidential elections of the new millennium rejuvenated
youth electors. The controversial circumstances of George W. Bush’s electoral
victory in 2000 reminded young Americans of an important civics lesson: every vote
counts, including theirs. During Bush’s first term, his decision to fight Iraq on the
shaky grounds that Saddam Hussein was building weapons of mass destruction and
supporting terrorism and his conservative positions on abortion, stem cell research,
and homosexuality riled left-leaning youths. In 2004, they rallied behind Democrat
John Kerry, but his candidacy was undone by the unsupported claims of a wellfunded right-wing group that Kerry had lied about his service in Vietnam. In 2008,
young people flocked to the campaign of Barack Obama. He ran for president as a
fresh-faced alternative to the Washington status quo. He pitched himself as a
candidate who would bring the nation together after eight years of bitter
divisiveness. Obama electrified Democratic audiences with his call for “hope” and
“change,” and he ran his campaign around the vague but appealing slogan, “Change
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We Can Believe In.” Obama’s campaign events drew enormous crowds. His
supporters, who were younger and more racially diverse than the population as a
whole, were highly motivated. Obama won the election with a clear majority of the
electorate, and a handful of commentators gushed that his triumph heralded a
political watershed: the passage of governmental power from the graying Baby
Boomers to the youthful Millennials.
Political observers pointed to the success of Obama’s massive youth-get-outthe-vote operation as key to his victory. Labeled the “Millennial Tidal Wave” or the
“Youthquake,” young people accounted for 23 million votes in 2008 (or 18% of the
aggregated total) – and increase of 2 million as compared to the 2004 election.
Nearly 55% of all eligible voters between ages 18 and 29 cast ballots, which
represented the highest turnout among youth since 1972, and they overwhelmingly
supported the 47-year-old Obama (68%) over his 72-year-old Republican opponent,
John McCain (32%).1061 The prospect of a rush of liberal-leaning young people into
mainstream politics startled conservatives. They worried that the demography
behind Obama’s youth-fired conquest might relegate the Republican Party to
permanent minority status. After the election, the GOP made a concerted effort to
stem the seemingly-imminent progressive swell by moderating some of its social
policy positions and by broadening its youth recruitment programs. Conservative
commentators recommended a more blunt approach. Near the fall 2010 mid-term
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elections, analyst Ann Coulter proposed a repeal of the Twenty-sixth Amendment.
Coulter based her pitch on her observation that young people are not as politically
serious as adults. Her proof: the 2008 election of Obama, which Coulter blamed on
youths who lacked “fully functional brains.”1062 The public, outside the conservative
blogosphere, responded to her call with a collective yawn.
Whether Obama’s 2008 victory was the result of a generational shift toward
an era of liberal governance or represented a quirk of political circumstances
remains to be seen. Conservative hyperventilating about 2008 notwithstanding, the
Twenty-sixth Amendment has had negligible electoral impact since its
promulgation. That historical trend can be partly explained by consistently low
turnout among young voters. It can also be further clarified by the incomplete
enfranchisement the amendment offered. While the 26th guaranteed Americans at
least 18-years-old the privilege of suffrage, it did not concurrently lower the
constitutional ages for holding political office: 25 for representatives, 30 for
senators, and 35 for presidents. Young people between ages eighteen and twentyfour remain the only voter group that cannot elect members of their constituency to
serve as federal congresspersons. The rules and regulations regarding
enfranchisement stemmed from an ethos that declaimed citizenry as shareholding
in the political community and voting as the essential act of citizenship. The sense
of equality bore by the status “of majority age” engendered a belief among
adolescents that they were equal in capacity, aptitude, and worth to adults, and,
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therefore, entitled to the full entitlements of adulthood. But the adult lawmakers
who authored the Twenty-sixth Amendment never considered making teenagers full
governing partners. They recognized in youth an ability to vote maturely but did
not believe young people had the capacity to govern wisely. By not specifically
granting persons aged 18 to 24 the privilege of office-holding in its language, the
26th Amendment provided adolescents electoral parity, but not full political
equality, with adults. Incomplete enfranchisement might explain why many young
people do not see voting as a tool to change the political system and why youth
suffrage did not loosen the grip of adultocracy.
Although the Twenty-sixth Amendment failed to become the springboard for
political transformation as its devotees predicted, it registered significant legal
impact. The amendment clarified age eighteen as the formal commencement of
adulthood. Throughout the 1970s, state governments responded by recalibrating
their ages of majority at eighteen to correlate with the federal standard. Like the
Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments, the Twenty-sixth did not shake the
fundamentals of social stratification, redefine social relationships, or improve social
rank for the newly enfranchised. Nevertheless, the clear public acknowledgement
of adolescents as persons equally capable to give consent as adults certainly revised
their legal identity and condition. The Twenty-sixth Amendment indirectly granted
to teenagers a degree of legal self-determination unknown to previous generations
of adolescents. It also unambiguously guaranteed to persons at least eighteen
years-of-age the rights and privileges of citizenship free from competency-based
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assessments. Resetting the legal threshold of adulthood from 21 to 18 spawned a
reconsideration of whether persons in their mid-teens could be considered mature
enough to make autonomous decisions – a notion that has informed recent attempts
to extend suffrage downward to 16- and 15-year-olds in Great Britain, Australia,
and several municipalities in the United States. Such efforts signify that
adolescence is no longer viewed as a period of crisis that threatens social order or
adult-centric age norms. That adolescence can be wholly defined by the “storms
and stresses” of the biological changes related to sexual maturation seems quaint.
Whether contemporary teenagers should be assigned their sociopolitical status
based on ascription or ability remains a civic question because of the Twenty-sixth
Amendment.
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